

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1368612-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 252

Page 5 ~ Duplicate - to File #163G-LO-14031 / pages 3-7 (ser. 1);  
Page 6 ~ b6; b7C;  
Page 7 ~ Duplicate - to File #163G-LO-14031 / pages 3-7 (ser. 1);  
Page 8 ~ Duplicate - to File #163G-LO-14031 / pages 3-7 (ser. 1);  
Page 9 ~ Duplicate - to File #163G-LO-14031 / pages 3-7 (ser. 1);  
Page 10 ~ Duplicate - to File #163G-LO-14031 / pages 3-7 (ser. 1);  
Page 11 ~ b1;  
Page 12 ~ b1;  
Page 13 ~ b1;  
Page 14 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 20 ~ b1;  
Page 21 ~ b1;  
Page 22 ~ b1;  
Page 31 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 32 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 33 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 34 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 35 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 36 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 37 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 38 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 39 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 40 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 41 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 43 ~ b1; b6; b7C;  
Page 61 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 62 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 63 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 64 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 65 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 66 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 67 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 68 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 69 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 70 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 71 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 72 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 73 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 74 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 82 ~ Duplicate - to pages 52-55 (ser. 11);  
Page 83 ~ Duplicate - to pages 52-55 (ser. 11);  
Page 84 ~ Duplicate - to pages 52-55 (ser. 11);  
Page 85 ~ Duplicate - to pages 52-55 (ser. 11);  
Page 90 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 91 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 92 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 93 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 94 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;

Page 95 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 96 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 97 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 98 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 99 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 100 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 101 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 102 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 103 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 104 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 105 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 106 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 107 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 108 ~ b2; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 114 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 115 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 124 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 125 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 126 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 127 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 151 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 152 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 153 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 154 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 155 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 156 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 157 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 158 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 159 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 164 ~ b1;  
Page 167 ~ Duplicate - to serial 2 in "email" section of WF File;  
Page 208 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 209 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 210 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 212 ~ b1;  
Page 213 ~ b1;  
Page 214 ~ b1;  
Page 215 ~ b1;  
Page 219 ~ b1;  
Page 220 ~ b1;  
Page 221 ~ b1;  
Page 239 ~ b1; b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 240 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 241 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 242 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 243 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 244 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 245 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 246 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 247 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 248 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 249 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 250 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 252 ~ b1; b6; b7C; b7D;

Page 253 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 254 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 255 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 256 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 257 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 258 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 259 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 260 ~ b1;  
Page 261 ~ b1;  
Page 262 ~ b1;  
Page 263 ~ b1;  
Page 264 ~ b1;  
Page 265 ~ b1;  
Page 266 ~ b1;  
Page 267 ~ b1;  
Page 268 ~ b1;  
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Page 271 ~ b1;  
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Page 281 ~ b1;  
Page 282 ~ b1;  
Page 283 ~ b1;  
Page 284 ~ b1;  
Page 285 ~ b1;  
Page 286 ~ b1;  
Page 287 ~ b1;  
Page 288 ~ b1;  
Page 289 ~ b1;  
Page 290 ~ b1;  
Page 291 ~ b1;  
Page 292 ~ b1;  
Page 293 ~ b1;  
Page 294 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 295 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 296 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 297 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 298 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 299 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 300 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 305 ~ Duplicate - to serial 32 in "News" section of WF File;  
Page 306 ~ Duplicate - to serial 32 in "News" section of WF File;  
Page 308 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 309 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 310 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 311 ~ Duplicate - to pages 31-41 (ser. 7);

Page 312 ~ Duplicate - to pages 31-41 (ser. 7);  
Page 313 ~ Duplicate - to pages 31-41 (ser. 7);  
Page 314 ~ Duplicate - to pages 31-41 (ser. 7);  
Page 315 ~ Duplicate - to pages 31-41 (ser. 7);  
Page 316 ~ Duplicate - to pages 31-41 (ser. 7);  
Page 317 ~ Duplicate - to pages 31-41 (ser. 7);  
Page 318 ~ Duplicate - to pages 31-41 (ser. 7);  
Page 319 ~ Duplicate - to pages 31-41 (ser. 7);  
Page 320 ~ Duplicate - to pages 31-41 (ser. 7);  
Page 321 ~ Duplicate - to pages 31-41 (ser. 7);  
Page 322 ~ Duplicate - to pages 61-69 (ser. 12);  
Page 323 ~ Duplicate - to pages 61-69 (ser. 12);  
Page 324 ~ Duplicate - to pages 61-69 (ser. 12);  
Page 325 ~ Duplicate - to pages 61-69 (ser. 12);  
Page 326 ~ Duplicate - to pages 61-69 (ser. 12);  
Page 327 ~ Duplicate - to pages 61-69 (ser. 12);  
Page 328 ~ Duplicate - to pages 61-69 (ser. 12);  
Page 329 ~ Duplicate - to pages 61-69 (ser. 12);  
Page 330 ~ Duplicate - to pages 61-69 (ser. 12);  
Page 366 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 367 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 368 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 369 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 370 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 371 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 372 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 373 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 374 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 375 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 376 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 377 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 378 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 380 ~ b1; b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 381 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 382 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 383 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 384 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 385 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 386 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 387 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 389 ~ Duplicate - to serial 29 in File #163G-LO-14031;  
Page 390 ~ Duplicate - to serial 29 in File #163G-LO-14031;  
Page 391 ~ Duplicate - to serial 29 in File #263G-LO-14031;  
Page 392 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 393 ~ Duplicate - to File #163G-LO-14031 / pages 87-91 (ser. 29);  
Page 394 ~ Duplicate - to File #163G-LO-14031 / pages 87-91 (ser. 29);  
Page 395 ~ Duplicate - to File #163G-LO-14031 / pages 87-91 (ser. 29);  
Page 396 ~ Duplicate - to File #163G-LO-14031 / pages 87-91 (ser. 29);  
Page 397 ~ Duplicate - to File #163G-LO-14031 / pages 87-91 (ser. 29);  
Page 401 ~ b1; b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 402 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 403 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 404 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 405 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;



Page 406 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 407 ~ b1;  
Page 408 ~ b1;  
Page 409 ~ b1;  
Page 410 ~ b1;  
Page 411 ~ b1; b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 413 ~ b7D;  
Page 419 ~ b1; b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 420 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 421 ~ b7D;  
Page 422 ~ b1;  
Page 423 ~ b1;  
Page 424 ~ b1;  
Page 425 ~ b1;  
Page 430 ~ b1; b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 431 ~ b7D;  
Page 438 ~ b1; b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 439 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 440 ~ b1; b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 441 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 445 ~ b1; b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 446 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 447 ~ b7D;  
Page 452 ~ Duplicate - to 163G-LO-14031 / pgs. 92-95 (ser. 31);  
Page 453 ~ Duplicate - to 163G-LO-14031 / pgs. 92-95 (ser. 31);  
Page 454 ~ Duplicate - to 163G-LO-14031 / pgs. 92-95 (ser. 31);  
Page 455 ~ Duplicate - to 163G-LO-14031 / pgs. 92-95 (ser. 31);  
Page 456 ~ b1; b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 457 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 458 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 459 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 460 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 461 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 462 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 463 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 464 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 465 ~ b7D;  
Page 466 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 471 ~ b1; b6; b7C; b7D;  
Page 480 ~ Duplicate - to page 43 (ser. 9);  
Page 482 ~ Duplicate - to serial 6 in "email" section of WF File;  
Page 483 ~ Duplicate - to serial 6 in "email" section of WF File;

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/30/2006

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field  
CI-5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

plp

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] (Pending) ✓

Title: (S) ALEXANDER LITVINENKO;  
A/K/A/ EDMOND CARTER

(S)

Synopsis: (U) (S) Open captioned matter.

b1

(S) (U)

~~Derived From : G-3~~  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) (U)

(U) Details: (S) CI-5 requests that the above captioned matter be opened in order to investigate the death of ALEXANDER LITVINENKO, a former Russian intelligence officer, who died on 11/23/2006 in Britain.

♦♦

12/1/2006

b6  
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
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(S)

60322  
UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

(Title) Alexander LITVINEN

(5)

(File No.)

b1

Item	Date Filed	To be returned		Disposition
		Yes	No	
1A1	12/11/06		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	original notes re interview of [redacted] [redacted]
See 1A folder				

b6

-b7C

b7D




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DATE 07-09-2010 BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN

Italian security consultant Mario Scaramella poses for the camera in this file photo taken in June 2006, in a Naples hotel. Scaramella was one of the last known contacts of former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko who died from polonium-210 poisoning, and was himself admitted to hospital in London, December 1, 2006 having also tested positive for the radioactive poison. Photograph: Salvatore Laporta/Getty Images


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## 'Italian who dined with the former KGB spy may yet share his fate'

STEPHEN MCGINTY

HE IS an enigma. An Italian academic at a university that refuses to confirm his status. A suspected gun runner. A victim of the Russian state or an secret extension of its iron fist? Questions swirled around the smartly dressed figure of Mario Scaramella last night as it was revealed he was carrying traces of polonium 210 in a "significant" quantity.

The Italian who dined with Alexander Litvinenko on the day the former KGB spy fell ill with radioactive poisoning was taken to University College Hospital London yesterday. Last night doctors confirmed he had been contaminated, though with far less of the substance than the dead Russian.



Consultant Keith Patterson said: "Tests have detected polonium 210 in Mr Scaramella's body but at a considerably lower level than Mr Litvinenko. He is currently well and shows no symptoms of radiation poisoning. He is receiving further tests over the weekend."

The revelation that Mr Scaramella's body contained a level which, experts said, was far above that expected on those exposed by social contact with Mr Litvinenko, indicates that he could have been a target of a second political assassination - "My son has been poisoned," claimed his father, Amedeo Scaramella, from Naples, last night.

But the difference in dosages between the two men may be a sign the academic was involved in a poisoning attempt in some other unexplained way.

What has become clear is that Winston Churchill's famous description of Russia as "a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma" could equally well describe Mr Scaramella.

When Mr Litvinenko became ill, Mr Scaramella came forward to explain how he had met the former KGB officer at the Itsu sushi bar in London to discuss a hit-list of Russian critics, mentioning Mr Litvinenko. They had first met when Mr Scaramella brought Mr Litvinenko to Italy in 2004 to testify to the Mitrokhin Commission, set up in 2001 to investigate KGB activities in Italy during and after the Cold War.

Mr Scaramella later told Italian authorities that Mr Litvinenko told him of an arms shipment coming to Italy, to be used in assassination attempts against him and Senator Paolo Guzzanti, who was chairing the commission.

Yesterday the Italian newspaper La Repubblica claimed the academic was under investigation for smuggling weapons between the former Soviet Union and Italy. It detailed how police in his home town, Naples, had been looking into the consulting work Mr Scaramella had carried out with Mr Guzzanti while working on the Mitrokhin Commission.

The newspaper alleged that police became suspicious as Mr Scaramella was said to have "detailed information", down to the route of the truck carrying the weapons.

It claimed police intercepted conversations with Mr Litvinenko discussing arms shipments from the former Soviet Union. They also intercepted conversations with another Russian secret service defector Euvgenij Limarev - the source of the e-mail hit-list shown to Mr Litvinenko.

La Repubblica claimed that magistrates asked Italian intelligence whether Mr Scaramella was working for them and were told he was not - though they could not be sure he was not working for another department. The article quoted sources who believed Mr Scaramella and his organisation, the Environmental Crime Prevention Programme, were CIA funded.

Mr Scaramella's lawyer says he has been told of no investigation and that he is happy to co-operate with magistrates.

What is known is that information on Mr Scaramella is difficult to come by. When Naples University - where he has been said to be based - has refused to say whether he works there.

In a 2004 interview with La Repubblica, he said he was a security expert trained in England, France and Belgium, was 36 and had two children.

He also said he had held a post at San Jose University in the United States and had been recruited by the CIA to go to Colombia to research links between Russian spies and drug trafficking.

On 13 March, 2004, while he was a consultant for the inquiry into alleged links between the KGB and the leftist Italian militants the Red Brigades, he was caught in gunfire between police and Mafia.

Information about the Environmental Crime Prevention Programme, which Mr Scaramella is said to head, is also scarce.

Nick Pisa, the first British journalist to interview Mr Scaramella following the Litvinenko poisoning, said: "The one thing I could not shake from my mind was how he spoke English with a slight Russian accent - being of southern Italian background myself I can recognise a Neapolitan accent and Professor Scaramella had no trace of one when he spoke English.

"His mannerisms were not like those of a typical southern Italian - there was very little hand waving and excitable chatter.

"Two days later, he held his now infamous press conference in Rome where he shattered illusions of James Bond style espionage by revealing he had eaten at Pizza Hut before

meeting Litvinenko. Again this to me seemed strange - a true Neapolitan would never dream of having pizza anywhere but Naples, let alone set foot in Pizza Hut.

There are lots of things that just don't add up.

It crossed my mind he may be a fantasist who likes to talk the talk, but now I'm not so sure. My firm belief is that he is a spy, but who for, exactly, is the question."

Yet a bright light was shone on the relationship between Mr Scaramella and Mr Litvinenko, who was quoted in a previously unpublished interview as saying that he believed the professor threatened to have his brother evicted from Italy in order to secure his testimony before the commission.

He described how Mr Scaramella had paid for his flight and hotel expenses to give evidence.

Mr Litvinenko said: "We arranged that I would come to Italy in February 2004. Then around that time something unexplainable happened. I have a brother called Maxim who has lived in Italy for four years. A month before I was due to arrive Maxim called me in a desperate state.

"The police no longer recognised his education visa and were going to expel him and send him back to Russia, which meant certain death. I asked Mario for help. He said not to worry and that [prime minister Silvio] Berlusconi had taken a personal interest in my information and that it would be sorted out and Maxim had nothing to worry about.

"I gave the commission all the help they wanted and Maxim was given political asylum. Maxim told me Mario had gone to the police station in Rimini and spoken to the police. I'm certain the whole thing was done to convince me to co-operate."

Now it is Mr Scaramella who is co-operating with Scotland Yard, which, according to a close friend of the professor, is housing him in a castle. Mr Scaramella is said to have commented: "They are treating me like the Prince of Wales."

They are also treating him like a potential key to the case. The question many people will be asking is whether he is a victim or a possible perpetrator.

#### **Tests show traces of radiation on Litvinenko's wife**

THE wife of ex-Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko has tested positive for traces of polonium-210 following the former intelligence officer's death, friends and officials said yesterday.

Marina Litvinenko had shown no ill effects after she was confirmed as having shown traces of the radioactive substance, the former spy's friend, Alex Goldfarb, said.

"She is very slightly contaminated," Mr Goldfarb said. "There are no dangerous levels, no treatment, no hospitalisation."

Pat Troop, chief executive of the Britain's Health Protection Agency, said earlier that the member of the family who had tested positively - who had not yet been named as his wife - had been exposed to a "very small" long-term health risk

"This adult family member received a tiny fraction of the lethal dose received by Mr Litvinenko himself," Ms Troop said.

Mr Litvinenko's wife and his father, Walter, kept a vigil at his hospital bedside in the days before he died.

So far 2,655 people have contacted NHS Direct fearing that they may have been in contact with the substance. A total of 356 have been asked to provide a urine sample for analysis.

But this figure could rise further as police trace Mario Scaramella's movements in the UK - revealing more sites that would have to be examined by scientists for alpha radiation.

Meanwhile, the post-mortem examination on Mr Litvinenko was completed yesterday at the Royal London Hospital. Those present wore protective clothing to avoid contamination.

#### **Related topic**

- [Alexander Litvinenko](http://news.scotsman.com/topics.cfm?tid=1528)  
<http://news.scotsman.com/topics.cfm?tid=1528>

**This article:** <http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/uk.cfm?id=1787322006>

**Last updated:** 02-Dec-06 01:16 GMT





U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

DATE: 12/05/06

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 07-09-2010 BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN

NAME: [REDACTED]

ADDRESS [REDACTED]

TELEPHONE: WORK [REDACTED]

HOME [REDACTED]

DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [REDACTED]

DRIVER'S LICENSE NUMBER: [REDACTED]

HAVE YOU FILED A COMPLAINT WITH THE F.B.I. IN THE PAST? YES ☒ NO

IF YES, APPROXIMATE DATE(S) \_\_\_\_\_

NATURE FOR VISIT/COMPLAINT: INFORMATION ON

[REDACTED]

66-C

DUTY AGENT [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/04/2006

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

CI-5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

plpp

Case ID #:

(S)

[REDACTED]

(Pending)

(S)

[REDACTED]

(Pending)

[REDACTED]

Title:

(S)

ALEXANDER LITVINENKO;

A/K/A EDMOND CARTER

[REDACTED]

b1

Synopsis:

(S)

Meeting with [REDACTED]

on

11/29/2006.

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

Reference:

(S)

163G-LO-14031 Serial 1

Details:

(S)

At approximately 9:30 AM on 11/29/2006, SA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7D

At this initial meeting the following was discussed:

[REDACTED] would need a ride to the meeting  
with [REDACTED] agreed to take them to the meeting and  
[REDACTED] They informed [REDACTED] that

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

b1

PP06 338 J.ec  
12/7/2006  
JN

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
(S) Re: (S) [redacted] 12/04/2006

b1

(U) (S) [redacted] informed [redacted] that she had met with [redacted] Upon a short briefing by [redacted] of the subject matter to be discussed with [redacted] [redacted] offered that there appeared to be no deviation from [redacted] story told to her on 11/27/2006. [redacted] requested a copy of [redacted] write up from her meeting with [redacted] [redacted] explained that it would take some time for that to be approved by FBI Headquarters. [redacted] appeared to understand completely.

(U) (S) [redacted] explained they wanted to meet with [redacted]  
[redacted]  
It is the understanding of this writer that [redacted] is the [redacted]  
[redacted] This contradicts page 3 of 163G-LO-14031 Serial 1 which states that [redacted]  
[redacted]

(U) (S) [redacted] had just learned via the television that YEGOR GAIDAR, former acting Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, had fallen ill possibly from poisoning.

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b7C  
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(U) (S) [redacted] contemplated taping the meeting. Due to some technical problems with their tape recorder, they decided against taping the session. (Note: [redacted]  
[redacted])

(U) (S) [redacted] explained to [redacted] that they would be asking [redacted] if he would agree to make a statement which is far more serious than an interview. As interpreted by this agent, a "statement" would be [redacted]  
[redacted] Further, by making a statement, [redacted] would be opening up himself to becoming a witness if this matter would make it to prosecution.

(U) (S) [redacted] informed the [redacted] had informed her on [redacted] that he did not believe that his name was in the public domain regarding this matter. He further relayed that he believed ALEXANDER LITIVINENKO had [redacted]  
[redacted] contradicted [redacted] belief by stating that they had information that [redacted]  
[redacted] (Note: Upon a quick

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 12/04/2006

b1

Internet check, [redacted] did not see that the [redacted] had published anything revealing [redacted] name prior to the date of this interview.)

(U)

~~(S)~~ Subsequent to the interview with [redacted] which was completed at approximately 2:30 PM, [redacted] made comments about their impression of [redacted] They presumed that he was a

[redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~ [redacted] also questioned [redacted] response to them regarding any [redacted]

[redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~ While at [redacted]

[redacted]

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(U)

~~(S)~~ Subsequent to the interview, [redacted] drove [redacted]

[redacted] This mission was successful. They then treated [redacted] to a late lunch/early dinner at Maggioano's in [redacted] then delivered [redacted]

[redacted]

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

~~SECRET~~

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 4:27 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) Assessment Re Polonium-210 Incident

SENSITIVE BUT ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
NON-RECORD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CTD) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 8:47 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) Assessment Re Polonium-210 Incident

SENSITIVE BUT ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
NON-RECORD

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In regards to the assumptions made by LLNL as to who may have perpetrated this act, WMDOU cautions readers of the report to consider LLNL does not have the same level of access to information as LEGAT London, or [redacted] This LLNL Assessment and the EC from LEGAT London setting their immediate leads have subsequently been submitted the the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit for any comments they deem necessary.

SSA [redacted]  
FBI Headquarters  
Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit  
Room [redacted]  
Office: [redacted]  
Pager: [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CTD) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 7:46 AM  
To: [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) Assessment Re Polonium-210 Incident

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b1

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[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 4:21 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: Polonium 210 request for assistance

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SENSITIVE BUT ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
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DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CTD) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 2:53 PM  
To: [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted]

60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

Subject: RE: Polonium 210 request for assistance

SENSITIVE BUT ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
NON-RECORD

[redacted]:

In discussion with our Laboratory Division's Chemical Biological Sciences Unit (CBSU), we would like to at least indicate to the [redacted] that we have additional technical capabilities that will be able to [redacted] if they so desire.

We (the Bureau in coordination with other cognizant USG National Laboratories and supporting interagency infrastructure) have capabilities to [redacted]

[redacted] That, in conjunction with other investigative information, may lead to the identification of possible perpetrator(s).

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I don't want to overstate our capabilities and do not want to speak for the Laboratory Division who are the subject matter experts, but it was felt that we wanted [redacted] to know that we are there to support them in whatever capacity they desire.

Let me know how you want to proceed and I can get you the most appropriate POCs in the Lab to help to further coordinate these issues.

FYI, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) is providing a more formal assessment in regard to this matter. I will provide a copy when completed. I believe their estimated completion time will be COB today. They coordinate these assessments through Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, CA, so COB for them is Pacific Standard Time. Hopefully I should have the assessment on my E-mail when I get in the office tomorrow.

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]  
ALAT London

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, November 27, 2006 7:31 PM  
To: [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Assistance to [redacted] re Litvinenko murder investigation [redacted]

SENSITIVE BUT ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
RECORD 163G-LO-14031

SA [redacted] will be the point of contact. Her number is [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, November 27, 2006 12:20 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: Request for Assistance to [redacted] re Litvinenko murder investigation [redacted]

b6  
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SENSITIVE BUT ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
RECORD 163G-LO-14031

Please see that attached and provide a Point of Contact for [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] Additional bio info and contact numbers will be available in the future. I appreciate your help with this request.

Thanks again for your quick help on this one,

[redacted]  
ALAT London

SENSITIVE BUT ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

SENSITIVE BUT ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

SENSITIVE BUT ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

SENSITIVE BUT ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

SENSITIVE BUT ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 4:20 PM  
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) Assessment Re Polonium-210 Incident



Open (CY 2006 V7)  
Bulletin 10...

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DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 7:46 AM  
To: [REDACTED] (LO) (FBI)  
Cc: [REDACTED]

60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

Subject: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) Assessment Re Polonium-210 Incident

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See attached DHS NAP Assessment regarding this matter

[REDACTED]

SENSITIVE BUT ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

SENSITIVE BUT ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

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~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (SF) (FBI)  
Sent: Thursday, December 07, 2006 2:44 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: Litvinenko

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DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

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(S) SECRET  
RECORD [redacted]

[redacted]  
I saw in ACS that you have the MLAT request from London for the Litvinenko "issue". We received a complaint on Tuesday from a [redacted] who had had some dealings with [redacted] with Litvinenko shortly before Litvinenko fell ill. The complaint is pretty detailed and also indicates that there is a [redacted] who had more significant dealings with [redacted]

(S) I would like to have the FD-71 uploaded and we should probably interview this [redacted] as well. Who knows, he [redacted] for this case. Anyway, Is your [redacted] file the appropriate place to upload the FD-71 and follow up interview, or is there a criminal case that would be more appropriate.

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~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

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b1

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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b7C

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 11/29/2006

To: Legat London

Attn: ALAT [REDACTED]

Baltimore  
Counterintelligence

Laboratory  
International Operations

Legat Rome  
Washington Field Office

ALAT [REDACTED]  
ALAT [REDACTED]  
FCI Squad SSA  
Eurasian Section,  
Section Chief James Casey  
HMRU, A/UC [REDACTED]  
Europe Section, SSA [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
Legal Attache  
CI-6, SSA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

From: WMD Directorate  
Investigation and Operations Section/WMD Operations  
Unit (WMDOU)  
Contact: IA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

Drafted By: [REDACTED] jmf

60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

Case ID #: 279A-HQ-C1432764-LO (Pending)  
163G-LO-14031 (Pending)

Reference: 163G-LO-14031, serial 1

Title: [REDACTED]

MURDER INVESTIGATION;  
VICTIM - ALEXANDER LITVINENKO  
[REDACTED]

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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Synopsis: To provide Legal Attache (Legat) London with  
requested assistance regarding [REDACTED] and  
Polonium 210.

Details: THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS LAW ENFORCEMENT  
SENSITIVE AND IS THE BASIS FOR AN ON-GOING CRIMINAL  
INVESTIGATION. IT MAY NOT BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED WITHOUT THE  
PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b1

*Read + Clear*

(S)

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In accordance with the request of LEGAT London,  
WMDOU is providing the following information:

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
LABORATORY DIVISION  
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RESPONSE UNIT  
Science Operations Program  
11/27/2006**

Polonium

Background

Polonium (Po) is considered a metalloid and has 28 isotopes and 7 isomers, all of which are radioactive. The predominant isotope, Po-210, has an atomic weight of 210 g/mol, an atomic number of 84 and a physical half-life of about 138 days. Polonium-210 is considered a rare naturally-occurring radioactive isotope (i.e. it is naturally found at low levels in soil, water and food). It is a progeny (i.e., a decay product) of natural uranium, specifically uranium-238.

Polonium was first discovered by Pierre and Marie Curie in 1897 while they were investigating the radioactivity in Uraninite (commonly called "pitchblende"). The Curies discovered that after separating out the Radium and Uranium, the remaining material was more radioactive than both of them combined due to the Polonium. Originally Polonium-210 was known as "Radium F". Historically, the Curies named the decay products of Radium in this manner (Radium A, B, etc.).

Chemical and Physical Properties of Po-210

Physical Half-life	138.4 Days
Source	Naturally occurring from the U-238 decay chain
Melting point	254° C
Boiling point	962° C
Density	9.2 g/cm <sup>3</sup>
Principal mode of decay	$\alpha$ :5.30 MeV (99.9%)
Direct Progeny	Lead-206 (Pb-206) [Stable]



Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material

Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM) is a group of radioactive isotopes that exist naturally (non-anthropogenic) in various matrices. The isotope Po-210 is a late product of the decay chain from Uranium-238. This decay chain also includes Radium-226 and the well known Radon decay products. Polonium-210 is widely distributed in minute amounts in the earth's crust. Uranium ores typically contain less than 0.1 mg Polonium-210 per ton.

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Due to its scarcity, Po-210 is difficult to obtain from natural sources and therefore is produced in milligram quantities artificially in nuclear reactors by bombarding Bi-209 with neutrons according to the following reactions:



### Polonium in Industry

Polonium-210 is used in industry as a static eliminator to dissipate static electricity in machinery. The alpha particles from the Po-210 ionize the adjacent air and neutralize the static electricity. The Po-210 is generally electroplated onto a foil and inserted into a holding device.

In addition, Polonium-210 can be combined with [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Open source information attributes this so-called [redacted] source with providing [redacted] needed to initiate the nuclear chain reaction in the first generation of nuclear weapons.

Polonium-210 was also evaluated for use in thermoelectric generators and was used to power the first communications satellite. It was abandoned in favor of isotopes which had longer half-lives (Pu-238) or those that emitted beta particles (Sr-90).

### Hazards Associated With Polonium Isotopes

Polonium-210 is a pure alpha particle emitter and has a biological half-life of 50 days (i.e., the time required for the body to eliminate half of the material taken in by natural biological means). The longest effective half-life (i.e., the time required for a radionuclide contained in a biological system, to reduce its activity by half as a combined result of radioactive decay and biological elimination) for Po-210 is reported to be about 46 days in the kidney. The critical target organs for Po-210 are considered to be the spleen and kidneys.

Because Po-210 has such a high linear energy transfer, all of the energy in the 5.3 MeV alpha decay particle is transferred to the target cell. Polonium-210 is a naturally occurring radioactive decay product of the uranium-238 decay series and, as such, can enter the food chain, along with

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other uranium decay series isotopes. The estimated average daily dietary intake of Po-210 from food and fluids is about 1 picogram, and the average amount of Po-210 in the body is about 0.24 micrograms (with approximately 60% of the total amount present in the mineralized bone). Cigarettes have been found to contain in excess of 0.5 pCi of Po-210 per cigarette which has led to the hypothesis that it may be the primary culprit in the onset of lung cancer. Patients who have unexplained elevated Po-210 in urine specimens are usually asked about their smoking habits as this could be a cause for the elevated readings. Grazing animals in the Arctic have shown concentrations as high as 1000 pCi/kg of body weight, and Po-210 can be found in a variety of marine organisms.

The use of Po-210 in industry has produced several accidents involving internal exposures (e.g., rupture of polonium-beryllium sources, contamination from static eliminators, and improper handling of sealed sources). Urine and fecal bioassays are required for proper monitoring of internal exposures.

Since polonium follows a similar chemistry as selenium and bismuth, dimercaprol is often suggested as a possible treatment for Po-210 intakes. Dimercaprol forms stable chelates with mercury, lead, arsenic, gold, bismuth, chromium, and nickel. Dimercaprol is itself toxic, so the hazards of its use need to be carefully balanced against any benefits it may have in accelerating excretion and preventing tissue uptake. It has been reported in the literature that Russian investigators have reported some success with the use of dimercaprol derivatives in animal experiments.

For occupational exposures, limits have been established regarding intake of Po-210. The annual limit of intake (ALI) and the derived air concentration (DAC) that will result in a dose of 5 rem for occupational workers is listed below:

Isotope	Inhalation ALI (mCi)	Inhalation DAC (mCi/ml)	Ingestion ALI (mCi)
Po-210 (W class, oxides, hydroxides and nitrates)	0.6	3E-10	3.0 (all forms)
Po-210 (D class, all other forms)	0.6	3E-10	
Gut Uptake fraction for Po-210			0.1 (all forms)

#### Some Additional Dosimetric Considerations

- 1 microCurie (1mCi) inhalation of a Class D Po-210 compound will give a dose of 9.3 rem
- 1 mCi inhalation of a Class W Po-210 compound will give a dose of 8.6 rem.
- 1 mCi ingestion of Po-210 will give a dose of 2 rem.

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The following table chronicles the sub lethal and the lethal range for acute radiation syndrome:

Phase of Syndrome	Feature	Sub lethal Range	Lethal Range
Prodromal Phase	Nausea, vomiting		
	Time of onset		
	Duration		
	Lymphocyte count		
	CNS function		
Latent Phase (Subclinical)	Absence of symptoms		
Acute Radiation Illness or "Manifest illness" phase	Signs and symptoms		
	Time of onset		
	Critical period		
	Organ system		
Hospitalization	% duration		
Mortality			

b7F

#### NRC Regulations

The quantity of Po-210 material exempted from NRC licensing is <0.1 uCi (10 CFR 20 Appendix C).

#### **\*\*END OF ASSESSMENT\*\***

The FBI WMD Directorate (WMDD), WMD Operations Unit (WMDOU) coordinates the FBI's response to WMD/CBRN threats and/or incidents throughout the United States. WMDOU regularly provides WMD/CBRN-related threat and credibility assessments to all FBI entities and other law

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enforcement/intelligence agencies. In addition to US agencies, WMDOU has also assisted the international law enforcement/intelligence community, to include [redacted] WMDOU maintains the capability to coordinate with agencies throughout the US government and to analyze/evaluate intelligence information from not only a criminal stand-point but also on a scientific, technical, and behavioral level.

LEGAT London's request for a specific subject matter expert on Polonium was considered too broad, as the nature of the specific request will determine the entity contacted. WMDOU possesses the contacts needed to properly evaluate and analyze information as required by [redacted] whether it involves physiological effects, forensic examination, or evidence recovery. It is requested LEGAT London provide WMDOU with a specific request and the appropriate assistance will be immediately obtained. WMDOU maintains a 24/7 response capability via both the Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) and the WMDOU Duty Agent. The WMDOU duty agent can be paged via contacting SIOC at [redacted] after 5:30pm eastern standard time.

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FBI ACS checks for polonium failed to show any previous cases where it was used as a poison. There are a limited number of references that individuals were attempting to obtain working knowledge of polonium.

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LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

LEGAT LONDON

LONDON, ENGLAND

Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

LABORATORY

AT QUANTICO, VA

For the Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU),  
read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

BALTIMORE

AT BALTIMORE, MD

For Baltimore Field Division FCI Squad SSA, read and  
clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

For Eurasian Section, read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT WASHINGTON, DC

For Europe Section, read and clear.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Set Lead 6: (Info)

LEGAT ROME

AT ROME, ITALY

Read and clear.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, DC

For CI-6, read and clear.

♦♦

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/08/2006

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: CD-1B, Room [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

CD-7B, Room [redacted]

IA [redacted]

Washington Field

Attn: Squad CI-5

SA [redacted]

From: San Francisco

Squad 16H / San Jose RA

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

DCP/DA

Drafted By: [redacted]

:aas

Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

11 (Pending)

Title: (S) [redacted]

LITVINENKO, ALEXANDER

ALEXANDER LITVINENKO

Synopsis: (S) Documents contact with [redacted]  
and his [redacted]

~~Derived From: G-3~~  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

Reference: (S) [redacted]

Details: (S) On [redacted] walked into the San Jose Resident Agency and provided information pertaining to the captioned investigation. The FD-71 documenting this information was uploaded as [redacted] of the captioned investigation. In essence, [redacted] advised that [redacted]

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(S) [redacted]

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b7C  
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b7D

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 12/08/2006

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[redacted] advised that his contact with [redacted]  
[redacted] but that he had recently become aware that  
[redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ On 12/06/2006 writing agent established telephonic contact with [redacted] was aware of the subject of the FBI's interest without writing Agent mentioning Aleksandr LITVINENKO's name. Although [redacted] first question related to whether he was considered a target of the FBI's investigation, he offered his assurances that he wanted to cooperate with the FBI. Writing Agent advised [redacted] that he was not the target of an FBI investigation. During the course of this telephone conversation, [redacted] advised that he had spoken with [redacted] regarding this matter.

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] described [redacted] as a [redacted] [redacted] and an as individual who was "involved in this investigation". [redacted] initially stated that he wanted [redacted] with the FBI and that [redacted] Writing Agent informed [redacted] that while he was entitled to have an attorney present during his interview, that there was some measure of urgency to this matter and that it would be better if the interview occurred sooner rather than later. [redacted] then agreed to be interviewed on [redacted] if [redacted] could be present via conference call for the first portion of the interview. Writing agent agreed to this stipulation and advised that after the initial portion of the interview [redacted] could, if he wanted to, suspend the interview until [redacted] could be physically present.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ At [redacted] suggestion, following the telephone conversation writing Agent contacted [redacted] telephonically. [redacted] advised that while [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] pertaining to [redacted] LITVINENKO, and the FBI's interest in interviewing him. [redacted] advised that [redacted] had contacted him regarding the FBI's interest in conducting an interview and that he had advised [redacted] to be interviewed by the FBI. [redacted] characterized [redacted] concern at being a target of an FBI investigation as a lack of

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To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 12/08/2006

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familiarity with federal law enforcement and nervousness at being contacted by the FBI. [redacted] stated that he would be available to spend a few minutes on [redacted] on a conference call preceding the FBI's interview of [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] is currently the [redacted]

[redacted] and that he is a [redacted]

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(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] advised that he had worked on matters related to LITVINENKO and has conducted an internal investigation. [redacted] expressed some surprise that it had taken the FBI as long as it had to get in touch with him and advised that he would be "happy to talk directly" with the FBI. [redacted] currently lives in [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 12/08/2006

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(S)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information only.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information only.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

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[REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, December 04, 2006 4:02 PM  
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: Additional Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) Assessments Re Polonium-210 Incident

DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

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b7C



Open (CY 2006 V7) Bulletin 11...



Open (CY 2006 V7) Bulletin 12...



Location and Identification of...

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

NON-RECORD

60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, December 04, 2006 2:54 PM  
To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI)  
Subject: Additional Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) Assessments Re Polonium-210 Incident

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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See attached additional DHS NAP Assessments regarding this matter

My apologies if you have already been provided these assessments through other channels.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

b1

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

(S)

[REDACTED]

1  
~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

RP

b6  
b7C

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

~~SECRET~~

U.S. Department of Justice



Federal Bureau of Investigation

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Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

December 07, 2006

(S)

~~(S)~~

\* Include any caveats required by the contents of this document, such as a FISA caveat, Grand Jury statement, etc. \*

(S)

(U)

~~(S)~~

USPER \_\_\_ Presumed USPER \_\_\_ Non-USPER X

(S)

~~(S)~~

If group, # of USPER group members: \_\_\_

(Note: A separate investigation should be opened on each member of a Group under investigation, as well as on the Group itself.)

(U)

~~(S)~~

Subject(s) Name: ALEXANDER LITVINENKO

(S)

~~(S)~~

~~(U)~~

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pp063417.1hm

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT NAME

CATEGORY OF INVESTIGATION (E.G. IT - AL QAEDA)

(S)

[Redacted]

In addition, provide a narrative below that identifies the grounds for the investigation, including the information or allegation (for a PI) or the specific and articulable facts (for an FI) forming the basis of the investigation, per AGG/NSI Parts II.C.1.a and II.D.1.

b1

~~(S)~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Please provide a narrative below addressing any sensitive circumstances noted.

This case is opened to investigate the death of ALEXANDER LITIVINENKO, [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~

~~Derived From : G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/07/2006

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

CD1B

Room [REDACTED]

From: Washington Field

CI-5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(S)

plp

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

(S)

(Pending)

DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

Title:

(S)

ALEXANDER LITVINENKO;

A/K/A EDMOND CARTER

(S)

(S)

Synopsis:

(S)

Notice of Initiation of [REDACTED]

(U)

(S)

~~Derived From: G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S)

(S)

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Details: (U)(S) Enclosed is an LHM providing the Department of Justice with information regarding the initiation of the above captioned matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

pp063418.ec

~~SECRET~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: Washington Field  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 12/07/2006

b1

~~(S)~~

LEAD (s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Disseminate enclosed LHM to DOJ.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Sent: Saturday, December 09, 2006 4:13 AM  
To: [redacted] (SF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Ltivenenko

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

Please include [redacted] as he is now assisting with this investigation.  
Thanks [redacted]

[redacted]  
ALAT London  
[redacted]

DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

b6  
b7C

From: [redacted] (SF) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, December 08, 2006 10:23 PM  
To: [redacted] (LO) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: Ltivenenko

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

[redacted] I made contact with [redacted] who has had an ongoing relationship with [redacted]

Two things of interest in this conversation:

1) The first thing he asked was whether he was the subject of the investigation.

2) he wanted his lawyer present during the interview (no surprise), [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

I told him that he was not the subject of the investigation and that he is certainly entitled to have a lawyer present during an interview. [redacted] and I said that I due to the urgency of this matter (btw, [redacted] knew exactly why I was calling without my having to tell him), I would rather talk to him sooner than that.

So we will be meeting on [redacted] and the lawyer will be on the line for the first part of the conversation. If the lawyer or [redacted] want to suspend the interview until [redacted] is in town we will do that, other wise we will continue with out the open line for the lawyer to listen in.

So, my obvious question is has [redacted] popped up in the investigation yet? I don't see anything recent for that name in [redacted]  
[redacted]

b7E

b1

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations~~

1  
~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (SF) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, December 08, 2006 8:03 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (LO)  
(FBI)  
Subject: [redacted]

b6  
b7C

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~

DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

b1

Attached is a write up of my telcals with [redacted]

It sounds like [redacted] but I didn't go into any detail over the phone so I can't be certain.

[redacted] asked me to make sure that CD-1 was "in the loop" and since you are obviously all the CD-1 San Francisco needs, can you please figure out who is handling the FBIHQ end of things and let them know that I'll be conducting an interview of [redacted]

b6  
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b7D

Thanks,



342aas01.ec (16 KB)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

1  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2006 10:27 AM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: More Litvinenko thoughts

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

b6  
b7C  
b1

Thank you, I saw [redacted] reply to the lead and agree... Wow.

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2006 9:45 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: More Litvinenko thoughts

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted] I was out on surveillance yesterday, and heading out there again in a few minutes.

There was no earth shattering feedback from [redacted]

However, here are a few things:

1. [redacted]
2. [redacted]  
[redacted]
3. [redacted]

You should have a copy of this via bumail by now.

4. [redacted]  
[redacted]

5. [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

6. I sent a lead to Boston to interview [redacted] It has not been uploaded yet -- otherwise, I would give you a serial. According to [redacted] << File: pp063451.ec >> Additional background on [redacted]

[redacted]

If you have any questions re this, please call me on my cell at [redacted]

b1

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2006 11:37 AM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: More Litvinenko thoughts

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

b6  
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b7D  
b1

[redacted]

Interesting piece of open source news - bearing on my email yesterday. Taking all of this with a grain of salt considering the media source ([www.rawstory.com](http://www.rawstory.com) - liberal-type of "Drudge"), report dated yesterday (12/11/2006) indicates that Litvinenko was "working on a contract for Erinys [Erinys International Ltd.]." The sources for the information are "two well placed British sources."

-- "Erinys is trying to break into the Russian market and Litvinenko was the front man introducing them to all sorts of people."

-- "...the reason that Litvinenko was meeting at Erinys' offices around the time of his contamination was to broker a deal of some sort with a Russian security start-up being created by.. [redacted]"

-- Erinys landed a \$86 million contract to guard Iraqi oil pipelines after Operation Iraqi Freedom.

-- "It may be significant that Erinys added an expert in Russian and Caspian oil and gas geopolitics to their management team just last April [2006]." [redacted] NOTE: The link to this expert takes you to [redacted] website, which highlights the April 2006 announcement of the addition of [redacted] Shall we take bets that this is the [redacted] could fit as well (oil/gas/security nexus), but the [redacted] connection makes this one more likely in my view.

Best,

[redacted]

[redacted]  
FBIHQ - Intelligence Analyst  
CD-7B - Eurasian Analysis

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
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~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



**Биография**

**Фотографии**

**Монографии**

**Книги под  
редакцией,  
публикации,  
статьи**

**Документы**

**Интервью,  
дискуссии**

**Написать  
письмо**

☒ Counter CO.KZ

УЧАСТНИК TOP  
Bambler's 100

DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1

(S)

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 07-09-2010 BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN

## Biography

Yuri Felshtinsky was born in Moscow in 1956. In 1974, he began studying history at the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute. In 1978, he immigrated to the USA and continued his study of history, first at Brandeis University and later at Rutgers, where he was awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (History). In 1993, he successfully defended his doctoral thesis at the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and became the first citizen of a foreign state to be awarded a doctoral degree in Russia. He has compiled and edited several dozen volumes of archival documents and is the author of the following books:

The Bolsheviks and the Left SRS [Bol'sheviki i levye esery] (Paris, 1985);

Towards a History of Our Isolation [K istorii nashei zakrytosti] (London, 1988; Moscow 1991);

The Failure of World Revolution [Krushenie mirovoi revolyutsii] (London, 1991; Moscow 1992);

Big Bosses [Vozhdi v zakone] (Moscow 1999);

Blowing up Russia: Terror from Within (with Alexander Litvinenko; New York, 2002).

### **Blowing-up Russia. Second Edition**

Acts of terror, abductions and contract killings organized by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation

[Download Microsoft Word document \(863k\)](#)

[Download WinRar archive \(188k\)](#)

### **Blowing-up Russia**

Acts of terror, abductions and contract killings organized by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation

[Download Microsoft Word document \(533k\)](#)

[Download WinRar archive \(122k\)](#)

### **Assassination of Russia. Script**

[Download Microsoft Word document \(98k\)](#)

[Download WinRar archive \(20k\)](#)

### **Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and the left opposition in the USSR, 1918-1928**

Revue publiee avec le concours du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Octobre-Decembre 1990

[Download Microsoft Word document \(104k\)](#)

[Download WinRar archive \(25k\)](#)

### **Trotsky's Notebooks, 1933-1935. Writings on Lenin, Dialectics, and Evolutionism**

Columbia University Press. New York. 1986

[Download Microsoft Word document \(k\)](#)

[Download WinRar archive \(k\)](#)

### **The legal foundations of the immigration and emigration policy of the USSR, 1917-27**

Soviet Studies. University of Glasgow Press. 1982

[Download Microsoft Word document \(105k\)](#)

[Download WinRar archive \(29k\)](#)



~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/11/2006

To: Boston

Attn: SSA [redacted] CI-1  
SSA [redacted]  
CI-2

From: Washington Field  
CI-5

Contact: SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b2

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

:plp [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted]

(S)

(Pending)

DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

Title: (S) ALEXANDER LITVINENKO;  
A/K/A EDMOND CARTER  
(S) [redacted]

b1

Synopsis: (U) (S) Request to conduct interview of [redacted]

Derived From: G-3  
Declassify On: X1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Reference: (S) [redacted]

Enclosure(s): (U) (S) Choice Point National Comprehensive Report.

Details: (S) On 11/29/2006, SA [redacted]

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b1

[redacted] (Closed), was a  
close associate with ALEXANDER LITVINENKO. Referenced serial  
provides specific details on this interview.

(U)

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(S)

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To: Boston From: Washington Field  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 12/11/2006

b1

~~(S)~~



(U) Enclosed is a Choice Point National Comprehensive Report on [redacted] to assist with locating him in order to conduct an interview. Open source information can also be found on the Internet under [redacted]

b6  
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b7D

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Boston From: Washington Field  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 12/11/2006

b1

(S)

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

BOSTON

AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

(U) Conduct interview with [REDACTED] to glean  
information on his relationship with ALEXANDER LITVINENKO, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Further, illicit more details on  
his encounter with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, December 18, 2006 10:55 AM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: litvinenko

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
~~RECORD HQ XXX~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
~~RECORD HQ XXX~~

I don't know a whole lot about the actual sources that provided the Polonium, but I have come across a great deal of information on the subject. Here's the short and sweet version of what I know and what I think.

Most of what I'm going to sum up here is from the Nuclear Assessment Program, and you may have encountered it all before. I've acquired their assessments of the Polonium used in the attack, that coupled with some FBI reporting is what I'm using here.

As you know, Polonium is a radioactive material that consistently produces Alpha particles, and to a much smaller extent, can produce gamma radiation. While it can occur naturally in uranium ore, it's quantities are extremely minute (1000 kilos of uranium ore contains 100 millionths of a gram). In order to be effectively produced, Polonium 210 must be [redacted] [redacted] It is available commercially in two different forms, either in a sealed source or as an isotope sample. The control of these types of commercially available Polonium is extremely high, and in the US requires a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It is estimated that only 100 grams of polonium 210 is created each year. In the assessment I read, a lethal dose of polonium is considered to be [redacted] In order to create a dose of this size it would require [redacted]

b7F

Here's where it gets interesting. [redacted]

[redacted] and a lead being set to investigate, but at this time I can't track down that document. I've talked to the agent with whom I'm working, and she is also going to try and come across that doc. As soon as we get it I'll pass the info to you.

b1

Let me know what else I can do to help, I'll probably shoot more over the weekend, as I'll have more time.

Thanks,

b6  
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Thursday, December 14, 2006 12:48 PM

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: litvinenko

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD HQ XXX

Hey - got a question for you - what do you know about the source of the polonium 210 used on Litvinenko? Do we have any idea where it came from? I am stuck in a CD mandatory conference until 330!

Thanks.

[redacted]  
CD-1F, Supporting CD-1B  
FBIHQ-JEH Room [redacted]

b6  
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b2

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

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(Rev.)

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLE/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

~~SECRET~~//MR

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 12/1/2006

To: New York  
Houston

Los Angeles

Washington Field

San Francisco

Counterintelligence

Attn: PM [redacted]  
Attn: ASAC [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
Attn: A/ASAC [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
Attn: SAC Kevin Favreau  
SSA [redacted] CD-2  
SSA [redacted] CD-5  
SSA [redacted] CD-1  
SSA [redacted] CD-6  
SIA [redacted] FIG  
Attn: ASAC [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
Attn: SC [redacted]  
SC [redacted]  
UC [redacted]

From: Counterintelligence  
CD-1F Unit, Room 4427  
Contact: [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b2

Approved By: [redacted]

(U) Drafted By: [redacted] jbr

(U) Case ID #: (S) 66F-HQ-A1453784-F (Pending)  
(S) 802A-HQ-C1517790-1 (Pending)

(S) Title: (S) ALEKSANDR LITVINENKO [redacted]  
AD-HOC REQUIREMENTS SET

Synopsis: (U)(S) This EC documents FBIHQ-directed collection requirements relating to the recent poisoning and subsequent death of Aleksandr Litvinenko in London.

b1

(U) (S) ~~Derived From : G-1~~  
~~Declassify On: 12/01/2031~~

~~SECRET~~//MR

(S)

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~//MR

To: New York From: Counterintelligence  
Re: ~~(S)~~ 66F-HQ-A1453784-F, 12/1/2006

(U) ~~(S)~~ Administrative: These ad-hoc requirements were developed by Counterintelligence Division, Eurasian Section, Collection Management and Reports Unit (CD-1F) and coordinated with the Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management Unit I (IRCMU I), in consultation with the Counterintelligence Division, Counterintelligence Analysis Section, Eurasian Analysis Unit (CD-7B). Intelligence responses to these requirements must cite ad-hoc requirements set CINT CD-012-06 and relevant FBI standing requirements sets, and should be drafted in EC and IIR format. Please upload ECs to ACS and send copies to CD-1F and CD-7B. These ad-hoc requirements will remain in effect for 90 days.

(S) Details: ~~(S)~~ Analysts in the FBIHQ Eurasian Counterintelligence Section (CD-1) in partnership with Analysts from FBIHQ Counterintelligence Analysis Section (CD-7) were tasked to draft an official statement regarding the FBI's knowledge [redacted]

[redacted] This request stems from the recent death of Aleksandr Litvinenko, a former [redacted] lieutenant-colonel, who was poisoned with Polonium-210 in London, Great Britain sometime on November 1, 2006. Litvinenko, who had been granted political asylum by Great Britain in May 2001, was an outspoken critic of the Putin administration and a close confidant of the [redacted]. Since 1998, Litvinenko has been a controversial figure, accusing the [redacted] of involvement in extra-judicial killings and participation in the 1999 apartment bombings that precipitated Russia's second war in Chechnya. Counterintelligence Division [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(A) Litvinenko's Death

(S)

(B)  
(C)

b1

(U) A. ~~(S)~~ Death of Aleksandr Litvinenko

1. (S) [redacted]
2. (S) [redacted]
3. (S) [redacted]
4. (S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~//MR

~~SECRET~~//MR

To: New York From: Counterintelligence  
Re: ~~(S)~~ 66F-HQ-A1453784-F, 12/1/2006

(U)

5. (S) [REDACTED]

6. (S) [REDACTED]

B. (S) [REDACTED]

1. (S) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

2. (S) [REDACTED]

3. (S) [REDACTED]

b1

C. [REDACTED]

1. (S) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

2. (S) [REDACTED]

3. (S) [REDACTED]

(S)

D. [REDACTED]

1. (S) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

2. (S) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

3. (S) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**Reporting Instructions:** (U//FOUO) When responding to this ad-hoc requirements set, please cite the following reference number in all IIRs: CINT CD-012-06. Responses derived from this ad-hoc requirement set should cite the specific requirement and be routed to both IA [REDACTED] of CD-1F/CD-1B and IA [REDACTED] of CD-7B. The collection reference number and the requirement designation will be used to manage, track, and retrieve information (e.g. CINT CD-012-06 B.2). These ad-hoc requirements will remain in effect for 90 days. Information collected must be submitted to FBIHQ by 02/01/2006.

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~//MR



~~SECRET~~//MR

To: New York From: Counterintelligence  
Re: ~~(S)~~ 66F-HQ-A1453784-F, 12/1/2006

(U)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U//FOUO) Field offices will expeditiously report intelligence identified as responsive to this requirements set, as reflected in the reporting instructions portion of this communication.

~~SECRET~~//MR

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/12/2006

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: [REDACTED]

CD-1F, Room [REDACTED]

Attn: [REDACTED]

CD-7B

From: Washington Field

CI-1

Contact: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b2

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: (S) [REDACTED]:oyi

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] (Pending)

Title: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) Synopsis: (S) This EC documents the information provided by [REDACTED] in relation to the recent poisoning and subsequent death of ALEKSANDR LITVINENKO in London.

(U) (S)

~~Derived From : G-1~~  
~~Declassify On: 12/12/2031~~

(U) Reference: (S) 66F-HQ-A1453784-F Serial 30

(U) Administrative: (S) This EC documents FBIHQ-directed collection relating to the recent poisoning and subsequent death of ALEKSANDR LITVINENKO in London.

b1

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE ASSET AND THE FACT THAT THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THIS SOURCE IS SINGULAR IN NATURE, EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE.

(S) On 12/11/2006, [REDACTED] who is a reliable source and whose reporting to date has been corroborated, provided the following information.

oi063461.ec

~~SECRET~~

(S)

[REDACTED] *MTT*

*[Signature]* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: Washington Field  
Re: (S) [redacted] 12/12/2006

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

b1

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, December 20, 2006 8:27 AM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Quick tidbit from BBC Radio 4 interview

b1

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

Ah, that makes sense.

I've attached the following comparative review (done for my own benefit) of [redacted] reporting to FBI, the Brits and the media. Thought you might like to see it. Any glaring errors, mistakes, omissions, etc. - please let me know. Suggestions and/or criticisms are welcome.

Best,



Comparing [redacted]  
[redacted].doc (45 ...)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, December 20, 2006 8:22 AM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Quick tidbit from BBC Radio 4 interview

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~NON-RECORD~~

He has talked about doing security investigations for [redacted] in Florida. This is how [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, December 20, 2006 8:16 AM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: Quick tidbit from BBC Radio 4 interview

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~NON-RECORD~~

[redacted]  
Interesting unclassified tidbit from the BBC Radio 4 interview last Saturday with [redacted] reported that [redacted] said the following: [redacted]

b1

Thoughts?

Best,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C

FBIHQ - Intelligence Analyst  
CD-7B - Eurasian Analysis

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~

~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, December 22, 2006 10:43 AM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Final thought

DATE: 07-09-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-09-2035

b1

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S)

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E  
b7F

(S)

Here's where it gets interesting. [redacted]

b1

[redacted] and a lead being set to investigate, but at this time I can't track down that document. I've talked to the agent with whom I'm working, and she is also going to try and come across that doc. As soon as we get it I'll pass the info to you.

(S)

1  
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b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

(S)

[Redacted]

b1

(S)

[Redacted]

DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/18/2006

To: Washington Field

Attn: CI-5  
SA [REDACTED]

From: Washington Field

CI-1

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b2

Approved By: [REDACTED] *OS*

Drafted By: (S) [REDACTED]: ym ✓

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] (Pending)  
(S) (S) [REDACTED] (Pending)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Title: (S) ALEXANDER VALTEROVICH LITVINENKO, aka  
(S) EDWIN REDWALD CARTER  
(S) [REDACTED]

(S)

Synopsis: (S) Results of contact with [REDACTED] in regards to  
the murder of the ALEXANDER VALETEROVICH LITVINENKO.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From : G-3~~  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE ASSET AND THE  
FACT THAT THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THIS SOURCE IS SINGULAR IN  
NATURE, EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF  
ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN  
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE.

b1

(S) (S) [REDACTED] was questioned as to any information  
she/he may have in regards to the recent poisoning death of  
(S) ALEXANDER VALETEROVICH LITVINENKO in England. [REDACTED]  
advised that she/he had no direct and/or indirect knowledge or  
(S) information concerning the poisoning death of LITVINENKO. The  
following is the only information [REDACTED] could provide at  
this time.

(S)

DO NOT UPLOAD

~~SECRET~~

(S)

b6  
b7C



~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 12/18/2006  
~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

b1

~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~ Others, according to [REDACTED] believed that  
since the murder of LITVINENKO and the poisoning of [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

~~(U)~~

~~(S)~~ This information is being forwarded to CI-5, SA  
[REDACTED] for her information. If additional information is  
obtained regarding captioned subject, CI-5 will be notified.

b6  
b7C

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-12-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-12-2035

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/12/2006

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: CD-1B, Room [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
CD-7B, Room [redacted]  
IA [redacted]  
CD-7F, Room [redacted]  
IA/RO [redacted]  
International Operations Attn: Europe Unit, Room [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
London Attn: ALAT [redacted]  
ALAT [redacted]  
Washington Field Attn: Squad CI-5  
SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b2

From: San Francisco

Squad 16H / San Jose RA

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

DCP/ly

Drafted By: [redacted]

aas

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

(Pending)

Title: (S) LITVINENKO, ALEXANDER

ALEXANDER LITVINENKO

b1

Synopsis: (S) Documents the results of an interview of [redacted]

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Details: (S) On 12/11/2006, [redacted] born

office telephone [redacted] cellular [redacted]  
telephone [redacted] home telephone [redacted] fax [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

SF Field Intelligence Group

Potential Intel Value: Yes ☒ No ☐

Reviewed By: [redacted] Date: 7 Jan 07

S-Drive Location: 16H

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 12/12/2006

b1

~~(S)~~

[redacted] email [redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment by Special Agent [redacted] and Special Agent [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents, the purpose of the interview, and after a brief conference call with [redacted] office telephone [redacted] cellular telephone [redacted] Agents advised both [redacted] of the voluntary, yet sensitive nature of the interview. As such, the FBI did not deem it appropriate to conduct the interview over an open telephone line. Agents reiterated the voluntary nature of the interview and reminded [redacted] that he may terminate the interview at any time. Agents provided the option of reconvening when [redacted] could have an attorney physically present. [redacted] advised that he knows one or more of the subjects of the current investigation and advised [redacted] to proceed with the interview, at which point [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~

[redacted] became a United States citizen in [redacted] fought the communists in [redacted] From his recollection of the 1970s [redacted] knows [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ On or about 02/14/1993, [redacted] was assassinated in a very violent fashion in [redacted] At the time of his death, [redacted] was working in the [redacted] Prior to traveling to [redacted] for the purpose of [redacted] younger brother, who was [redacted] introduced him to [redacted] who was [redacted] provided [redacted] with some pointers on what to do and how to handle himself [redacted] traveled to [redacted] a couple of times, and continued to interact with [redacted]

~~(U)~~

~~(S)~~ At some point during this general time frame, [redacted] visited California and first met with [redacted] met [redacted] through [redacted] because [redacted] knew [redacted] very well as they are [redacted] and may have been [redacted] currently resides in [redacted] and his current telephone [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: (S) [redacted] 12/12/2006

b1

(S)

number is [redacted] [redacted] spoke with [redacted]  
since LITVINENKO was poisoned.

(U) (S) [redacted] and [redacted] started the [redacted]

[redacted] In the mid  
1990s, [redacted] was, to the best of [redacted] knowledge, the

[redacted] became involved with [redacted] as a volunteer and  
participated strictly out of scientific interest. Although  
[redacted] offered, through [redacted] to pay [redacted]

(U) (S)

[redacted] In addition, [redacted] presented some  
documents that supported his allegations.

(U) (S) The [redacted] began prior to [redacted]

(U) (S)

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: (S) [redacted] 12/12/2006

b1

(S)

[redacted]

(U) (S) In general [redacted] talks with [redacted] sporadically, perhaps two to three times per year. [redacted] usually calls [redacted] home telephone number. [redacted] is very vocal about what he knows and what he does. [redacted] is not a very secretive person. [redacted] tends to do a lot of [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] has no information pertaining to [redacted] education, but believes that he is a [redacted]

(U) (S) [redacted] is an [redacted] for the [redacted] and is responsible for the [redacted] [redacted] From what [redacted] said, the mafia was involved in [redacted] believes that this position was [redacted] primary source of income.

(U) (S) [redacted] was described as having a great personality and capable of commendable actions, such as leaving his job to work on environmental issues. [redacted] is not about making misrepresentations. However, at the moment [redacted] seems to invite publicity.

(U) (S) A couple of years ago [redacted] told [redacted] that he, [redacted] had been [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) (S) For the last three years [redacted] has been [redacted]

(U) (S) During his investigation, [redacted] made an accusation about [redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 12/12/2006

b1

[redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ During a trip to California, [redacted] talked openly about [redacted] despite [redacted] understanding that it was supposed to be secret. During a face-to-face conversation that occurred in [redacted] told [redacted] that he was going to [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] also believes [redacted] mentioned the name Aleksandr LITVINENKO during [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Another name associated with his conversations regarding LITVINENKO was [redacted] [Phonetic]. [redacted] believes [redacted] mentioned the name over the phone a couple of years ago describing [redacted] as a friend. It is believed that [redacted]

b6  
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b7D

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] suspects that [redacted] has been under surveillance [redacted]  
[redacted] believes that [redacted] was investigated by Italian authorities and that his home was searched and his telephone was tapped.

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] never mentioned [redacted]  
[redacted] That attempt had been made using firearms.

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] believes that [redacted] was in [redacted]  
[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: (S) [REDACTED], 12/12/2006

b1

(S)

(U) (S)

[REDACTED] last spoke with [REDACTED] approximately two to three days after LITVINENKO was poisoned. [REDACTED] called [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During this conversation, which [REDACTED] characterized as "weird", [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After their conversation about the poisoning of LITVINENKO, [REDACTED] mentioned that he wanted to [REDACTED] which [REDACTED] thought was odd.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U) (S) Previous contact with [REDACTED] in early 2006 was limited to, possibly, one telephone call. During this conversation, they discussed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] previously visited [REDACTED]

(U) (S) [REDACTED] has no information relating to the motivation for poisoning LITVINENKO, but speculated that it might be related to the [REDACTED]

(U) (S) When questioned about DIGNITY AND HONOR, [REDACTED] stated he has read about DIGNITY AND HONOR on the internet, but was never mentioned to him by [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: (S) [redacted] 12/12/2006

b1

(S)

(U) (S) [redacted] key associates are [redacted]  
[redacted] however, has kept his distance from [redacted]  
[redacted] speculated that [redacted] has kept his distance from  
[redacted] because [redacted]  
[redacted] also  
associated with some people who participated in the [redacted]  
[redacted] does not  
think that they know very much about [redacted]  
admits to knowing other associates of [redacted] in the San  
Francisco bay area, but was reluctant to provide agents with  
their names and contact information out of respect for their  
privacy.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 12/12/2006

b1

(S)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information only.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-12-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-12-2035

~~SECRET~~//20320205

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/05/2007

To: Washington Field

Attn: SA [redacted]  
CI-5

From: Boston

CI-1

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] ✓

Drafted By: (S) [redacted]

:mrz MRZ

Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

(Pending)

Title: (S) ALEXANDER LITVINENKO;  
aka EDMOND CARTER

(S) [redacted]

Synopsis: (U) (S) To provide results of interview of [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)

(U)

Derived From : G-3

Declassify On: 02/05/2032

(S)

(U) [redacted]

Reference: (S) [redacted]

Enclosure(s): (U) (S) Attached hereto are items [redacted] had previously provided to [redacted] a synopsis of his travel, a copy of his passport, a copy of his American Airlines miles, a copy of his American Express activity report, a copy of his Bank of America account information, and related news articles. In addition, attached is an FD-302 of an interview conducted on January 27, 2007 of [redacted]

Details: (U) (S) Per lead set from Washington Field, Boston was requested to contact [redacted] and determine his relationship with ALEXANDER LITVINENKO, [redacted]

[redacted] It was also requested that [redacted] be questioned further about an unidentified male

~~SECRET~~//20320205

(S) [redacted]

45MR201.EC

b6  
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Boston  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 02/05/2007  
(S)

b1

(UM) that was reportedly seen with [redacted]  
[redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ On December 11, 2006, [redacted] provided information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that [redacted] and had a brief encounter with [redacted] and an unidentified male in the [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] provided information regarding various persons of interest to the FBI. In order to provide a better understanding of these individuals, the following background information was provided through research conducted by Boston Fig Analyst [redacted] Open source information referenced herein include articles from the Associated Press wire, USA Today, The New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, and The Independent. The following individuals were mentioned throughout the course of the interview.

[redacted]  
(U) Background: [redacted] was accused of [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
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b7D

(U) Link to LITVINENKO: LITVINENKO and [redacted]  
[redacted] One source indicates that [redacted]

(U) Other Acquaintances: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] has close ties to [redacted]  
[redacted]

(U)

(U) Background: Open source reporting shows that in [redacted]  
[redacted] He is reported to

To: Washington Field From: Boston

Re: (S) [redacted] 02/05/2007

(S)

[redacted] When the Soviet Union collapsed, the  
regiment became part of the [redacted] In 1996, [redacted]

[redacted] In 2001, [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] for the death of LITVINENKO.  
He denies involvement in the murder.

(U) Link to LITVINENKO (U) (S) [redacted] has known  
LITVINENKO for [redacted] but was not close to him. [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U) Other Acquaintances: (U) (S) [redacted]

[redacted]  
(U) Background: Open source reporting indicates that

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To: Washington Field From: Boston  
Re: (S) [redacted] 02/05/2007

b1

[redacted]

[redacted] are investigating him for the death of LITVINENKO. He denies any wrongdoing.

(U) Link to LITVINENKO: Open source reporting indicates that LITVINENKO [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) Other Acquaintances: [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) Background: Open source reporting shows that in

[redacted]

[redacted] When the Soviet Union collapsed, the regiment became part of the [redacted] Limited information was available on

[redacted]

(U) Link to LITVINENKO: Open source reporting indicates that [redacted] was not acquainted with LITVINENKO.

[redacted] but other sources indicate that he never met LITVINENKO. [redacted]

[redacted] He has not been contaminated with radiation poisoning.

(U) Other Acquaintances: [redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~SECRET~~//20320205

To: Washington Field From: Boston  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 02/05/2007

~~(S)~~

[redacted]

(U) Background: [redacted] and LITVINENKO were acquaintances. Open source research shows that [redacted]

[redacted]

Open source research goes on to say that [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] denies any wrongdoing.

Tests indicate he has been exposed to polonium-210.

[redacted]

(U) Background: [redacted] (aka [redacted]) is a

[redacted]

b6  
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b7D

[redacted]

(U) A SIPRNET search revealed no results on the name [redacted] however, an open source search on the name [redacted] indicates that [redacted]

[redacted]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ The following is information for WFO regarding details of the interview of [redacted] on January 27, 2007.

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~//20320205

To: Washington Field From: Boston  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 02/05/2007

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] As further detailed in the attached FD-302, on  
October 12, 2006 at approximately 10:00 pm, in the [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] had recently contacted [REDACTED]  
and questioned him regarding his certainty that he had [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and the FBI, with documentation of his recent travel, to  
include his travel records and his bank statements. These  
records corroborated his [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) With regard to the [REDACTED]  
encounter, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
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b7D

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Writer opines it would not be possible for  
[REDACTED] to make a positive identification of the UM.  
Boston attributes this to the happenstance nature of the  
meeting which [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] In addition to [REDACTED] of the  
encounter, he has also been exposed to a great deal of media  
coverage of the LITVINENKO case. This coverage has put  
[REDACTED] picture on the television and the internet. As one  
would expect, [REDACTED] has been following this case very  
closely, and regularly checks news articles, and related  
internet reporting. [REDACTED] said that if [REDACTED] was  
taller, thinner and of darker complexion than [REDACTED] then  
the UM could have been [REDACTED] wasn't certain  
either way.

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] speculates that ALEXANDER LITVINENKO  
was poisoned by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] but he could not provide  
any corroborating evidence for that assertion.

~~SECRET~~//20320205

~~SECRET~~//20320205

To: Washington Field From: Boston  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 02/05/2007

~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~

b1

~~(S)~~ Boston denotes that [redacted]  
at anytime during the interview. [redacted] was extremely  
cooperative and was open to further contact by the FBI.

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~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Boston considers this lead covered.

~~SECRET~~//20320205



~~SECRET~~//20320205

To: Washington Field From: Boston  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 02/05/2007

b1

(S)

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON D.C.

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~//20320205

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-12-2010  
 CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
 REASON: 1.4 (C)  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 07-12-2035

- 1 -

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/29/2007

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
 social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at his  
 residence. [redacted] telephone number  
 [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the  
 interviewing agent, the identity of the FBI contract employee  
 [redacted] (retired Special Agent), and the nature of the  
 interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

(U) ~~(S)~~

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] explained that at approximately 10:00 pm  
 on [redacted]

[redacted] has known [redacted] since 1998, and had most recently  
 seen him in January of 2006.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] described [redacted] as [redacted]  
 [redacted] described the weather as nice, with  
 the area being lit by street lights. [redacted] said the  
 encounter with [redacted] and the UM was less than five minutes in  
 length. The conversation between [redacted] and the UM  
 took place entirely in Russian, and [redacted]  
 [redacted] described the UM as taller,  
 thinner, and with a darker complexion than [redacted] The UM was  
 clean shaven, with short dark straight hair. [redacted] said that  
 the UM was [redacted] is absolutely  
 positive that it was [redacted] that he had run into. [redacted]  
 relayed that he is not sure of the UM identity but said that  
 subsequent to looking at a picture on the Internet, he said it  
 could possibly be [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

45MR202.FD302

Investigation on 01/27/2007 at [redacted] Massachusetts

b1

File # [redacted] Date dictated 01/29/2007by SA [redacted] *MEZ*  
[redacted] *CHN*

b6  
 b7C

~~SECRET~~

b1

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 01/27/2007 , Page 2

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] felt that this meeting could not have been staged. He explained that after [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as having been the [REDACTED] In 2001 [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] spent a great deal of time with LITVINENKO while they were [REDACTED] [REDACTED] described LITVINENKO as being very greedy. According to [REDACTED] LITVINENKO "always wanted more". [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did remain in contact with LITVINENKO, but it was on an irregular basis.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] said that LITVINENKO had been introduced to [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] LITVINENKO would [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Unbeknownst to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and LITVINENKO knew each other. LITVINENKO and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This circle of creating lies, and selling them as truths, is what [REDACTED] feels

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

b1

Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 01/27/2007, Page 3

ultimately got LITVINENKO killed. [ ] feels that LITVINENKO told so many lies, that eventually he could not discern fact from fiction. This creating of false information also upset the FSB.

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] said that [ ] and LITVINENKO had been killed. [ ] felt that [ ] before LITVINENKO was [ ] Over the period of a few months, [ ]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] stated that using Polonium is a very "Russian thing to do". [ ] claimed that Polonium was also used in the September 2004 poisoning of [ ]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] had recently received quite a few

b6  
b7C  
b7D



(U) ~~(S)~~ [ ] was willing to be recontacted by the FBI in the future.

(U)

~~(S)~~

Derived From : G-3  
Declassify On: 01/29/2032

~~SECRET~~



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Your world

Driving value

Wish I could

Carbon champions

The Times

November 23, 2006

## Poison case turns to hunt for third man

DANIEL McGRORY, MICHAEL EVANS AND MARCUS LEROUX

- Mystery Russian is prime suspect
- Ex-spy's health has deteriorated

A mystery Russian who met Alexander Litvinenko, the former KGB spy, at a London hotel on the day he was poisoned has emerged as the prime suspect in the hunt for the assassin.

Mr Litvinenko told Scotland Yard detectives that he had arranged a rendezvous with an old friend, but was surprised to find another man present who introduced himself only as "Vladimir".

The stranger, described as a "tall, taciturn sharp-featured Russian in his early forties", accompanied an ex-Kremlin bodyguard, Andrei Lugovoy, to the hotel.

Mr Litvinenko told police that he became suspicious that "Vladimir" was careful to reveal nothing about his identity, or why he had turned up to what was supposed to be a private get-together.

The man reportedly pressed Mr Litvinenko repeatedly to join him in a cup of tea but said little else during the brief meeting on November 1. Later that day he complained of feeling violently ill.

Detectives say "Vladimir" could be crucial to their inquiry, but the victim who holds the key to this investigation was unable to talk to police yesterday and doctors say that they do not know when Mr Litvinenko may be well enough to be questioned again.

So far he has spent 16 hours trying to recall all those he met and what he ate and drank in the days before he fell ill, but detectives are anxious to question him further.

They want to know who else knew about his planned meetings and whether he was being followed or his telephones or e-mails were being bugged.

Those who saw Mr Litvinenko in the intensive care ward at University College Hospital yesterday were struck by the further dramatic deterioration in his condition.

Alex Goldfarb, his close friend, said: "I fear he is slipping away before our eyes and doctors don't know how to save him. He is very tired, he is not really communicating. He is aware and alert but the light is irritating him and he is much thinner. He just slips in and out of consciousness and holds on to his wife's hand."

Mr Goldfarb said that his friend had never met "Vladimir" before and was curious about why he was there.

WORLD BRIEFING



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
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19

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"He knew to be cautious in front of a stranger. He was trying to remember everything he could about this man to help the police.

"He only agreed to the meeting because he used to know Andrei Lugovoy during their days in the KGB."

Since the attack Mr Lugovoy and "Vladimir" have not been seen in the UK. Both men claimed to have arrived in London last month to sign contracts with wealthy Russian oligarchs to provide bodyguards.

Mr Lugovoy used to guard the Russian Prime Minister during his KGB days and is a former member of the 9th Directorate of its successor, the FSB. As the investigation into the would-be killer's identity intensified, Russia's foreign intelligence service (SVR) issued its most strident denial that it was involved. Sergei Ivanov, an SVR spokesman, was quoted as saying: "Mr Litvinenko is not the kind of person for whose sake we would spoil bilateral relations. It is absolutely not in our interests to be engaged in such activity."

Doubts persist over whether the substance used to attack Mr Litvinenko was the toxic metal thallium, or something else. In their latest statement, doctors said that Mr Litvinenko's condition had deteriorated in the past 24 hours and he remained seriously ill.

#### Russia's intelligence services

##### FSB

Successor to the KGB. HQ at the Lubyanka. Intelligence, counter-intelligence, smuggling, terrorism etc. Once headed by Putin

##### SVR

Foreign Intelligence Service. Monitors worldwide nuclear developments, terrorism, drugs trade, organised crime and illicit arms trade

##### GRU

Feared military intelligence directorate. HQ is glass building outside Moscow known as the Aquarium

Sources: CIA, Russian news agencies



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13

**EURASIA DAILY MONITOR****Volume 1 , Issue 93 (September 27, 2004)**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 07-12-2010 BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN

**ROMAN TSEPOV, R.I.P.****By Charles Gurin**

While the murder of a businessman is hardly news in Russia, the death of the head of a private security company in St. Petersburg on September 24 has raised eyebrows. According to press reports, Roman Tsepov, general director of the Baltik-Eskort private security firm, had felt sick for two weeks, but doctors were unable to find the cause of his illness. He was subsequently hospitalized in grave condition, and while doctors had planned on sending him to Germany for treatment, the condition had already infected his bone marrow and was untreatable (Delovoi Peterburg, September 24). The St. Petersburg prosecutor's office has launched an investigation into his death, which they are treating as a premeditated murder.

Russky kurier, citing the St. Petersburg-based Agenstvo Zhurnalistskikh Rassledovani (Agency for Journalistic Investigations), reported that somewhere around September 10 or 11, Tsepov was poisoned with "a large dose of medicine used for treating leukemia patients (Russky kurier, September 27). The Stringer information agency had earlier cited rumors that Tsepov had been poisoned by a heavy metal: "The poison is among experimental chemicals, and access to it is severely restricted." Stringer said that Tsepov's case resembled that of Ivan Kivelidi, the influential businessman apparently poisoned to death along with his secretary in 1995 (Stringer-news.ru, September 25). Indeed, Saratov Governor Dmitry Ayatskov stated that Kivelidi's killers had used a top-secret modern chemical substance from Shikhany, a major Russian chemical weapons storage facility located in Saratov (see "Preventing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism: The Case of Russia," Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 20, November 1997).

Whatever the substance that killed Tsepov, his death has drawn attention because, by all accounts, his influence and ties went well beyond his immediate business. "Officially, Tsepov headed one of the best protection agencies in Petersburg," NTV television reported. "Unofficially, he had influence and interests in many spheres of business and even in the power structures" (NTV.ru, September 25).

Kommersant was even more explicit about Tsepov's purported web of contacts. "His sphere of influence was very wide -- from pharmaceuticals and protection service to ports, tourism, shipping, insurance, and even the mass media," the newspaper wrote. "According to sources in the law-enforcement organs, Roman Tsepov kept in touch with many siloviki, from Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev to the head of the presidential [security service] Vladimir Zolotov. It is said that he was in well with deputy presidential administration chief Igor Sechin and even Vladimir Putin himself. In UBOP [the anti-organized crime directorate] it is said that Mr. Tsepov actively used those contacts to resolve business issues and also carry out delicate errands for a number of very highly placed persons. In addition, it is said that Roman Tsepov used his connections to lobby for the appointments of Interior Ministry and FSB [Federal Security Service] officers. It was precisely because of this that one of his nicknames within certain circles was 'the Producer' " (Kommersant, September 25).

(14)

Moskovskiye novosti reported in July that Tsepov had presented himself to Yukos shareholders as essentially having been commissioned by Sechin, Zolotov, and even Putin to "come to terms" with the embattled oil company. "As soon as the 'Kremlin representative' asked for a big advance on his services, his powers were called into question. Tsepov's former relationship with Zolotov and Sechin and possibly also with Putin is a hard fact, but the level and quality of his present-day contacts is, basically, a matter of speculation" (Moskovskiye novosti, July 9).

Following word of Tsepov's death, the journalist Yulia Latynina said on her Ekho Moskvyy radio program that Tsepov had reportedly told Yukos that he represented Sechin's interests and had full authority to resolve the conflict with the company as long as he and Gennady Timchenko were put on Yukos' board of directors. Britain's Telegraph has described Timchenko as "a Kremlin insider and oil trader" who shares a KGB past with Putin and is "very close" to the Russian president (see EDM, July 28). Latynina said, "But what's interesting is that when I was told this story -- and a lot of people told me it -- I had the impression that Mr. Tsepov . . . didn't understand that this [deal] is for others, and that, in essence, these people didn't need a representative in the person of Mr. Tsepov" (Ekho Moskvyy, September 25).

The Stringer information agency quoted from a dossier on Putin that it first reported about in November 2000. The dossier was allegedly prepared by the FSB, then added to by the Interior Ministry's investigative department under Vladimir Rushailo, currently the CIS executive secretary. The dossier alleged that Tsepov, who in the early 1990s was an officer in the St. Petersburg police's anti-organized crime directorate and in charge of collecting license fees from casinos, acted as a go-between for a monthly payment from a leading casino owner to Putin, who was then deputy mayor of St. Petersburg. The dossier also claimed that in 1995, Tsepov gave Putin's wife a Chinese emerald he had won in a card game with a criminal boss, who had stolen it in South Korea. The emerald was reportedly included on an Interpol list of stolen gems. "Tsepov renders services to Putin on condition that the latter will 'protect' his activities," the dossier alleged (Stringer-news.ru, September 25; Stringer, November 2000).

Tsepov's Baltik-Eskort provided protection during the 1990s for the family of then-St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak and for his deputy, Vladimir Putin. It also protected a variety of VIPs from other walks of life, including the crime boss Vladimir Malyshev (Russky kurier, September 27).

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~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

b6  
b7C

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 10:04 AM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Information on Litvinenko

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

DATE: 07-12-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-12-2035

b1

[redacted]  
Here is some interesting info on [redacted] that I found in the Open Source Center. At least as of September 2005, he was [redacted] Born in [redacted]

[redacted] Needless to say, this is quite the player for someone like Litvinenko to investigate.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b2

[redacted]  
Intelligence Analyst  
Eurasia Analysis Unit (CD-7B)  
[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, November 27, 2006 5:40 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Information on Litvinenko

b1

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

[redacted]  
Thanks for adding me to distribution list - I very much appreciate it. FNU [redacted] is likely [redacted]  
[redacted] name has been in the open press, as well as two of [redacted] associates: [redacted] and [redacted]  
[redacted] Open sources have the following to say about [redacted]

b6  
b7C

b7E

~~SECRET~~

(S) [redacted]

b1

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

Best,

[Redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [Redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, November 27, 2006 5:13 PM  
To: [Redacted]  
Cc: [Redacted]  
Subject: Information on Litvinenko

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD

b1

<< File: pp063311.ec >> All: I will be sending you the referenced attachment via bumail.

[Redacted]

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

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~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/26/2007

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: CD-1B, Room [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

IA [redacted]

CD-7F, Room [redacted]

Attn: Squad CI-5

SA [redacted]

Washington Field

b6  
b7C  
b2

From: San Francisco

Squad 16H / San Jose RA

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] *ly*

Drafted By: [redacted]:aas *du*

Case ID #: (S) [redacted] (Pending) - [redacted]

Title: (S) (S) LITVINENKO, ALEXANDER

ALEXANDER LITVINENKO

b1

Synopsis: (U) (S) Documents the results of an interview of [redacted] conducted on 03/26/2007.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U) Details: (S) On 03/26/2007, [redacted]

[redacted] office telephone [redacted]  
cellular telephone [redacted] home telephone [redacted]  
[redacted] fax [redacted] email [redacted] was  
interviewed at the San Jose RA, and provided the following  
information:

(U) (S) [redacted] has not been in contact with [redacted]  
[redacted] since his, [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

## SF Field Intelligence Group

Potential Intel Value: Yes ☒ No ☐

Reviewed By: [redacted] Date: 27 Mar 07

S-Drive Location: [redacted]

b6  
b7C

b1

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 03/26/2007

b1

~~(S)~~

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [redacted] advised that he had seen news reports regarding the death of First Name Unknown (FNU) POMAROV. POMAROV was the head of the Russian delegation to the INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (IMO), who was on his way to meet with [redacted] when he fell ill and died. Because of his diplomatic status, his body was immediately transported to Russia, where it was cremated. POMAROV's family claims that he had been poisoned.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [redacted]  
[redacted] called [redacted] several times seeking an interview. [redacted] ignored his messages. [redacted] then started calling [redacted] former employers and other associates in an attempt to get [redacted] to speak with him. [redacted] impression was that [redacted] was attempting to [redacted] in particular, [redacted] believes that [redacted] knew of [redacted]

One example of this regarded [redacted]

which [redacted]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ During one of his visits to the San Francisco Bay Area, [redacted] visited the [redacted]  
During this visit, [redacted]

[redacted] cellular telephone [redacted] home telephone  
[redacted] and [redacted]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [redacted] showed [redacted] some documents that he, [redacted] said were [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 03/26/2007

b1

~~(S)~~

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~

[redacted] had contact with the [redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~

While searching for news articles related to [redacted] found a Romanian news article on the Internet about [redacted]  
[redacted] Because the article was in Romanian, [redacted] was unable to read it. [redacted] had paid [redacted]  
[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 03/26/2007

b1

(S)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information only.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information only.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/02/2007

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: CD-1B, Room [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

IA [redacted]

CD-7F, Room [redacted]

Washington Field

Attn: Squad CI-5

SA [redacted]

From: San Francisco

Squad 16H / San Jose RA

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

*LR6/Dut*

Drafted By: (S) [redacted]

:aas

Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

(Pending)

(U) Title: (S) LITVINENKO, ALEXANDER

ALEXANDER LITVINENKO

(U) Synopsis: (S) Documents the results of interviews at the

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) (S)

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S) (S)

Details: (U) (S)

On 04/02/2007, SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]

interviewed [redacted]

telephone [redacted] at his place of

employment. After being advised of the identities of the  
interviewing agents, [redacted] provided the following  
information:

(U) (S) [redacted] first met [redacted]  
approximately five to seven years ago when he, [redacted] was

[redacted] Approximately two years ago [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

*Read + Clear*

*5/15/2007*

*DRG*

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 04/02/2007

b1

(S) returned to [redacted] with a young woman who may have been his girlfriend and requested [redacted] assistance in [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] has no further information regarding the nature of [redacted] research, or whether [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ A day later [redacted] called [redacted] and requested [redacted]

[redacted] had the impression that [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ On 04/02/2007, SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] interviewed [redacted]

[redacted] telephone [redacted] email [redacted]

[redacted] at the [redacted]

After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and that the purpose of the interview was to attempt to determine if the [redacted]

[redacted] was related to the poisoning of Alexander LITVINENKO, [redacted] provided the following information:

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C  
b7D



~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 04/02/2007

b1

~~(S)~~

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] advised that he would check with the  
[REDACTED] to determine if it was possible to  
share information pertaining to [REDACTED] and if so,  
what, if any, process is required.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 04/02/2007

b1

~~(S)~~

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information only.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information only.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/04/2007

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: CD-1B, Room [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
IA [redacted]

International Operations

Attn: CD-7F, Room [redacted]  
Europe Unit, Room [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]

London

Attn: ALAT [redacted]  
ALAT [redacted]

Washington Field

Attn: Squad CI-5  
SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b2

From: San Francisco

Squad 16H / San Jose RA

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] LRG/ol

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Drafted By: (S) [redacted] : aas

Case ID #: (S) [redacted] (Pending) - [redacted]

b1

Title: (S) (U) LITVINENKO, ALEXANDER  
[redacted]  
ALEXANDER LITVINENKO

Synopsis: (U) (S) Documents information provided by [redacted]  
[redacted]

(S) (S) (U) ~~Derived From: G-3~~  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) [redacted]

(U) Details: (S) On 04/03/2007, [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] telephone [redacted]  
[redacted] email [redacted] advised that the  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b1

~~SECRET~~

Read + Clear  
3/13/2007  
114

[redacted] [signature]

[signature]

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 04/04/2007

b1

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ However, after discussing the matter with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] advised that should the FBI  
present the [REDACTED] with a valid subpoena, such  
information could be provided [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED] telephone [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] fax [REDACTED] email [REDACTED] is willing  
to "informally" accept a subpoena.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 04/04/2007

b1

~~(S)~~

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information only.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

LONDON

AT LONDON, UK

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ San Francisco requests that London advise the appropriate British authorities that the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and therefore may be related to Alexander LITVINENKO's death. San Francisco further requests that London advise the British authorities that the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] will only release this information in response to a Subpoena, or the British equivalent.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Set Lead 3: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information only.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information only.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

**Precedence:** ROUTINE

**Date:** 04/06/2007

**To:** Washington Field

**From:** Washington Field

CI-5

**Contact:** SA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b2

**Approved By:** [REDACTED]

**Drafted By:** [REDACTED]:plp

DATE: 07-12-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-12-2035

**Case ID #:** [REDACTED]

(Pending)

Liaison (Pending)

**Title:** [REDACTED]

ALEXANDER VALTEROVICH LITVINENKO;  
A/K/A EDWIN REDWALD CARTER

**Synopsis:** [REDACTED]

Travel to New York.

~~Derived From : G-3~~  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

**Details:** [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED] traveled to New York Division on 04/01/2007 through 04/02/2007 to participate in a debrief of a New York source. Attached is a list of participants which includes members of [REDACTED] UK.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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### ITINERARY

[redacted]  
9:00am: FBI personnel meet on 25th floor (HQ/WFO/NY)

(S) 9:30am: 26 Federal Plaza. [redacted] arrives. SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] will escort.

9:45am: ADIC Conference Room. Introduction of personnel, CD SAC **Richard DesLauriers** and ASAC [redacted] and preliminary briefing. Briefing will cover the following information:

1. Itinerary
2. Hotel issues/security/traffic at hotel
3. Briefing Agenda with source
4. meals
5. comms between rooms
6. questions

DATE: 07-12-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-12-2035

60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

(S) 11:30am: Personnel to meet [redacted] Address will be confirmed at pre-brief. Please go directly to the room to which you are assigned. Don't stop at front desk. If for some reason you are challenged by hotel staff say that you are there to attend a meeting being hosted by [redacted]  
[redacted] Two cars will be transporting to the site.

Source

SA [redacted]

(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

HQ analyst

SA [redacted] (WFO)

[redacted] (FBI NY)

NY Analyst

(S)

Tech Agent (SO-6)

12:00 noon: SA [redacted] will bring the source to [redacted] and de-brief will commence. Finger food will be available in [redacted] Periodic breaks will be taken as dictated by the briefing pace. Source is [redacted]

6:30pm: All personnel (except source) are invited to have dinner with our guests. We have tentative plans to dine at [redacted]

[redacted]  
AM: Continuation of previous day's briefing. Times to be determined. Follow-up on any questions that may have resulted from previous day.

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
~~SECRET~~

Personnel:

A/SSA [redacted] NY

[redacted]

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[redacted] NY

SA [redacted] WFO

[redacted] (c)  
[redacted] (w)

SA [redacted] NY

[redacted] (w)

SA [redacted] MY

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b2

IA [redacted] (NY)

IA [redacted] (HQ)

[redacted]

SSA [redacted] (NY)

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-12-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (B,C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-12-2035

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/06/2007

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field  
CI-5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] (Pending) ✓  
(S) [REDACTED] Liaison (Pending)

Title: (S) ALEXANDER VALTEROVICH LITVINENKO;  
A/K/A EDWIN REDWALD CARTER  
(S) [REDACTED]

(U) Synopsis: (S) VTT on 03/28/2007.

(S) (U) ~~Derived From : G-3~~  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Details: (S) On 03/28/2007, SA [REDACTED] participated in a VTT with FBIHQ representatives present at WFO, SSA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] New York Field Office and Boston Field Office also participated. The purpose of the VTT was to initiate a dialogue between the field offices and FBIHQ with information pertinent to the above captioned matter.

(S) (S) FBIHQ informed the field offices that they would open an HQ control file to serve as a repository of all the information that is coming in from the various field offices. FBIHQ also requested that the field reach out to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CD1B will coordinate the various efforts. CD1B has also been advised by the [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

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(S) [REDACTED]

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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b1

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 04/06/2007

~~(S)~~

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~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~ New York Division asked FBIHQ for guidance on the  
[REDACTED] FBIHQ was not prepared  
to discuss this in the VTT forum.

♦♦

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~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-15-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-15-2035

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/09/2007

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: CD-1B, Room [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
CD-7B, Room [redacted]  
IA [redacted]  
CD-7F, Room [redacted]  
IA/RO [redacted]  
Attn: Europe Unit, Room [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
Attn: A/LEGAT [redacted]  
Attn: ALAT [redacted]  
ALAT [redacted]  
Attn: LEGAT [redacted]  
Attn: Squad CI-5 [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

International Operations

Athens  
London

Paris  
Washington Field

b6  
b7C  
b2

From: San Francisco  
Squad 16H / San Jose RA  
Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] *[Signature]*

Drafted By: (S) [redacted]: aas *[Signature]*

Case ID #: (S) [redacted] (Pending) - [redacted]

Title: (S) (U) LITVINENKO, ALEXANDER  
[redacted]  
ALEXANDER LITVINENKO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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(U) Synopsis: (S) On 04/09/2007 [redacted]  
provided the enclosed English, Italian, and Russian language  
documents.

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(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) (S) Enclosure(s): (U) (S) Enclosed in a 1-A envelope for file copy  
only is the original FD-597 acknowledging the receipt of the  
enclosed documents. Enclosed for all recipients is a copy of [redacted]

~~SECRET~~ (S) *[Signature]*

b1

## SF Field Intelligence Group

Potential Intel Value: Yes ☒ No ☐

Reviewed By: *[Signature]* Date: 16 Apr 07

Drive Location: 164

b6  
b7C

*Rec'd + Clear*  
*[Signature]*  
5/21/2007

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 04/09/2007

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an Internet news article relating to the death of Igor PONOMAREV. Enclosed for WFO, CD-1B, CD-7B, and file only are copies of documents provided by [redacted]

Details: ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ On 04/09/2007. [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] office telephone [redacted]  
cellular telephone [redacted] home telephone [redacted]  
[redacted] fax [redacted] email [redacted] was  
interviewed at his place of employment by Special Agent [redacted]  
[redacted] who was familiar with the identity of  
the interviewing Agent from previous interviews provided the  
enclosed documents and the following information:

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b7D

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Approximately two years ago, [redacted]  
gave [redacted] Unbeknownst to [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] However, he declined to  
sign the FD-597.

~~(S)~~ These documents have not been translated or  
analyzed. [redacted]

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~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ According to [redacted] he may have been  
the subject of surveillance on [redacted]  
[redacted] returned home, [redacted]  
[redacted] in his car with [redacted] at approximately  
9:40 PM. [redacted] observed a small blue car, possibly a  
Honda, license plate [redacted] or [redacted]  
parked on the street a short distance from his driveway. A

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 04/09/2007

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~~(S)~~

check of California DMV records for these four license plates were negative.

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] observed three or four people, who looked younger, in the car. [REDACTED] was concerned, so he backed his car into his driveway and remained in his car [REDACTED]. The individuals in the car in question also remained in their vehicle and after about 10 minutes drove forward a short distance and blocked his driveway. After another approximately five minutes, the car drove forward another three to four houses and parked on the street. [REDACTED] pulled out of his driveway and followed the car in order to get the car's license plate. After noticing that [REDACTED] was driving in their direction, the blue car attempted to make a U-turn, but was stopped by the street's median. [REDACTED] passed the blue car, after which it made another U-turn and began to follow [REDACTED] car. [REDACTED] turned right at the cross street and then made another immediate right. The driver of the blue car either did not see him make the turn or was not following him, because the blue car did not make the second right turn with [REDACTED].

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] noted that the date of this incident occurred relatively shortly before the shooting of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED] was advised that the most likely explanation for this incident was that the occupants of the car were teenagers or young adults who were in the neighborhood for other reasons and, after observing that they had disturbed [REDACTED], decided to act in the observed manner for the purpose of increasing [REDACTED] [REDACTED] discomfort for their amusement. [REDACTED] was advised to report any future incidents to writing agent.

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~

[REDACTED] will probably be [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 04/09/2007

b1

[REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] advised that the name of the

[REDACTED]

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~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

email [REDACTED] indicated that  
he is not inclined to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 04/09/2007

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~~(S)~~

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information only.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information only.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

ATHENS

AT ATHENS, GREECE

(U) ~~(S)~~ In June, 2007, [REDACTED] is  
planning on [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] has expressed concern that, because he has been  
associated with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] has been advised that in the unlikely event he is  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] San Francisco  
Respectfully requests that should [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
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b7D

Set Lead 4: (Info)

LONDON

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 04/09/2007

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~~(S)~~

AT LONDON, UK

(U) For information only.

Set Lead 5: (Action)

PARIS

AT PARIS, FRANCE

(U) ~~(S)~~ In June, 2007, [REDACTED] is  
planning on [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] has expressed concern that, because he  
has been associated with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] has been advised that in the unlikely event he is  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] San Francisco  
respectfully requests that should [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Set Lead 6: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information only.

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~~SECRET~~



## Axis Information and Analysis

08.01.2007 11:49 (GMT) - 007 News

- German weekly magazine *Focus* pays attention in its latest issue to the fact that shortly before poisoning of the former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Alexander Litvinenko in London, a Russian diplomat had died at similar mysterious circumstances.

Last autumn Igor Ponomarev, representative of Russia in the International Maritime Organization (IMO), died in the British capital. *Focus* writes that the diplomat was attending a theatre performance when suddenly felt badly, experiencing a strong attack of thirst. The Russian had drunk a few litres of water, then had died. A heart attack was declared the reason of his death, his body was quickly delivered to Russia, though no post-mortem examination was made.

Sudden thirst is not known as a symptom of heart attack, according to Dietrich Andresen from the German Society of Cardiologists. In opinion of experts-toxicologists, Gabriela Gerber-Zupan from the Poisoning Emergency Centre in Munich, told the *Focus*, it could be thallium (it was firstly assumed as a cause of Alexander Litvinenko's poisoning, too) that might cause similar thirst. Igor Ponomarev wanted together with Litvinenko's Italian contact, Mario Scaramella, arrive to the appointment with the Russian ex-security officer, however, died according to his relatives, a day before the planned meeting on October 30, 2006.

Ponomarev's relatives, according to the *Focus*, do not exclude that the destruction of the Russian diplomat is connected with the poisoning case of the former FSB officer. Scotland Yard did not launch investigation of the reasons of death of the Russian diplomat as, according to its spokesman, nobody had applied about its excitation.

Close

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 07-14-2010 BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN

~~SECRET~~//20320330

DATE: 07-15-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-15-2035

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/30/2007

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: SSA [redacted]

CD-1B, Room [redacted]

IA [redacted]

CD-7B

Washington Field

Attn: SA [redacted]

CI-5

Boston

Attn: IA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b2

From: Boston

CI-1

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

:mrz *MRZ*

Case ID #: [redacted]

(S)  
(S)  
(S)

(Pending)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Title: [redacted]

ALEXANDER LITVINENKO;

aka EDMOND CARTER

(S)

(S)

OO:BS

b1

Synopsis: [redacted]

(U)  
(S)

To document the results of a meeting with [redacted]

(U)

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: 03/30/2032

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Details: [redacted]

(U)  
(S)

Per lead set from Washinton D.C. Field Office (WFO), Boston had previously interviewed [redacted] on [redacted] to determine his relationship with ALEXANDER LITVINENKO, [redacted] Further conversation with WFO and the Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters (FBIHQ), revealed the need for a

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(S)

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*Read + clear*  
*5/2/2007*

To: Boston From: Boston  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 03/30/2007

b1

follow-up interview in order to answer some specific questions not fully covered in the first interview.

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] relayed the following events as how ALEXANDER LITVINENKO and [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Historically television has been the optimal media to transmit political commentary and propaganda to the Russian public. [REDACTED] stated that Channel 1 controlled 80 percent of the market. (Per open source Internet checks [REDACTED] was referring to ORT otherwise known as First Channel).

(U) ~~(S)~~ According to [REDACTED] BORIS YELTSIN's protective security team killed VLADISLAV LISTIEV, the chairman in charge of Channel 1. A multi agency task force was organized to investigate the murder. [REDACTED] described the task force as being a myriad of Russian police departments and law enforcement agencies, to include the [REDACTED] (NFI). [REDACTED] became a primary suspect in the investigation. [REDACTED] opines that with the murder of LISTIEV and [REDACTED] in prison or dead, YELTSIN could place his supporters in charge of Channel 1.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The following events were described by [REDACTED] as told to him by LITVINENKO. It should be noted that [REDACTED] relayed that LITVINENKO tended to embellish the truth in order to inflate his own importance. LITVINENKO represented the [REDACTED] in the investigation of the murder of LISTIEV. LITVINENKO quickly concluded that LISTIEV had not been murdered by [REDACTED] While LITVINENKO was meeting with [REDACTED] at his office, a group of officers from the above described task force showed up with an arrest warrant for [REDACTED] Assuming that [REDACTED] would be killed on the way to prison, LITVINENKO told the officers that he was an [REDACTED] Lieutenant Colonel, and that he was investigating [REDACTED] LITVINENKO then told the officers that if they tried to enter the office he would kill whoever entered the room. LITVINENKO instructed the officers that they should convene between themselves to decide who would enter the room first and inevitably be killed. While this was all happening LITVINENKO contacted his superiors back at the [REDACTED] LITVINENKO relayed to his superiors, if [REDACTED] was to be arrested at this time he would most likely be killed while en

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To: Boston From: Boston  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 03/30/2007

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~~(S)~~

route to prison. Eventually, the arrest warrant was rescinded and the task force was dismissed.

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Writer opines that while the validity of this story is uncorroborated, it is important to note, that this action clearly aligned LITVINENKO with [redacted] and would later play into LITVINENKO being fired from the [redacted]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [redacted] first met ALEXANDER LITVINENKO the night before a press conference in [redacted]. The conference was held by [redacted] to announce that the [redacted]

[redacted] explained that [redacted] put on the appearance that he wielded great power and influence, but he was more talk than anything else. [redacted] thought that if he helped to get [redacted]

[redacted] To the surprise of [redacted] and LITVINENKO, instead of [redacted]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ LITVINENKO belonged to a small group within the [redacted]. [redacted] described this group as a special missions unit. They primary carried out killings ordered by the [redacted]. [redacted] opinion was that LITVINENKO did not actually carry out any killings, but rather he was in charge of organizing the operation. One such operation carried out by this particular group was the killing of PAUL TATUM. TATUM was a U.S. businessman who owned a luxury hotel in Russia (NEI). [redacted] at one point asked [redacted] LNU, whether he [redacted] gave a very elusive answer to the question. [redacted] did not press the matter.

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [redacted] said that he had met [redacted] on [redacted] while attending [redacted]. He said that he could not recall, but he believed he sat at the same table as [redacted] has had very little contact with [redacted]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [redacted] said that he had met [redacted] only once for approximately five minutes. He was introduced to [redacted] in a passing conversation. He described [redacted] as a close associate of [redacted] but had no further information.

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~~SECRET~~//20320330

To: Boston From: Boston  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED], 03/30/2007

~~(S)~~

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~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ Boston notes that [REDACTED] at  
anytime during the interview. [REDACTED] was extremely  
cooperative and was open to further contact by the FBI.

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~~SECRET~~//20320330

To: Boston From: Boston  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 03/30/2007

b1

(S)

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON D.C.

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON D.C.

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~//20320330

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-12-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-12-2035

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/07/2007

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: SSA [redacted]

CD-1B, Room [redacted]

IA [redacted]

CD-7F, Room [redacted]

International Operations

Attn: SSA [redacted]

Europe Unit, Room [redacted]

San Francisco

Attn: SA [redacted]

Washington Field

Attn: SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b2

From: London

Legat London

Contact: ALAT [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted]

(Pending) [redacted]

b1

Title: (U) (S) LITVINENKO, ALEXANDER

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Synopsis: (U) (S) Cover lead.

(U)

(S)

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

(S)

(U) [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Reference: (S) [redacted]

(U)

Details: (S) On 4/26/2007, Legat London responded to San Francisco EC dated 4/4/2007, requesting DIDO authority be requested to release information provided by San Francisco to [redacted] As a result of the request, San Francisco attempted to establish contact with the WF Case Agent for guidance.

b1

(U) (S) To ensure that this information is not mishandled, this lead is being discontinued until new guidance is provided by San Francisco or Washington Field. This lead is considered covered.

(S)

~~SECRET~~

(S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

*Lead + Clear*  
*5/30/2007*  
*YH*

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: London  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 05/07/2007

b1

~~(S)~~

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Read and Clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Read and Clear.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

SAN FRANCISCO

AT SAN FRANCISCO, CA

(U) Request DIDO authority for dissemination of information and provide new guidance to London.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Read and Clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-15-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-15-2035

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/11/2007

To: Counterintelligence  
London  
Washington Field

Attn: CD-1B, Room [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
Attn: ALAT [redacted]  
Attn: Squad CI-5  
SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b2

From: San Francisco  
Squad 16H / San Jose RA  
Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] *M*

Drafted By: [redacted]:aas *an*

Case ID #: (S) [redacted] (Pending) [redacted]

Title: (S) (U) LITVINENKO, ALEXANDER  
[redacted]  
ALEXANDER LITVINENKO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1

Synopsis: (U) (S) San Francisco requests that CD-1B obtain  
Designated Intelligence Disclosure Official (DIDO) Authority  
to pass classified information to [redacted]  
[redacted]

(U) (S) Derived From: G-3  
Declassify On: X1

(S) (U) (S) San Francisco requests that CD-1B obtain  
Designated Intelligence Disclosure Official (DIDO) Authority  
to pass the following information to [redacted]  
[redacted] and notify London upon receipt of this authority  
so that [redacted] can evaluate the information  
and determine whether to issue a subpoena, or its equivalent  
under British law, for the [redacted]  
[redacted]:

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(S) [redacted] has been an associate  
of [redacted] On

b1

~~SECRET~~

(S)

[redacted] *[signature]*

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 05/11/2007

b1

[redacted] advised the FBI that during one of

[redacted]

were provided to [redacted] by Alexander LITVINENKO.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted] Although  
the information contained within appeared dated, [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

b1

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [redacted] also advised that [redacted] also

[redacted]

therefore to Alexander LITVINENKO and his subsequent death.

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ On 04/03/2007, the FBI contacted a  
representative of [redacted]

[redacted] The FBI was  
advised that advised that [redacted]

[redacted]

should the FBI present [redacted] with a valid  
subpoena, such information could be provided.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

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~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: San Francisco  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 05/11/2007

b1

~~(S)~~

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

(U)

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U)

~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ San Francisco requests that CD-1B obtain Designated Intelligence Disclosure Official (DIDO) Authority to pass the information contained in this communication to [REDACTED] and notify London upon receipt of this authority.

b7D

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-15-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-15-2035

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/03/2007

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: CD-1D, SSA [redacted]  
CD-1B, SSA [redacted]

— Washington Field

Attn: SSA [redacted] CI-5

Boston

Attn: SSA [redacted] CI-1

Baltimore

Attn: SA [redacted] Calverton RA, Squad 8 b6 b7C b2

New York

Attn: SA [redacted] CT-3

From: New York

CD-7

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Drafted By: [redacted]:saj (S)

Case ID #: (S) [redacted] (Pending) [redacted] (Pending)

Title: (S) [redacted]

b1

Synopsis: (U) (S) To report results of an interview with [redacted] and a subsequent telephone call on [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
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(U)

(S)

~~Derived From: G-3~~  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Details: (S) On [redacted] SA [redacted] (CD-7) and SA [redacted] (CT-3) met with [redacted] at a diner in midtown Manhattan. The predication for this interview was to respond to a recent lead set to the New York CT Division and assigned to SA [redacted] whom subsequently coordinated with CD-7 due to overlapping investigational interests.

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(S)

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At. wpa

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To: Counterintelligence From: New York  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 04/03/2007

b1

~~(S)~~

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted]  
[redacted] is the [redacted]  
[redacted] New York, NY 10019. The [redacted]  
[redacted] funded by the Russian dissident, [redacted]  
[redacted] who currently resides in London. [redacted] is a friend  
of Alexander LITVINENKO (deceased) who was poisoned in November  
2006. He is also a [redacted]

[redacted] where he discussed the assassination of LITVINENKO.

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ After a brief introduction as to the FBI's mission  
regarding issues concerning national security and  
counterintelligence, SA [redacted] offered condolences concerning  
the recent death of [redacted] friend and colleague, LITVINENKO.  
After some general discussion regarding the assassination of  
LITVINENKO, (none of which has not already been reported in open  
sources), SA [redacted] then broached the subject of other  
suspicious deaths, specifically those of ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA and  
IVAN SAFRONOV. In addition, the recent shooting of [redacted]  
[redacted] was also mentioned.

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [redacted] stated that he had been wondering when  
someone from the FBI was going to approach him on that subject.  
He then volunteered that [redacted]  
[redacted] He was  
later able to verify the exact time as [redacted]  
[redacted] was ostensibly with [redacted]  
[redacted] and  
wanted to speak to [redacted] about something important. [redacted]  
then played the message for the agents. The message was from  
[redacted] who stated that [redacted]  
[redacted] The message went on to say that  
[redacted] and that he [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [redacted] stated that this message was probably in  
reference to [redacted] Ostensibly  
there were plans to establish a [redacted]  
[redacted] to highlight the  
murder of Alexander LITVINENKO. Some of the invited participants  
on this committee are the [redacted]  
[redacted]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ In order to [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: New York  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted], 04/03/2007

b1

~~(S)~~

[redacted]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [redacted] provided a copy of the [redacted]  
[redacted] that had been sent to [redacted] from  
[redacted] via himself (see attached). The date of the [redacted]  
[redacted] believes that

[redacted]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ According to [redacted] during [redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [redacted] attested that both [redacted] had  
been [redacted]

[redacted]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [redacted] stated that [redacted] would have more  
particulars concerning this matter. He recommended that [redacted] be

[redacted]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ [redacted] stated that he didn't have any information  
regarding the specifics of the death of IVAN SAFRONOV but that he  
had a [redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: New York  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 04/03/2007

b1

(U) (S) [REDACTED] stated that he wasn't sure if all the recent murders/assaults are connected, however, he felt that it was certain that the journalist (SAFRONOV) appeared to have been killed because of his investigation into weapons sales.

(U) (S) [REDACTED] stated that he didn't believe that the [REDACTED]

(S) (U) (S) [REDACTED] stated that he believed that LITVINENKO was killed because he was emblematic of the failure of the [REDACTED]. He had made them a laughing stock. He wrote about the apartment bombings and tried to expose the corruption of the [REDACTED]. And, when he ran, he didn't run to MI-6 or the CIA, he ran to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. In addition, it was widely believed that LITVINENKO was working with [REDACTED] which only served to earn him further enmity from Russia.

b6  
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(U) (S) [REDACTED] felt that in the United States that there were three potential targets for assassination attempts; [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] also admitted that he was presently [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) (S) [REDACTED] stated that he would be [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] He also affirmed that he would stay in contact with SA [REDACTED] if anything of interest came up.

b6  
b7C  
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(U) (S) On [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] received an urgent message from [REDACTED] to call him. When she returned the phone call he said that [REDACTED]. He said that [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] He additionally stated that he was really concerned and wanted SA [REDACTED] to know. SA [REDACTED] thanked him for the information and encouraged him to continue to stay in touch and let her know [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

♦♦

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~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: New York  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 04/03/2007

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(S)

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

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Page 1

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/11/2006

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: UC [redacted]

CD-1B, room [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

CD-1B, room [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

CD-1B, room [redacted]

IA [redacted]

CD-7B, room [redacted]

Attn: SA [redacted] CD-1

SA [redacted] CD-1

Attn: SSA [redacted]

A/SSA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b2

Washington Field

Houston

From: Houston

CI-3

Contact: A/SSA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: (S) [redacted] jss

Case ID #: (S) [redacted] (Pending)

(S) (S) [redacted] (Pending)

b1

Title: (S) [redacted]

(U) Synopsis: (S) To report asset debrief 12/06, 12/13, and 12/14/2006.

(U) (S) Derived From : G-3  
Declassify On: 25X1 Human

Details: (U) (S) On 12/06/2006 and 12/13/2006 SA's [redacted] and [redacted] met with a Houston operational asset with excellent access whose reporting has been evaluated as consistently reliable, who provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

b1

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

Case ID : [redacted]

Serial : [redacted]

(S)

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(S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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Page

6

(S)

(S)

(S)

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(S)

(S)

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ For information only.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

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~~SECRET~~

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Page

7

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) ~~(S)~~ For information only.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

HOUSTON

AT HOUSTON, TX

(U) ~~(S)~~ For information only.

\*\*

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b6  
b7C

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (SF) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2007 1:49 PM  
To: [redacted]

Cc:  
Subject: Information at [redacted] possibly related to Litvinenko

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

DATE: 07-12-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-12-2035

b1

[redacted] an associate of [redacted] recently informed me that about two years ago

[redacted] and therefore may be related to Litvinenko's murder. I also interviewed a [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

So, it seems prudent to attempt to identify what [redacted]

[redacted] Their legal department has advised that a subpoena will suffice for their purposes. Since the crime in question occurred in the UK, the subpoena (or whatever the UK equivalent is) should originate there. Our only other alternative is an [redacted] And to be honest, I'd rather not go there if I don't have to.

So, for London: Are the [redacted] interested in knowing what [redacted] and if so, can they produce an official legal request equivalent to a subpoena that can be served on a US entity?

[redacted]

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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b7C  
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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2007 4:31 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: Kommersant transcripts - 30 March 2007 questioning of Berezovsky - of interest

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b7D  
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~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

DATE: 07-13-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-13-2035

[redacted]  
This morning (2 May 2007), Kommersant published Russian-language transcripts of the questioning of [redacted]  
[redacted] This interview was Russia's  
response to the British questioning of [redacted] and others in Russia. Most of the questions were asked by [redacted]  
[redacted] (unsure on last name), [redacted] -- I assume that the [redacted] provided the  
questions, but [redacted] was to be the one doing the asking. On the transcript of Cassette #3, the following interaction  
took place. This is my very loose translation (emphasis intended).

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(S) If you go to [www.kommersant.ru/articles/2007/\[redacted\].html](http://www.kommersant.ru/articles/2007/[redacted].html), you'll be able to download all six transcripts. Could we  
have [redacted] take a look at the transcripts and answer some follow-up questions? Actually, perhaps we could talk  
about all of this in conjunction with the [redacted] emailed about yesterday. I think that some follow-up with  
[redacted] could be useful.

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b1

(S) Thought you'd like to see this information,

Best,

[redacted]

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]  
FBIHQ - Intelligence Analyst

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/10/2007

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

CI-5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

b6

b7C

b2

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

:plp [REDACTED]

DATE: 07-13-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-13-2035

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

(S)

(S)

(S)

[REDACTED] (Pending)

[REDACTED] Liaison (Pending)

Title: [REDACTED]

ALEXANDER VALTEROVICH LITVINENKO;

A/K/A EDWIN REDWALD CARTER

(S)

Synopsis: (U)(S)

Meeting with FBIHQ .

(U)

(S)

~~Derived From : G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

Details: [REDACTED]

(S)

On 05/09/2007, IA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] attended a meeting at FBIHQ with IA [REDACTED] and IA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had invited WFO to meet to review

(S)

reporting on [REDACTED]

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(S)

In conclusion, it was agreed that [REDACTED] would

(S)

prepare questions to be posed to [REDACTED]

♦♦

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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(S)

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(S)

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DATE: 07-13-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-13-2035

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

May 24, 2007

(U) ~~(S)~~ T-1 IS A SENSITIVE SOURCE WHO HAS BEEN VETTED.  
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF  
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN  
WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE OF  
INFORMATION.

(S)

(S)

(S)

b1

~~(S)~~ (U)

~~Derived From : G-3~~  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1

(S)

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

(S)



~~SECRET~~

(S)

(S)

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/24/2007

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: CD-1A

SSA [redacted]

London

Attn: Legat

Washington Field

Attn: Squad CI-1

Squad CI-5

SA [redacted]

From: Washington Field

CI-2

Contact: [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b2

Approved By: [redacted] LB/m

Drafted By: [redacted]

:MRM

(S)

Case ID #

(S) (S)

[redacted]

(Pending)

[redacted]

(S) (S)

[redacted]

(Pending)

[redacted]

(S) (S)

[redacted]

(Pending)

Title: (S)

[redacted]

Synopsis: (U) (S) Lead for London.

(U)

(S)

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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Reference: (S)

[redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

(U) (S) [redacted]

b7E

Enclosure(s):

(S)

Enclosed are two copies of an LHM for CD-1A.

Details:

(S)

[redacted]

b7D  
b7E

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

(S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: Washington Field  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 05/24/2007

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

b7D  
b7E

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ WFO, Squad CI-2 furnished an LHM to Legat London to be provided to [REDACTED] in EC dated 11/17/04. The purpose was to furnish information regarding Alexander Litvinenko, AKA:Aleksandr Litvinenko, a former [REDACTED] officer residing in London, to [REDACTED] WFO CI-2 did not receive a copy of Legat London's response in EC dated 8/9/05, referenced serial#177 most likely because the captioned case is assigned to WFO squad CI-1. In the interim, Litvinenko, died due to radiation poisoning and is alleged to have been assassinated by the Russian government or those associated with it.

b7D

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~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: Washington Field  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 05/24/2007

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

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(S)

~~(S)~~ Due to the above, WFO is interested in [REDACTED]

(S)

Therefore, it is requested that the enclosed LHM be furnished to [REDACTED] with a request to answer this question and any information they may have [REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: Washington Field  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 05/24/2007  
~~(S)~~

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

b1

~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ CD-1A is requested to obtain DIDDO authority to  
furnish the enclosed LHM to the [redacted]

Set Lead 2: (Action)

LONDON

AT LONDON

~~(S)~~ to [redacted] ~~(S)~~ London is requested to furnish the enclosed LHM

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-13-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-13-2035

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/10/2007

To: Washington Field

Attn: SA [redacted] Squad CI-5

From: Counterintelligence

CD-7B/FBIHQ/5266

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] [signature]

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b7C  
b2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Drafted By: [redacted]:bj

Case ID #: (S) [redacted] (Pending)

(U) (S) 163G-LO-14031 (Pending)

Title: (S) [redacted]  
(S) ALEKSANDR LITVINENKO INVESTIGATION

b1

Synopsis: (S) Based on our meeting on 9 May 2007, this electronic communication provides questions to the case agent for use in a follow-up interview of [redacted] in the LITVINENKO investigation.

(U) (S) Derived From: G-3  
Declassify On: 05/10/2032

Details: (S) On 2 May 2007, Kommersant released six separate transcripts of the [redacted] an investigator assigned to the LITVINENKO case from the [redacted] In the course of the [redacted] in light of the Kommersant transcripts. Given this, the following questions are provided.

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(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

(S) [signature] [redacted]

[redacted] [signature]

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Counterintelligence  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 05/10/2007

(S)

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~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Counterintelligence  
Re: (S) [redacted] 05/10/2007

(S)

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(S)

[redacted]

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(S)

[redacted]

(U) THE ALLEGED LITVINENKO INVESTIGATION IN SPAIN

(U) At the end of the first *Kommersant* transcript, [redacted] reported that LITVINENKO was involved in an investigation in Spain (alongside Spanish police). According to [redacted] LITVINENKO traveled to Spain sometime in August-September 2006. The investigation involved illicit activity (particularly money laundering and real estate ventures) by [redacted]

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(S)

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Counterintelligence  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 05/10/2007

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

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(S)

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Counterintelligence  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 05/10/2007

~~(S)~~

(S)

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~~(S)~~

b1

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ ASSORTED QUESTIONS

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- 
- 

~~(S)~~

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~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Counterintelligence  
Re: (S) [redacted] 05/10/2007

(S)

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~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Counterintelligence  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 05/10/2007

~~(S)~~

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

b1


WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, DC

~~(S)~~ For use in any follow-up interview with [redacted]

~~(S)~~

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1 -  
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1 -



b6  
b7C

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1

b6  
b7C

DATE: 07-13-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-13-2035

60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/03/2007

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: [REDACTED]

Room 5266

From: Washington Field

CI-5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

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b7C  
b2

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(S)

:plp [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(S)

(Pending) ✓

DATE: 07-13-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-13-2035

Title: (S) ALEXANDER LITVINENKO;  
A/K/A EDMOND CARTER

(S)

b1

Synopsis: (U) (S) Email from [REDACTED]

(S)

(U)

~~Derived From : G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

Enclosure(s): (U) (S)

(S)

Email from [REDACTED]

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b7D

Details: (U) (S) On 06/03/2007, SA [REDACTED] received the attached email from [REDACTED] is forwarding this to FBIHQ for review since this series of communications were forwarded to the [REDACTED] regarding the LITVINENKO investigation.

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DATE: 07-13-2010  
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REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/03/2007

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: [REDACTED] CD-7B  
Room 5266

From: Washington Field

CI-5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b2

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] plp

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] (Pending) ✓

Title: (S) ALEXANDER LITVINENKO;  
(S) A/K/A EDMOND CARTER  
(S) [REDACTED]

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Synopsis: (S) Follow-up contact with [REDACTED]

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(S) ~~Declassify On: X1~~

Enclosure(s): (S) Email from [REDACTED]

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Details: (S) On 05/31/2007, IA [REDACTED] IA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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To: Counterintelligence From: Washington Field  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 06/03/2007

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~~(S)~~

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Read and clear.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/29/2007

To: Washington Field

Attn: CI-5, SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

From: Washington Field

CI-5

Contact: SA [redacted]

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b7C  
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Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

(Pending)

Title: (S) [redacted]

Synopsis: (U)(S) Source reporting.

(S)(U)

~~Derived From: G-3~~  
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(S)

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DO NOT UPLOAD

~~SECRET~~

(S)

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: (S) [redacted] 05/29/2007

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
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b7C  
b2

Requestor:   
Telephone: (S)   
Case/File #: (S)

Date: 06/18/2007  
Squad/Unit/Legat/etc.:   
Case Title: ALEXANDER LITVINENKO

Language From: Russian Into: English

### ☐ TRANSLATION

- ☐ Summary  
☐ Verbatim  
☒ Other: List

- ☒ Document(s) # of pages: 3  
☐ Video # of HH:MM:   
☐ Audio # of sessions:   
# of HH:MM:   
☐ Telephone  
☐ Microphone  
☐ Live monitoring  
☐ Other:   
☐ Electronic file(s)  
☐ E-mail # of e-mails:   
☐ Web pages # of URLs:

Participants in the recording/document (if known):

Purpose: ☐ Public release  
☐ Court  
☐ Information only

Deadline (if any):

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Nature of assignment:

DATE: 07-13-2010  
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REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-13-2035

Date of assignment:

Time:

Location: 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

Clearance required (e.g., TS-SCI, Secret, etc.):

Names and titles/ranks of FBI participants:

Names and titles/ranks of other participants:

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NOTE: Talking points must be provided to interpreter at least 24 HOURS before assignment.

Special Instructions/Information: (e.g., synopsis of case, handling caveats, etc.)

Note: Info provided by (S)   
on 5/31/07

OFFICE USE ONLY Tasking Number:

Quality Control: ☐ Yes ☐ No

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Rev. 4/06/2007

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
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retrieved on Mon, 30 Oct 2006 04:45:28 GMT.

These search terms have been highlighted: **vektor viktor ivanov**

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# Open Source Center

Document ID: CEP20050913027087  
Content Type: Translation/Transcription  
Version Number: 01

Region: Eurasia

Sub-Region: Russia

Country: Russia

Topic: DOMESTIC ECONOMIC, MILITARY

Source-Date: 09/13/2005

Russian President's Aide Reelected Defense Company's  
Chairman of Directors

CEP20050913027087 Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey WWW-Text  
in English 1141 GMT 13 Sep 05

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

MOSCOW. Sept 13 (Interfax-AVN) - Russian President's aide **Viktor Ivanov** was reelected as the chairman of the Board of Directors of the  
Almaz-Antei air defense company.

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"The decision on his reelection was adopted following the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov's directive "On voting" that recommended voting for his candidacy as this is 'in the interests of the Russian Federation in the course of decision-making at Almaz-Antei'," reads the press release of the company received by Interfax-Military News Agency on Tuesday.

It also reads that Ivanov has been heading the Board of Directors of the company for three years since June 2002.

Born in 1950 in Novgorod, he studied at the Leningrad-based Bonch-Bruyevich electrotechnical institute, which he graduated from in 1974. Then he joined army, and later was an engineer at the **Vektor** research and production association in St. Petersburg.

He was in service with secret services for over 20 years since 1977. He started service as a junior officer of the regional section of the USSR KGB in the Leningrad region, and finished his secret service carrier as the Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Security Service. In 1987 and 1988, he took part in action in the course of Soviet operations in Afghanistan.

From 1994 till 1996, he was head of the Administrative Bodies Directorate of St. Petersburg city administration. From 1996 till 1998, he discharged duties as the Director General of the Teleplyus limited company. From 1998 till 1999, he occupied the position of the head of a directorate of the Russian Federal Security Service, from which he was promoted to the post of the FSB Deputy Director and head of the Russian Federation Economic Security Department. He was the head of the presidential apparatus from 2000 till March 2004, when he became the aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

[Description of Source: Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey WWW-Text in English -- Internet news service devoted to military news and owned by the independent Interfax news agency; website located at [www.militarynews.ru](http://www.militarynews.ru)]

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
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retrieved on Sun, 29 Oct 2006 10:53:36 GMT.

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Document ID: CEP20011123000070  
Version Number: 01

**Region: Central Eurasia**

**Sub-Region: Russia**

**Country: Russia**

**Topic: DOMESTIC POLITICAL, TECHNOLOGY, MILITARY**

**Source-Date: 11/23/2001**

**Russia: Dep Chief of Putin's Administration Elected to  
Almaz Board of Directors**

*CEP20011123000070 Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey WWW-Text  
in English 0941 GMT 23 Nov 01*

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

MOSCOW. Nov 23 (Interfax-AVN) - **Viktor Ivanov**, deputy head of the  
Russian president's administration, has been unanimously elected chairman  
of the Almaz defense company's board of directors, a company official told  
Interfax-Military News Agency on Friday. Ivanov was born in the city of  
Novgorod in 1950. He graduated from the Leningrad Bonch-Bruyevich

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Electrotechnical Institute of Communication with a diploma in radio communication and from the KGB higher courses. He worked as an engineer in the **Vektor** research and production association from 1971 to 1977. After that he joined the security service and worked there until 1994. His last post was the head of the anti-smuggling section in the Federal Counterintelligence Service department for the Leningrad region. From 1987 to 1988 he was on a mission in Afghanistan. In 1994 Ivanov was appointed head of the administration bodies department in the St. Petersburg Mayor's Office. In 1998 he became head of the interior security department in the Federal Security Service (FSB) and a year later FSB deputy director and head of the economic security department. In January 2000 Ivanov was appointed deputy head of President Vladimir Putin's administration. After the elections the Almaz board of directors considered current issues related to the enterprise's activities, the official said. In particular, the board approved the enterprise's budget for the first half of 2002 and analyzed current legal issues, which was necessary because the post of board chairman had been vacant since June 10 this year. The session did not consider any restructuring of the enterprise, the official stressed. Several long-term issues were put off to the next session which is to take place in two weeks. Ivanov had earlier been elected to chair the board of directors in the Antei consortium. Antei and research and production company Almaz are Russia's largest developers and manufacturers of air defense systems. In particular, Antei manufactures and exports mobile Tor-M1, S-300B, Antei- 2500 and other systems. Almaz has been chosen by the Russian government to function as the basic organisation for development of a promising surface-to-air missile system for all armed services. The enterprise has designed several generations of surface-to-air missile systems and their modifications, including S-25, S-75, S-125, S-200, S-300PMU1 and S-300PMU2 Favorit that are the backbone of Russia's air defense. Almaz is currently developing and testing the promising S-400 Triumf system. The two organizations are expected to be incorporated into an Air Defense Consortium, now at the formative stage.

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[Description of Source: Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey WWW-Text in Russian -- independent Russian internet website devoted to military affairs]

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# Sergei Yushenkov

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Sergei Yushenkov (Сергей Ющенко) (1950-2003) was a liberal Russian politician well known for his uncompromising struggle for democracy, rapid free market economic reforms, and higher human rights standards in Russia. He was assassinated on April 17, 2003, just hours after registering his political party to participate in the December 2003 parliamentary elections.

## Contents

- 1 Political career
- 2 Kovalev commission
- 3 Assassination
- 4 Investigation
- 5 References
- 6 External links
  - 6.1 English
  - 6.2 Russian
- 7 See also

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## Political career

Yushenkov was an elected member of all Russian Parliaments from 1989 to 2003. During the Soviet coup attempt of 1991, he organized the "living chain" of civilians who came to protect their Parliament in Moscow, and he successfully negotiated with military personnel sent to storm the building.

As a person with a military background, Yushenkov was the strongest proponent of reform in the Russian Army, and he campaigned tirelessly to abolish conscription, reduce the size of the Army, and protect all rights of military personnel who suffered from abuse and dedovshchina. Yushenkov was a prominent critic of the Chechen Wars. He argued that Russian Army operates in Chechnya (a part of Russia) illegally.

His political party, Liberal Russia, was officially formed on October 22, 2002. The other initial organizers of this party before its registration were Vladimir Golovlev, Victor Pokhmelkin, and controversial businessman Boris Berezovsky. Vladimir Golovlev was assassinated on August 21, 2002 (his killers were never found), and Boris Berezovsky was expelled, presumably on the request of State authorities who refused to register the party, and possibly due to tensions between the initial organizers of the party [1] (<http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/Parties/m.64562.html>).

## Kovalev commission

Yushenkov was vice chairman of the Sergei Kovalev commission formed to investigate the Russian apartment bombings [2] (<http://www.eng.terror99.ru/publications/107.htm>), and his views that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) had orchestrated the bombings to generate public support for the Chechen War were similar to those of journalist David Satter, a Johns Hopkins University and Hoover Institute scholar. [1]. During his visit to the United States in April 2002, Yushenkov described a secret order issued by Boris Yeltsin to initiate the Second Chechen War, according to Alexander Goldfarb [3] ([http://www.hro.org/editions/yushenkov/02\\_06\\_03.htm](http://www.hro.org/editions/yushenkov/02_06_03.htm)). The order was issued in response to a demand from 24 Russian governors that the then-unpopular Yeltsin should transfer all state powers to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Yeltsin's order was dated September 23 1999, the same

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei\\_Yushenkov](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Yushenkov)

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day that FSB operatives were caught red-handed while planing a bomb in an apartment complex in the city of Ryazan (after which the sequence of bombings in several Russian cities suddenly stopped). The next day, Vladimir Putin began the military campaign in Chechnya. According to Yushenkov, Putin's rise to power represented a successful coup d'état organized by the FSB.

## Assassination

Sergei Yushenkov was shot dead near his house in Moscow on April 17, 2003, just hours after finally obtaining the registrations needed for his Liberal Russia party to participate in the December 2003 parliamentary elections in 55 regions. His last known public utterance was "Registration has been completed." [4] ([http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_qn4158/is\\_20030419/ai\\_n12693024](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_20030419/ai_n12693024)). Mikhail Trepashkin believed that Yushenkov was murdered because he was a leader of an opposition party that openly challenged the power of the FSB and Russian authorities. Moreover, Yushenkov promised voters an independent investigation of the Russian apartment bombings as a key issue of his election campaign (an interview of Trepashkin can be seen in director Andrei Nekrasov's documentary "*Disbelief*" [5] (<http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0389929/>), Google Video (<http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=7658755847655738553>)). Just before his death, Sergei Yushenkov received threats from a high-ranking FSB general, Aleksander Mikhailov, according to Grigory Pasko [6] (<http://grani.ru/Projects/Yushenkov/m.30073.html>).

## Investigation

Four people have been convicted during a controversial trial for the murder of Sergei Yushenkov and are currently serving prison sentences. Most prominent among them is Mikhail Kodanov, a former co-chairman of the Liberal Russia party organized by Yushenkov himself. During the trial, Mikhail Kodanov strenuously claimed to be innocent. He later tried to commit suicide and was placed in the FSB's special Lefortovo prison. According to attorney Henry Reznick, Kodanov was convicted solely on the basis of the false testimony of another convicted suspect (Alexander Vinnik) who made a series of contradictory statements, including claims that Yushenkov was killed by the government ("убила власть") [7] (<http://grani.ru/Society/Law/m.63911.html>). Critics also insisted that the political murders of two chairmen of the Liberal Russia party should have been considered as the same case in the court, which would make it clear that some of the suspects were wrongly accused [8] (<http://grani.ru/Projects/Yushenkov/m.67481.html>). Some observers noted that Kodanov was relatively unknown in Russian politics until he was named to Yushenkov's party by Boris Berezovsky, ostensibly to make a mockery of Vladimir Putin (Kodanov was nicknamed "Putin" because he looks very much like the President). Some Russian media claimed that it was Boris Berezovsky who organized the murder of Sergei Yushenkov through his agent Mikhail Kodanov.

## References

1. ^ David Satter. *Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State*. Yale University Press. 2003. ISBN 0-300-09892-8.

## External links

### English

- Russian liberal deputy shot dead (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2957077.stm>) - BBC News
- Yushenkov, a Russian idealist (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2957823.stm>) - BBC News
- Obituary ([http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_qn4158/is\\_20030419/ai\\_n12693024](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_20030419/ai_n12693024)) - *The*

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- Moscow: Death of a deputy ([http://www.jamestown.org/publications\\_details.php?volume\\_id=16&&issue\\_id=621](http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=16&&issue_id=621)) - The Jamestown Foundation
- Russian MP's death sparks storm (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2958997.stm>) - BBC News
- Russia buries slain deputy as concern mounts over political killings (<http://eng.terror99.ru/publications/092.htm>) - Agence France-Presse
- Russian deputy assassinated (<http://www.voanews.com/uspolicy/archive/2003-04/a-2003-04-23-2-1.cfm?renderforprint=1&textonly=1&&TEXTMODE=1&CFID=65026161&CFTOKEN=46301489>) - Voice of America News

**Russian**

- Sergei Yushenkov knew that he was a target of FSB assassination (<http://grani.ru/Projects/Yushenkov/m.30073.html>)
- Publications about the murder of Sergei Yushenkov (<http://grani.ru/Projects/Yushenkov/>)
- Interview with Radio Free Europe (<http://www.svoboda.org/programs/hr/2003/hr.021803.asp>)
- Yushenkov on the Russian apartment bombings (<http://archive.svoboda.org/programs/hr/2002/hr.031302.asp>)
- List of members of Kovalev comission (<http://terror99.ru/commission.htm>)
- Yuri Shchekochikhin on the murder of Sergei Yushenkov (<http://ys.novayagazeta.ru/text/2003-04-21.shtml>)
- Opinions about death of Yushenkov (<http://grani.ru/Events/Terror/m.33541.html>)

**See also**

- Human rights in Russia
- Yuri Shchekochikhin
- Sergei Kovalev
- Anna Politkovskaya
- Alexander Litvinenko
- Galina Starovoitova
- Artyom Borovik

Retrieved from "[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei\\_Yushenkov](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Yushenkov)"

Categories: 1950 births | 2003 deaths | Russian politicians | Russian dissidents | Russian murder victims

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# Yegor Gaidar

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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
**This article documents a current event.**

Information may change rapidly as the event progresses.

**Yegor Timurovich Gaidar** (Егoр Тимурoвич Гайдaр) (born March 19, 1956) is a Russian economist and politician, and was the acting Prime Minister of Russia from June 15, 1992 to December 14, 1992. He is the grandson of famous Soviet writers Arkady Gaidar (on the side of his father, Rear Admiral Timur Gaidar) and of Pavel Bazhov (on his mother's side).

## Contents

- 1 Professional life
  - 1.1 After 1994
  - 1.2 Positions held
  - 1.3 Honorary positions
- 2 2006 illness
- 3 References
- 4 External links



Yegor Gaidar

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## Professional life

Gaidar graduated with honors from the Moscow State University, Department of Economics, in 1978 and worked as a researcher in several academic institutes. A long-time member of the Communist Party and an editor of the CPSU ideological journal *Communist* during the perestroika, he turned a liberal during the time of Yeltsin's reforms. In 1991 he quit the Communist Party and joined Yeltsin's government.

While in government, Gaidar advocated liberal economic reforms according to the principle of shock therapy. His most well-known decision was to abolish price regulation by the state, which immediately resulted in a major increase of prices and amounted to officially authorizing a market economy in Russia. He also cut military procurement and industrial subsidies, and reduced the budget deficit. Gaidar was the Minister of Economic Development from 1991 until 1992, and Minister of Finance from February 1992 until April 1992.

He was appointed acting Prime Minister under President Boris Yeltsin in 1992 from June 15 until December 14, when the anti-Yeltsin Congress of People's Deputies refused to confirm him in this position and chose instead the seemingly more conservative Viktor Chernomyrdin. Gaidar was also the First Deputy Prime Minister from 1991 until 1992 and again from September 1993 until January 1994.

## After 1994

Later in 1994, after leaving the government, he became a founding member and chairman of the Democratic Choice of Russia party. In 1999, he became a founding member and co-chairman, along with his longtime political ally Anatoly Chubais of the Union of Right Forces. He served as a deputy of the State Duma from 1999 to 2003. In 2001 the Democratic Choice Party merged into the Union of Right Forces. After URF's failure to regain seats in the parliament in 2003, Gaidar gradually retired from public political activities, concentrating on research in economics.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yegor\\_Gaidar](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yegor_Gaidar)

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Yegor Gaidar has over 100 publications in Australia, Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Taiwan, UK, USA, and by international institutions.

Yegor Gaidar just published a new book, "*Lasting time. Russia in the World.*" (Russian) where he criticized the economic policies of Putin's administration. In this book, he completed a meticulous analysis of the close relationship between the energy prices and political events in Russia. He justified that one of main reasons behind the Soviet Union's fall was the low price of oil. Prices were also low during Yeltsin's rule, which was a serious problem that made political and economic reforms in the country very difficult. According to Gaidar, it is wrong to rely only on oil and gas (as the current Russian government is doing), as it creates only a false impression of prosperity and stability in the country. He argued that a lot more must be done to promote real economic development.


## Positions held

- Director of the Transformation Economy Institute
- Executive Vice-President of the International Democratic Union (Conservative International)
- Steering Committee member "Arrabida Meetings" (Portugal)
- Member of the Baltic Sea Cooperation Council under the Prime-Minister of Sweden
- Member of the Editorial Board of "Vestnik Evropy" (Moscow)
- Member of the Advisory Board of the "Acta Oeconomica" (Budapest)
- Member of the Advisory Board of the CASE Foundation (Warsaw)

## Honorary positions

- Honorary Professor, University of California, Berkeley.
- Terry Sanford Distinguished Lecturer, Duke University
- Honorary Academy member of the Ukrainian Academy of Management
- Honorary Director, Russia- Ukraine Institute for Personnel and Management

## 2006 illness

 **This section documents a current event.** Information may change rapidly as the event progresses.

On November 28, 2006, Yegor Gaidar was found unconscious in County Kildare, Ireland where he had been presenting his new book, "*Lasting time. Russia in the World.*". He was taken to a Dublin hospital and doctors say there is a serious threat to his health. There have been suspicions of a poisoning but Gaidar and his close ally Anatoly Chubais have refrained from accusing the Russian Security Service.<sup>[1]</sup>

Doctors see no natural reason for Yegor Gaidar's condition but say that it is not life threatening.

These events are reminiscent of last days of Alexander Litvinenko, who died of radiation poisoning on 23 November 2006.

On November 30, 2006, Gaidar's doctors made a statement that they believed he was also poisoned.

On December 6, 2006, Gaidar claimed in an op-ed published in both Russian-language and English-language publications, that he was poisoned by adversaries of the Russian authorities. He did not elaborate on who these adversaries may be.

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## References

1. ^ Second Russian in poison mystery (<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20845077-2703,00.html>), November 29, 2006

## External links

- Yegor Gaidar's Project Syndicate op/eds ([http://www.project-syndicate.org/contributors/contributor\\_comm.php4?id=165](http://www.project-syndicate.org/contributors/contributor_comm.php4?id=165))
- Yegor Gaidar's home page (<http://www.gaidar.org/>)

Preceded by: <b>Boris Yeltsin</b>	<b>Acting Prime Minister of Russia</b> 1992	Succeeded by: <b>Viktor Chernomyrdin</b>
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Categories: Current events | Prime Ministers of Russia | Russian politicians | Russian economists | Alumni and faculty of Moscow State University | 1956 births | Living people | Duke University faculty

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
[http://opensource.dni.ic.gov/doc\\_lib/2003/007/01/CEP20030701000079N.html](http://opensource.dni.ic.gov/doc_lib/2003/007/01/CEP20030701000079N.html) as  
retrieved on Mon, 30 Oct 2006 03:46:07 GMT.

These search terms have been highlighted: **vektor ivanov**

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# Open Source Center

Document ID: CEP20030701000079

Version Number: 02

**Region: Central Eurasia**

**Sub-Region: Russia**

**Country: Russia**

**Topic: DOMESTIC POLITICAL, LEADER**

**Source-Date: 06/26/2003**

**Russian Website Profiles Presidential Staff Deputy Head  
Viktor Ivanov**

*CEP20030701000079 Moscow Stringer News Agency WWW-Text in  
Russian 26 Jun 03*

[Correction -- rewording second sentence, sixth paragraph: Information  
Desk report: "'Kremlin Borman's' Career"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Viktor **Ivanov**, deputy head of the Presidential Staff, is a very reserved man.  
He is renowned for his ability to collect information and choose the right

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personnel. He gives virtually no interviews but he does speak in Putin's name at various public events. In the leader's entourage he holds approximately the same position as Borman held under Hitler, and he is just as secretive.

Nevertheless, some information about him has leaked out.

### Patriotism Brazilian-Style

Viktor Petrovich **Ivanov** was born 12 May 1950 in Velikiy Novgorod into the family of a military man. In 1971-1977, after graduating from the Leningrad electrical engineering institute, he worked as an engineer at the **Vektor** science and production association. In 1977-1994, after graduating from the KGB higher courses, he worked at a directorate of the Office for St Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast. He was promoted to chief of the department for combating smuggling. In 1987-1988 he was in Afghanistan. In 1994-1996, at Putin's initiative, he headed the St. Petersburg city hall administrative organs administration and left with him after Anatoliy Sobchak's defeat at the gubernatorial elections.

After Putin was appointed FSB [Federal Security Service] head **Ivanov** initially headed the internal security directorate as a deputy director [as published]. In 2000 he became deputy director of the Presidential Staff responsible for personnel. In 2002 he headed the board of directors of the newly created Almaz-Antey Air Defense Company, which produces S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems, and he also oversees the Presidential Staff Main Administration for CIS Affairs.

It was at **Ivanov's** initiative that the Russian Federation president's actively operating commission for pardons was eliminated, after which the number of convicts pardoned by the president declined substantially.

Viktor Petrovich is now regarded as a member of one of the subgroups of "Kremlin Chekists" which also includes his namesake Defense Minister Sergey **Ivanov** and FSB Deputy Director Yuriy Zaostrovtssev. At the same time the previously close cooperation with FSB Director Nikolay Patrushev and Internal Affairs Minister Boris Gryzlov has disappeared in recent years, most likely because of the claims of the latter's stooges to posts controlled by the Presidential Staff deputy head's people.

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In terms of his views Viktor **Ivanov** is a statist of the Latin American type. In other words, he acknowledges Russia's subordination to its senior partners in the shape of the United States and above all the EU countries in the foreign policy sphere and is prepared for substantial concessions in the economic field in exchange for the right to deal with his opponents inside the Russian Federation without interference from international organizations. Here the status of a state of the semi-colonial type independent of its senior partners should be actively concealed by statist rhetoric and references to a great past.

### Defender of His Fellow Tribesmen

Viktor **Ivanov** is regarded as the de facto author of the law "On Russian Federation Citizenship" adopted 20 February <sup>2003</sup> this year by 235 votes from the centrist factions and Zhirinovskiy supporters. The Communists and their allies and also Yabloko, the SPS [Union of Right-Wing Forces] and part of the Regions of Russia group did not support the law. Even in the opinion of Sergey Markov, director of the Institute of Political Studies, in general known for his loyalty to the Kremlin, the law was not liberal enough and it contains numerous opportunities for abuses by officials and the security structures.

In turn Yabloko Deputy Chairman Sergey Mitrokhin noted that the law "erects a barrier on the path of the influx of human resources" and "makes the position of our compatriots abroad far more difficult" and in its text you can clearly trace the interests of the MVD, which if the law is adopted will receive tremendous opportunities during additional bureaucratic procedures. Communist Anatoliy Chekhoyev, deputy chairman of the Committee for CIS Affairs, noted that under the new law "having removed 28 million Russians from our patronage, we will be completing the country's collapse." State Duma Deputy Vyacheslav Igrunov's appeal to Viktor **Ivanov** suggesting that the group for the law's development include representatives of organizations of refugees and the Russian diasporas of the near abroad went unanswered.

The law does indeed utterly fail to consider the situation, and, according to the original draft, a former USSR citizen from another former Soviet republic, irrespective of ethnicity, will find things no simpler than an inhabitant of Africa (primarily because of the five-year residence qualification and the numerous bureaucratic procedures). Deputy Viktor Alksnis, who traditionally defends the Russian-speaking population of the near abroad, also actively criticized the law and in the end could not get through the

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amendment on a simplified procedure for inhabitants of the post-Soviet republics still without citizenship either of the Russian Federation or of other countries to obtain citizenship.

At the same time a mass issue of Russian passports to inhabitants of Abkhazia was organized, in fact in circumvention of the law, as was described in detail in the previous issue of Stringer. The Kremlin clan to which **Ivanov** belongs thus deemed it necessary, despite their initial wish, to demonstrate a certain concern for the pro-Russian former Soviet citizens.

But in practice this "concern" ended up as cheap window dressing and the selling off of passports intended for Abkhazia to the inhabitants of pro-Western Transcaucasus republics.

**Ivanov's** position with regard to the law "On Russian Citizenship" can be understood on the basis of his report at the Ministry of Justice collegium in February last year. According to the "Kremlin Borman," at the time of the report there were up to 12 million illegal immigrants living in Russia and within a year that figure could rise to 19 million. And here, according to his report in Moscow, alone there are 600,000 Azerbaijanis and 200,000 Chinese, of whom 13 and 350 people respectively pay taxes. **Ivanov** said that the Justice Ministry headed by Yuriy Chayka has not been monitoring the actions of the Foreign Ministry, which has simplified the procedure for entering Russia, making it possible to come here with only a birth certificate, which is intolerable under the conditions of the fight against terrorism.

At the same time Viktor Petrovich also sharply criticized a number of aspects of the activity of the Ministry of Justice (the inefficiency of the work of the bailiffs service, the influence of the criminal world on the activity of the ministry's regional structures, contradictions in internal departmental legislation, and so forth) which indicates a certain tension between **Ivanov** and Justice Minister Yuriy Chayka. In addition the speech delivered by the Staff deputy head at the ministry, which is in the traditional sphere of the activity of Dmitriy Kozak, chief of the Presidential Staff legal administration, is evidence of covert antagonism between them. According to available information, the conflict between **Ivanov** and the Surkov-Voloshin group, which opposes the St. Petersburg Chekists, is proceeding just as clandestinely but at the same time extraordinarily fiercely. **Ivanov's** attempt to form a Presidential Staff administration for work with the State Council, which would center on him, was the source of their latest clash. The attempt failed, the administration was not formed, and Viktor **Ivanov's** positions in

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the Presidential Staff are now weaker than they were a year ago.

### Empire That Never Was

In 1990 **Ivanov** registered the Blok small enterprise together with Boris Gryzlov, who is now internal affairs minister, but this company failed to achieve any particular successes in business. In 1996-1998 he headed the Russian-American Teleplus closed joint-stock company, which organized the transmission of 30 satellite channels, including CNN and Euronews.

The American Telcell company, which owns 45 percent of the shares in Teleplus, is a subsidiary structure of the American multinational Metromedia, which operates in the majority of countries of the former USSR and East Europe, but recently its activity has been winding down there.

Other companies close to Viktor Petrovich were said to include the High Technologies Bank, which is one of the 100 largest banks. It is known that Baatyr Shondzhiyev, deputy chairman of the bank's management board, took part in the presidential elections in Kalmykia with **Ivanov's** clandestine support and entered the second round, collecting 38 percent of the votes.

Shondzhiyev was hyped by Moscow structures under the leadership of someone called Khan, but they were very thrifty when it came to money and failed to organize a real scandal against Kirsan Ilyumzhinov.

One of the main bulwarks of the "Kremlin Borman" was believed to be the Rosspirtprom federal state unitary enterprise created on instructions from Putin in May 2000. In fact it brought together all state enterprises in the liquor and vodka industry. But several months ago Rosspirtprom director Sergey Zivenko, who is allegedly a stooge of the Ivanovs, lost his post -- it is said not without the involvement of FSB Director Nikolay Patrushev.

An even more important role in the group of the St. Petersburg Ivanovs is played by the Mezhprombank Open Joint-Stock Company and management board chairman Sergey Pugachev, who is doing everything to demonstrate his orthodox power-based views but at the same time his proximity and loyalty to the authorities. This, Russia's largest nonstate bank, now ranks third overall in the country after Sberbank and Vneshekonombank but recently Pugachev and his friends have been dogged by serious business failures. In particular they have not actually managed to acquire controlling blocks of shares in Gazprom, Alrosa, and Slavneft.

As a whole the belief that Pugachev would play the role of Berezovskiy

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under Putin has not been justified. Putin is not very eager (or else he is unable) to make the final break with the remains of Yeltsin's team and the president does not want to tie himself to one grouping fully. Moreover, **Ivanov's** excessive persistence is thoroughly annoying Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin], according to some reports.

### Battle for Almaz

But there is no doubt that the favorite creation of the Presidential Staff deputy head is the Almaz-Antey air defense company, created in April 2002 on instructions from Putin and bringing together 43 state and joint-stock enterprises. It was **Ivanov** who was able to prevent the company from being included in the assets of the "Defense Systems" financial and industrial group, on which Vice Premier Ilya Klebanov, in charge of the military-industrial complex, was insisting.

At the same time largely thanks to **Ivanov's** efforts Rosoboronprom was created --- the main (practically a monopoly) Russian arms exporter uniting the Rosvooruzheniye company with Promeksport, hived off from it under Yeltsin. Ranking 13th among the world's largest arms exporters, Rosoboronprom on average sells arms worth about \$3 billion a year. The concern is headed by Andrey Belyaninov, from the KGB, who has also worked at the Foreign Intelligence Service and is seen as someone close to **Ivanov**.

The ousting from the military-industrial complex of the overtly pro-Washington lobby in the shape of Klebanov, former Vice Premier Yakov Urinson, and other similar Americanophiles incurred the serious displeasure of their undeclared leader Chubays. Speaking at the Union of Right-Wing Forces congress 14 December 2001, Chubays stated: "There are very few of us in the foreign policy elite, there are virtually none of us in the defense and military elite, there are none of us at all in the intelligence community, and there are none of us in the spheres which are basic for the formation of Russia's future policy in the world and for the identification of its place in the world. If we are really speaking of strategy then it is fundamentally into this sphere that we must expand. Expand without surrendering one inch of the positions we have irreversibly won in the economic sphere, in the business sphere, in the industrial sphere, in the domestic political sphere. Radically advancing into defense, into intelligence, into the military sphere, into the foreign policy sphere -- where Russia's identity in the next five to seven years will be determined."

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And as we know, Anatoliy Borisovich's words are not at odds with his deeds. So there is an opinion that the recent murder of Igor Klimov, acting general director of Almaz, who was close to **Ivanov**, and of Sergey Shchitko, director of the Rostek open joint-stock company, which belonged to the concern, could have been part of the "expansion" he had announced.

As we know, the previous attempt at such "expansion" occurred with the removal of Yevgeniy Ananyev, former editor of the pornographic Megapolis-ekspress newspaper, from the post of Rosvooruzheniye and the restoration of the unity of the defense export structures destroyed by Ananyev.

### St. Petersburgers Are Not Rivals

The St. Petersburg group is afraid of Vladislav Surkov since the St. Petersburg men are not part of the capital's system of relationships. Those in the know claim they do not have their own proper intelligence and counterintelligence service. All matters to do with collecting rumors and assessing the current situation for decisions on personnel issues and other such problems are the responsibility of Presidential Staff Deputy Head and Chekist Viktor **Ivanov**. But unlike Surkov, if anything happens **Ivanov** is threatened with dismissal and oblivion -- it is pointless for the Chekist team to run a risk in the game with the wily Vladislav. SO Surkov is boldly positioning himself next to Putin, sitting to the right of the frame. No one knows **Ivanov's** face. Voloshin could be confused with a church sentry but everyone knows Surkov.

TV pictures like these are significant to people who understand these things, especially officials, and are key and are worth a lot.

In restaurants in and around Moscow Surkov regularly holds closed briefings with friendly journalists from "leading" publications. The number of journalists of this kind close to him is as many as 30. At these meetings he "leaks" information and gives the signals he and his bosses need.

[Description of Source: Moscow Stringer News Agency -- Website devoted to compromat and exposes of politicians; reportedly linked to Yukos oil company; located at [www.stringer-news.ru](http://www.stringer-news.ru).]

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# Mikhail Trepashkin

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

**Mikhail Ivanovich Trepashkin**, (Russian: Михаи́л Ива́нович Трепа́шкин) (7 April 1957 – ), a Moscow attorney and former FSB officer, was invited by MP Sergei Kovalev to assist in an independent inquiry of the Russian apartment bombings in September 1999 – the atrocities that provoked the Second Chechen War and skyrocketed Vladimir Putin to presidency.

The inquiry led to nowhere because of the government stonewalling [1]

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Mikhail Trepashkin

([http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_qn4196/is\\_20031221/ai\\_n10911502](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4196/is_20031221/ai_n10911502)). Then two sisters whose mother was killed in one of the houses hired Trepashkin to represent them in the trial of two Russian Muslims accused of transporting explosives for the bombings [2] (<http://eng.trepashkin.ru/court/81282.html>).

While preparing for the trial Trepashkin uncovered a trail of a mysterious suspect whose description had disappeared from the files. To his amazement, the man turned out to be one of his former FSB colleagues. He also found a witness who testified that evidence was doctored to lead the investigation away from incriminating the FSB [3] (<http://www.prima-news.ru/news/news/2004/5/19/28486.html?print>).

But Trepashkin never managed to air his findings in court. On October 22, 2003, just a week before the hearings, a gun was allegedly planted into his car, and he ended up behind bars. However, before his arrest he told his story to a Moscow journalist [4] (<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/8014-18.cfm>).

The gun charge was thrown out by a Moscow appeals court[5] (<http://eng.trepashkin.ru/court/95342.html>), but Trepashkin was convicted by a closed military court to four years for "disclosing official secrets" [6] ([http://coranet.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print\\_right.php?func=detail&par=10113](http://coranet.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=10113)). [ In September 2005 after serving two years of his sentence, Trepashkin was released on parole, but two weeks later was re-arrested after the State appealed the parole decision [7] (<http://eng.trepashkin.ru/press/95348.html>).

The case of Mikhail Trepashkin caught the attention of the Western press [8] (<http://www.eng.terror99.ru/publications/#trepashkin>), caused an uproar among human rights campaigners [9] (<http://eng.terror99.ru/publications/151.htm>), was put on record by Amnesty International, mentioned by the US State Department [10] (<http://eng.trepashkin.ru/reaction/80577.html>) and even featured in an award-winning documentary *Disbelief*[11] (<http://www.disbelief-film.com/>).

Mikhail Trepashkin recently managed to send a few letters from his prison [12] (<http://www.chechenpress.info/events/2006/12/01/03.shtml>). He asks why did the democratic forces of Russia betrayed him while Aleksander Litvinenko, he and others bravely came forward to tell the truth about FSB.

## See also

- Alexander Litvinenko poisoning

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail\\_Trepashkin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Trepashkin)

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## External links

- The Trepashkin Case (<http://eng.trepashkin.ru/>)
- Human Rights First - call for action ([http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/hrd\\_russia/alert121504\\_trepashkin.htm](http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/hrd_russia/alert121504_trepashkin.htm))
- International Commission of Jurists - Trepashkin statement ([http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id\\_article=3205&lang=en](http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id_article=3205&lang=en))
- Text of D.C. Bar International Law Section letter ([http://www.dcbar.org/for\\_lawyers/sections/international\\_law/russia.cfm](http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/sections/international_law/russia.cfm))
- Amnesty International appeal (<http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/document.do?id=ENGEUR460632005>)
- Letters of Trepashkin from prison (Russian) (<http://www.chechenpress.info/events/2006/12/01/03.shtml>)
- The Trepashkin Case in Novaya Gazeta (Russian) (<http://www.novayagazeta.ru/rassled2/trepaschkin/karta.shtml>)

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Categories: Russian lawyers | Russian dissidents | KGB officers | Russian journalists | Living people

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# Yuri Shchekochikhin

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

**Yuri Petrovich Shchekochikhin** (Юрий Петро́вич Щекочихин) (June 9, 1950, Kirovabad - July 3, 2003, Moscow) was a Russian journalist, writer, and liberal lawmaker. Shchekochikhin made his name writing about and campaigning against the influence of organized crime and corruption in the Russian government. He died suddenly in 2003 after a mysterious illness later linked to thallium poisoning, in what was believed by many to be a politically-motivated assassination.

## Contents

- 1 Investigative journalism
- 2 Political career
- 3 Death
- 4 Last book
- 5 External links
  - 5.1 English
  - 5.2 Russian
- 6 Books
- 7 See also

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## Investigative journalism

Shchekochikhin graduated from the Journalism Department of Moscow State University in 1975. He worked as an investigative journalist at *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (1972-1980) and *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (1980-1996), and then as a deputy editor of the liberal newspaper *Novaya Gazeta* (from 1996). Beginning in the 1990s, he published many articles critical of the Chechen Wars, human rights abuses in the Russian army, state corruption, and other social issues. Since 1995 he was an author and host of an investigative journalism program called "Special Team" on independent Russian television.

## Political career

Yuri Shchekochikhin began his political career in 1990, when he was elected as a representative to the Congress of People's Deputies. He was elected to the Russian State Duma from the liberal Yabloko party in 1995. He was a member of a Duma committee on the problems of corruption, and was a UN expert on the problems of organized crime. He was a vocal opponent of the Chechen Wars.

From 2002, Shchekochikhin was a member of the Sergei Kovalev Commission, which investigated allegations that the 1999 Moscow apartment bombings had been orchestrated by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) to generate support for the war [1] (<http://www.eng.terror99.ru/publications/107.htm>).

One of Shchekochikhin's last articles before his death was "*Are we Russia or KGB of Soviet Union?*" [2] (<http://ys.novayagazeta.ru/text/2003-01-27.shtml>) It described such issues as the refusal of the FSB to explain to the Russian Parliament what poison gas was applied during the Moscow theater hostage crisis, and work of secret services from the former Soviet republic of Turkmenistan, which operated with impunity in Moscow against Russian citizens of Turkoman origin.

He also tried to investigate criminal activities of FSB officers related to money laundering through the Bank of

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuri\\_Shchekochikhin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuri_Shchekochikhin)

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New York and illegal actions of Yevgeny Adamov, a former Russian Minister of Nuclear Energy. This case was under the personal control of President Vladimir Putin [3] (<http://ys.novayagazeta.ru/text/2003-06-02.shtml>). In June of 2003, Shchekochikhin contacted the FBI and got an American visa to discuss the case with US authorities [4] ([http://www.yabloko.ru/Publ/2006/2006\\_06/060620\\_novg\\_shekoch.html](http://www.yabloko.ru/Publ/2006/2006_06/060620_novg_shekoch.html)). However, he never made it to the USA because of his sudden death. Some Russian media claimed that Putin has issued an order to discharge 19 high-ranking FSB officers involved in this case in September 2006 as part of a Kremlin power struggle, but all these officers still continue to work in their FSB positions [5] (<http://www.grani.ru/Politics/Russia/President/m.114307.html>).

## Death

Shchekochikhin died suddenly on July 3, 2003 after a short and mysterious illness. His relatives were denied an official medical report about the cause of his illness, and were forbidden to take specimens of his tissues to conduct an independent medical investigation [6] ([http://www.yabloko.ru/Publ/2006/2006\\_06/060620\\_novg\\_shekoch.html](http://www.yabloko.ru/Publ/2006/2006_06/060620_novg_shekoch.html)). Nevertheless, they managed to send a specimen of his skin to London, where a tentative diagnosis was made of poisoning with thallium [7] (<http://www.eng.terror99.ru/publications/118.htm>) [8] (<http://2006.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2006/82n/n82n-s05.shtml>). This caused widespread speculation about the cause of his death, especially since another member of the Kovalev commission, Sergei Yushenkov, was assassinated the same year [9] (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2957823.stm>) [10] (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2958997.stm>), and the legal counsel and investigator of the commission, Mikhail Trepashkin, was arrested by Russian authorities. [11] (<http://eng.trepashkin.ru/>) [12] (<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR460132006?open&of=ENG-2U4>)

## Last book

Shchekochikhin's last published book was "*Slaves of KGB: 20th Century. The religion of betrayal*", a nonfiction work describing numerous stories of real people who were forcibly recruited by the Russian KGB (later the FSB) to work as undercover informers or agents. These people virtually became slaves of their KGB recruiters, and betrayed their closest friends, colleagues, and relatives. He was working on a book about wars in Chechnya that remained unfinished at his death.

## External links

### English

- Obituary (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/obituaries/story/0,3604,994245,00.html>) - *The Guardian*
- Mysterious deaths of Kremlin critics ([http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/11/24/europe/EU\\_GEN\\_Britan\\_Poisoned\\_Spy\\_Glance.php](http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/11/24/europe/EU_GEN_Britan_Poisoned_Spy_Glance.php)) - *International Herald Tribune*
- Yuri Shchekochikhin: A Tribute ([http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_qa3996/is\\_200401/ai\\_n9358369](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200401/ai_n9358369)) - *Demokratizatsiya*

### Russian

- Site dedicated to Yuri Shchekochikhin in *Novaya Gazeta* (<http://ys.novayagazeta.ru/>)
- Biography and publications (<http://www.yabloko.ru/Persons/schekoch.html>)
- Personal site of Yuri Shchekochikhin (<http://www.rusglobe.net/shekochihin/index.shtml>)
- I have learned to always tell the truth and be afraid of nothing (<http://ys.novayagazeta.ru/text/2003-08-11-03.shtml>) interview with Yuri Shchekochikhin

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- Letters from the Presidents (<http://ys.novayagazeta.ru/text/2000-06-15.shtml>) Congratulations from Mikhail Gorbachev and Vladimir Putin on his 50th birthday in 2000

## Books

- Slaves of KGB. 20th Century. The religion of betrayal (Рабы ГБ. XX век. Религия предательства) (<http://www.yabloko.ru/Publ/Raby/rab.html>), Moscow, 1999.

## See also

- Human rights in Russia
- Sergei Yushenkov
- Sergei Kovalev
- Anna Politkovskaya
- Alexander Litvinenko
- Galina Starovoitova
- Artyom Borovik

Retrieved from "[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuri\\_Shchekochikhin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuri_Shchekochikhin)"

Categories: Russian dissidents | Assassinated journalists | Alumni and faculty of Moscow State University | Russian journalists | Russian murder victims | Russian politicians

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# Galina Starovoitova

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

**Galina Vasilyevna Starovoitova** (Галина Васильевна Старовойтова) (17 May 1946, Chelyabinsk - November 20, 1998 St Petersburg) was a Russian politician and ethnographer known for her work to protect ethnic minorities and promote democratic reforms in Russia. She was shot to death in her apartment building in 1998.

## Contents

- 1 Early life and academic career
- 2 Political career
- 3 Assassination and investigation
- 4 Footnotes
- 5 External links
- 6 See also

DATE: 07-13-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
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DECLASSIFY ON: 07-13-2035

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## Early life and academic career

Born in the Ural mountains city of Chelyabinsk to a Belarusian father and a Russian mother, Starovoitova earned an undergraduate degree from the Leningrad College of Military Engineering in 1966 and an MA in social psychology from Leningrad University in 1971. In 1980 she earned a doctorate in social anthropology from the Institute of Ethnography, USSR Academy of Sciences, where she worked for seventeen years. Her PhD thesis, published in 1987, was a study of the Tatars of Leningrad. She also published extensively on anthropological theory, cross-cultural studies, and Caucasian anthropology.

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## Political career

Galina Starovoitova began her political career in 1989, when she was elected as a representative to the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union from Armenia. She worked to protect the human rights of people in Nagorno-Karabakh during the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict. From 1991 until 1992 she was an advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin on state policies with regard to the numerous ethnic groups of Russia. She was fired for criticizing Moscow's support for Ossetians against the Ingush in the North Caucasus [1] (<http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol9/galina.html>).

In 1995, she was elected to the Russian State Duma from the political movement "Democratic Russia - Free Workers Union". The movement was led by her and two prominent members of the Moscow Helsinki Group: Lev Ponomarev and the dissident Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin, who was famous for revealing collaboration of the church leadership with the KGB, including the alleged involvement of Patriarch Alexius II as a KGB agent [1] [2].

Galina Starovoitova was a strong defender of ethnic minorities. She said: "If in accordance with international standards we recognize the rights of nations to self-determination, we must recognize it also within Russia," [2] (<http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol9/galina.html>). Together with Sergei Kovalev and others, she conducted negotiations with Dzhokhar Dudaev in attempt to prevent the First Chechen War. They convinced Dudaev to sign a protocol where he agreed to withdraw his demands for immediate Chechen independence and begin official negotiations, according to another Duma member involved in the process, Valeriy Borshev [3] (<http://www.svobodanews.ru/Transcript/2006/11/20/20061120202035617.html>). However, Boris Yeltsin decided to proceed with military operations, because Sergei Stepashin (then FSB director) and others convinced Yeltsin

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galina\\_Starovoitova](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galina_Starovoitova)

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that military operations were necessary and would be very quick and successful [1] When the war began, Starovoitova called Yeltsin "Boris the Bloody" and said: "The historic time of Yeltsin the reformer has passed, and his new regime can turn out to be dangerous not just for Russia." [4] (<http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol9/galina.html>).

Over the years, Galina Starovoitova attended numerous international meetings and discussions, where she had conversations with world leaders including Margaret Thatcher, Jacques Chirac, Václav Havel, Henry Kissinger and Lech Wałęsa.

Starovoitova was strongly against the omnipresence of security services in Russia and believed that lustration is necessary, but none of the other elected representatives supported her [5] (<http://www.svobodanews.ru/Transcript/2006/11/20/20061120202035617.html>). She was a sharp opponent of the Communist and Nationalist majority in Duma who hold strongly anti-semitic views. Once she publicly said: "I propose a decision to order a medical examination of deputies of the State Duma, especially in the light of yesterday's voting on the battle against anti-semitism, when many of our colleagues gave us reason to doubt their mental health." [6] (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/219212.stm>)

In April of 1998 she became the leader of "Democratic Russia", then registered as an official party, in order to prepare for State Duma elections in the coming December. This was the time when state security people were coming to power as Prime Ministers of Russia: GRU-connected Sergei Kiriyenko was replaced in August 1998 by SVR veteran Yevgeny Primakov [1] who had excellent business relationships with Slobodan Milošević and Saddam Hussein (he was even paid by Saddam Hussein for his services according to Richard Butler [7] (<http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30C1FFE3B550C728CDDA10894D1494D81&n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2fPeople%2fH%2fHussein%2c%20Saddam>)). New leadership also came to the state security services as Vladimir Putin was appointed as head of FSB on July 1998. Galina Starovoitova tried to prevent such people from coming to power using her personal connections with different political figures and with Yeltsin's wife, according to Valeriy Borshev [8] (<http://www.svobodanews.ru/Transcript/2006/11/20/20061120202035617.html>). At the same time, she openly opposed the broad scope of FSB powers as a part of her political platform in "Democratic Russia". She also campaigned against the nomination of Yevgeny Primakov in the State Duma [9] (<http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol9/galina.html>).

## Assassination and investigation

Starovoitova was gunned down in the entryway of her apartment building on November 20th, 1998. Her aide, Ruslan Linkov, was wounded in the attack. Just two days before, Aleksander Litvinenko and seven other FSB officers asserted at a press conference in Moscow that FSB leadership had decided to return to the practice of political assassinations [10] (<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engEUR460401998>). However, FSB Director Vladimir Putin said: "I do not have any elements from which I can conclude that this was a political murder" [11] (<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engEUR460401998>). The murder investigation took place under the personal control of Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin [12] (<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9811/21/russia.slain.politician/index.html>) (former FSB boss and future Prime Minister of Russia). In June 2005 two men, Yuri Kolchin and Vitali Akishin, were convicted for her murder and sentenced to 20 and 23 years of imprisonment respectively. Akishin was the one who actually pulled the trigger and Kolchin was one of the people who had organized the attack. On September 28, 2006 another man named Vyacheslav Lelyavin was sentenced to 11 years in prison for his role in organizing the murder.[13] (<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/09/29/013.html>) However, people who were actually responsible for this assassination and paid for it have never been found, according to Valery Borshev [14] (<http://www.svobodanews.ru/Transcript/2006/11/20/20061120202035617.html>). Therefore, he compared this case with murder of dissident priest Alexander Men.

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## Footnotes

1. <sup>a b c</sup> Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West, Gardners Books (2000), ISBN 0-14-028487-7
2. <sup>^</sup> Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia--Past, Present, and Future. 1994. ISBN 0-374-52738-5.

## External links

- Galina Starovoitova tribute page (<http://www.geocities.com/Athens/2533/galina.html>)
- Thousands mourn slain Russian lawmaker (<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9811/24/russia.funeral/>) - CNN
- St. Petersburg Court Sentences Two, Frees Four In Starovoitova Murder ([http://www.rferl.org/features/features\\_Article.aspx?m=06&y=2005&id=4A681090-D952-4B3A-BA84-E65498F466E2](http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=06&y=2005&id=4A681090-D952-4B3A-BA84-E65498F466E2)) - Radio Free Europe
- In Memoriam: Galina Vasilyevna Starovoitova (<http://www.russianamericanchamber.org/newsletter/starovoitova.html>) - Russian Commerce News
- USIP — Sovereignty after Empire Self-Determination Movements in the Former Soviet Union. Case Studies: Nagorno-Karabakh. ([http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks19/chap3\\_19.html](http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks19/chap3_19.html)) by Galina Starovoitova, Publication of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

## See also

- Yuri Shchekochikhin
- Sergei Yushenkov

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Categories: Russian murder victims | Murdered politicians | Russian politicians | 1946 births | 1998 deaths | Russian dissidents

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## Yuri Shchekochikhin

**Yuri Petrovich Shchekochikhin** (Юрий Петрович Щекочихин) (June 9, 1950, Kirovabad - July 3, 2003, Moscow) was a Russian journalist, writer, and liberal lawmaker. Shchekochikhin made his name writing about and campaigning against the influence of organized crime and corruption in the Russian government. He died suddenly in 2003 after a mysterious illness later linked to thallium poisoning, in what was believed by many to be a politically-motivated assassination.

### Investigative journalism

Shchekochikhin graduated from the Journalism Department of Moscow State University in 1975. He worked as an investigative journalist at Komsomolskaya Pravda (1972-1980) and Literaturnaya Gazeta (1980-1996), and then as a deputy editor of the liberal newspaper Novaya Gazeta (from 1996). Beginning in the 1990s, he published many articles critical of the Chechen Wars, human rights abuses in the Russian army, state corruption, and other social issues. Since 1995 he was an author and host of an investigative journalism program called "Special Team" on independent Russian television.

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### Political career

Yuri Shchekochikhin began his political career in 1990, when he was elected as a representative to the Congress of People's Deputies. He was elected to the Russian State Duma from the liberal Yabloko party in 1995. He was a member of a Duma committee on the problems of corruption, and was a UN expert on the problems of organized crime. He was a vocal opponent of the Chechen Wars.

From 2002, Shchekochikhin was a member of the Sergei Kovalev Commission, which investigated allegations that the 1999 Moscow apartment bombings had been orchestrated by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) to generate support for the war [1].

One of Shchekochikhin's last articles before his death was "Are we Russia or KGB of Soviet Union?" [2] It described such issues as the refusal of the FSB to explain to the Russian Parliament what poison gas was applied during the Moscow theater hostage crisis, and work of secret services from the former Soviet republic of Turkmenistan, which operated with impunity in Moscow against Russian citizens of Turkoman origin.

He also tried to investigate criminal activities of FSB officers related to money laundering through the Bank of New York and illegal actions of Yevgeny Adamov, a former Russian Minister of Nuclear Energy. This case was under the personal control of President Vladimir Putin [3]. In June of 2003, Shchekochikhin contacted the FBI and got an American visa to discuss the case with US authorities [4]. However, he never made it to the USA because of his sudden death. Some Russian media claimed that Putin has

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issued an order to discharge 19 high-ranking FSB officers involved in this case in September 2006 as part of a Kremlin power struggle, but all these officers still continue to work in their FSB positions [5].

## Death

Shchekochikhin died suddenly on July 3, 2003 after a short and mysterious illness. His relatives were denied an official medical report about the cause of his illness, and were forbidden to take specimens of his tissues to conduct an independent medical investigation [6]. Nevertheless, they managed to send a specimen of his skin to London, where a tentative diagnosis was made of poisoning with thallium [7] [8]. This caused widespread speculation about the cause of his death, especially since another member of the Kovalev commission, Sergei Yushenkov, was assassinated the same year [9] [10], and the legal counsel and investigator of the commission, Mikhail Trepashkin, was arrested by Russian authorities. [11] [12]

Shchekochikhin's last published book was "*Slaves of KGB: 20th Century. The religion of betrayal*", a nonfiction work describing numerous stories of real people who were forcibly recruited by the Russian KGB (later the FSB) to work as undercover informers or agents. These people virtually became slaves of their KGB recruiters, and betrayed their closest friends, colleagues, and relatives. He was working on a book about wars in Chechnya that remained unfinished at his death.

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Starovoitova was gunned down in the entryway of her apartment building on November 20th, 1998. Her aide, Ruslan Linkov, was wounded in the attack. Just two days before, Aleksander Litvinenko and seven other FSB officers asserted at a press conference in Moscow that FSB leadership had decided to return to the practice of political assassinations [10]. However, FSB Director Vladimir Putin said: "I do not have any elements from which I can conclude that this was a political murder" [11]. The murder investigation took place under the personal control of Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin [12] (former FSB boss and future Prime Minister of Russia). In June 2005 two men, Yuri Kolchin and Vitali Akishin, were convicted for her murder and sentenced to 20 and 23 years of imprisonment respectively. Akishin was the one who actually pulled the trigger and Kolchin was one of the people who had organized the attack. On September 28, 2006 another man named Vyacheslav Lelyavin was sentenced to 11 years in prison for his role in organizing the murder. [13] However, people who were actually responsible for this assassination and paid for it have never been found, according to Valery Borshev [14]. Therefore, he compared this case with murder of dissident priest Alexander Men.

On February 13, 2004, Yanderbiyev was assassinated when a bomb ripped through his SUV in the Qatari capital, Doha. Two of his bodyguards were killed as well and his 12-year-old son was seriously injured. It was unclear who was responsible for the blast, but suspicion fell on Russia's intelligence services, who denied any involvement, and internal feuding among the Chechen rebel leadership. Maskhadov's separatist Foreign Ministry condemned the assassination as a "Russian terrorist attack", comparing it to the attack that killed Dudayev.

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The car bomb led to Qatar's first anti-terrorism law, declaring lethal "terrorist acts" punishable by death or life imprisonment. On February 19 the Qatari authorities arrested three Russians in the Russian embassy villa for the murders. One was released due to his diplomatic status and the remaining two SVR agents: Anatoly Yablochkov (Анатолий Яблочков) and Vasili Bogacheov (Василий Богачёв), were charged. According to Moscow, they were secret intelligence agents sent to the Russian Embassy in Doha to collect information about global terrorism.

The trial proceedings were closed to the public after the defendants claimed that one of the prosecution witnesses, the Qatari Colonel Dawi or Dawdi, had tortured them in the first days after their arrest, when they had been held incommunicado. The two Russians alleged that they had suffered beatings, sleep deprivation and attacks by guard dogs. Russia used these torture allegations and the fact that the two officers were arrested within an extraterritorial compound belonging to the Embassy (i.e. effectively on Russian soil) to demand the immediate release of her citizens. On June 30, 2004 both Russians were sentenced to life imprisonment; passing the sentence, the judge stated that they had acted on orders from the Russian leadership. [1]

The verdict caused severe tensions between Qatar and Russia, and on December 23, 2004, Qatar agreed to extradite the prisoners to Russia, where they would serve out their life sentence. The agents received a heroes' welcome on returning to Moscow in January 2005 but disappeared from public view shortly afterwards. The Russian prison authorities admitted in February 2005 that they were not in jail, but said that a sentence handed down in Qatar was irrelevant in Russia

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Anna Politkovskaya was only one of many journalists recently murdered in Russia. The list of criminal cases from "Glasnost Defense Foundation" led by Aleksei Simonov from Moscow Helsinki Group includes 9 killed and 59 attacked (severely beaten) journalists, and 11 attacks on editorial offices only in 2006 (from January to October). [6]. In 2005, the list of all cases includes 6 murders, 63 attacks, 12 attacks on editorial offices, 23 cases of censorship, 42 criminal prosecutions, 11 illegal layoffs, 47 arrests, 382 lawsuits, 233 cases of obstruction, 23 closings of editorial offices by authorities, 10 evictions, 28 confiscations of printed production, 23 cases of stopping broadcasting, 38 refusals to distribute or print production, 25 acts of intimidation, and 344 other violations of Russian journalist's rights [7].

In a more recent development, ex-KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko died in London, following a lethal dose of radioactive polonium-210<sup>[59] [60]</sup>, while investigating Politkovskaya's death. The Litvinenko death is currently under investigation by the British authorities<sup>[61] [62]</sup>. This incident was remarkably similar to poisoning by thallium of KGB defector Nikolay Khokhlov<sup>[63]</sup> and another journalist from Novaya Gazeta Yuri Shchekochikhin (Юрий Щекочихин)<sup>[64] [65]</sup>. The journalist who prepared the interview with Khokhlov for Novaya Gazeta was Politkovskaya<sup>[66]</sup>. The last book by Shchekochikhin was *Slaves of KGB* (Рабы КГБ). He also investigated the Russian apartment bombings as a member of the Kovalev Commission with Mikhail Trepashkin. Litvinenko was writing a new book about FSB activities including concentration camps in Chechnya. In that regard, he had frequent contacts with Politkovskaya, according to Larisa Volodimirova<sup>[67]</sup>.

Former KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky believes that the murders of Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, Yuri Shchekochikhin, Politkovskaya, Litvinenko and others mean that FSB has returned to the practice of political assassinations<sup>[68]</sup>, which were conducted in the past by the Thirteenth KGB Department<sup>[69]</sup>.

Other similar cases are assassinations of Russian politicians Galina Starovoitova and Sergei Yushenkov and death of journalist Artyom Borovik who tried to investigate russian apartment bombings.

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Sergei Yushenkov was shot dead near his house in Moscow on April 17, 2003, just hours after finally obtaining the registrations needed for his Liberal Russia party to participate in the December 2003 parliamentary elections in 55 regions. His last known public utterance was "Registration has been completed." [4]. Mikhail Trepashkin believed that Yushenkov was murdered because he was a leader of an opposition party that openly challenged the power of the FSB and Russian authorities. Moreover, Yushenkov promised voters an independent investigation of the Russian apartment bombings as a key issue of his election campaign (an interview of Trepashkin can be seen in director Andrei Nekrasov's documentary "Disbelief" [5], Google Video). Just before his death, Sergei Yushenkov received threats from a high-ranking FSB general, Aleksander Mikhailov, according to Grigory Pasko [6].

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[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, June 20, 2007 1:53 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Question for other sources

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[redacted] -  
Vanity Fair is partially correct, but there's a lot of misconception out there about Russia's new CT legislation. At present, I'm not sure that our sources would be able to provide much in the way of accurate information.

On 6 March 2006, RF Federal Law 35-FZ was passed, "On the Counteraction of Terrorism." In the new law, Article 10, Section 1 provides for the use of "weapons from the territory of the Russian Federation" and "formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" in "suppressing international terrorist activities outside the Russian Federation." Article 10, Section 2 states that any decision to do so shall be rendered by RF President. Article 10, Section 3 indicates that the RF President's decision to do so must be "on the basis of the appropriate decision of the RF Federation Council of the Federal Assembly."

Then, on 27 July 2006, Putin signed Federal Law 153-FZ, "Amendments of a number of federal laws pursuant to the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism." If you recall, the month before this (early June), four Russian diplomats were kidnapped and killed by militants in Iraq. Putin immediately called on Russia's special services [redacted] to do whatever was necessary to find the perpetrators. In June, a bill meant to clarify and amend the earlier law (35-FZ) was already in the Duma -- the kidnappings only added the icing. Per 153-FZ, the Russian president now has the right to deploy "sub-units of the [redacted] and other special services" (for example, [redacted] extraterritorially in order to "suppress international terrorist activities."

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RF Federal Law 153-FZ received a lot of Russian press, particularly in the days around its second reading in the Duma (circa early July). The problem is this -- everyone started citing/applying these new laws to the Litvinenko poisoning [redacted] Litvinenko, et. al.).

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Thoughts?

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, June 20, 2007 1:19 PM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: Question for other sources

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[redacted] In reading an article from Vanity Fair in April 2007, I saw a reference that the Duma passed a law making it legal for the Kremlin to murder enemies of the state outside the country. Do you know have any of our sources been queried about this? If not, I want to send a lead to 1B re this.

[redacted]  
DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigation  
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[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, March 19, 2007 12:33 PM  
To: [redacted]

Subject: FW: (U.K.; Russia) U.S. Embassy Comments on British Government Reaction to Apparent Use of "Polonium 210" in Murder Former Russian Spy Litvinenko - London 1022

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Interesting

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (BS) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, March 19, 2007 11:39 AM  
To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: FW: (U.K.; Russia) U.S. Embassy Comments on British Government Reaction to Apparent Use of "Polonium 210" in Murder Former Russian Spy Litvinenko - London 1022

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FYI. Interesting from both WMD aspect and FCI aspect.

[redacted] Don't know if you have already seen this.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (BS) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, March 19, 2007 9:25 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: FW: (U.K.; Russia) U.S. Embassy Comments on British Government Reaction to Apparent Use of "Polonium 210" in Murder Former Russian Spy Litvinenko - London 1022

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Just an FYI, Please share if you deem appropriate. dw

Subject: (U.K.; Russia) U.S. Embassy Comments on British Government Reaction to Apparent Use of "Polonium 210" in Murder Former Russian Spy Litvinenko - London 1022

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TELEGRAM

March 16, 2007

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[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, July 31, 2007 8:40 AM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: Melnychenko suffered a microstroke

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## Melnychenko To Be Discharged In Two Or Three Weeks

CEP20070729950046 Moscow Interfax in English 1443 GMT 29 Jul 07

[OSC Transcribed Text]

[Computer selected and disseminated without OSC Editorial intervention]

KYIV. July 29 (Interfax) - Microstroke was diagnosed for Former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's bodyguard Mykola Melnychenko, his lawyer Pavel Sychoy told Interfax on Sunday.

"Doctors hope to put Melnychenko on his legs in two or three weeks," the lawyer said, adding that Melnychenko stays at the intensive care unit; his relatives were allowed to visit him.

It was reported earlier that the former presidential bodyguard was hospitalized to Oktyabrskaya clinic in Kyiv on Sunday after he suffered a stroke.

Melnychenko at one time disclosed tapes which he claimed had been made in the office of former President Leonid Kuchma. Some of them were used to bring political charges of conspiring to kill journalist Georgy Gongadze against Kuchma.

[Description of Source: Moscow Interfax in English -- Nonofficial information agency known for its extensive and detailed reporting on domestic and international issues]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6  
b7C  
b2

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

b1

(S)

~~SECRET~~

BKB/PLT

b6  
b7C



~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, July 20, 2007 3:32 PM  
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: Melnychenko

DATE: 07-13-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-13-2035

60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD

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b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED] just an update. According to a 7/12/2007 Ukrayinska Pravda website article, Melnychenko plans to run in the September 30 elections in the list of the Party of Free Democrats (PFD), though the PFD has not agreed yet to put him on the list. There was also an article on Agentura.ru on 7/13 that he apparently was having some sort of unspecified plastic surgery at a Kyiv clinic (though my Russian is a bit rusty). In any case, he appears to be in Kyiv as of 7/13, according to press reports.

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

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(S)

1  
~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C



~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, August 27, 2007 4:19 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: Former Ukrainian Bodyguard Melnychenko Sent Abroad For Treatment

b6  
b7C

DATE: 07-13-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-13-2035

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~NON-RECORD~~

60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

## Former Ukrainian Bodyguard Melnychenko Sent Abroad For Treatment

CEP20070827950149 Moscow Interfax in English 1015 GMT 27 Aug 07

[OSC Transcribed Text]

[Computer selected and disseminated without OSC Editorial intervention]

KYIV. Aug 27 (Interfax) - Mykola Melnychenko, the former security officer who furnished audio tapes implicating former President Leonid Kuchma in the murder of a journalist, has flown abroad for treatment.

Melnychenko, a candidate to the Ukrainian parliament for the Party of Free Democrats, said it was not possible to detect the causes of his ill health in Ukraine, his party said on Monday. "There is only one hospital, Feofania, in Ukraine which has all the necessary equipment to diagnose the condition and rehabilitate patients who have suffered a stroke," the party said.

"However, despite requests from the Party of Free Democrats and a group of parliamentarians, the presidential administration and the department of governmental affairs have denied Maj. Melnychenko treatment at the state-owned Feofania clinic hospital," the party said.

Melnychenko published the recordings that he said were taped in the office of then President Leonid Kuchma. They prompted political accusations against the president concerning his possible involvement in the murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze.

It was reported earlier that on July 29 Melnychenko was admitted to the Oktyabrsky hospital in Kyiv, diagnosed with a minor stroke.

[Description of Source: Moscow Interfax in English -- Nonofficial information agency known for its extensive and detailed reporting on domestic and international issues]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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b7C  
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b1

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2007 4:56 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Former Ukrainian Bodyguard Melnychenko Sent Abroad For Treatment

b6  
b7C  
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(C) ~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

b2

It seems that is correct. According to his 4/13/2001 interview with INS in the Czech Republic, she is

DATE: 07-13-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-13-2035

60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, August 27, 2007 5:59 PM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Former Ukrainian Bodyguard Melnychenko Sent Abroad For Treatment

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~NON-RECORD~~

b6  
b7C

This is very interesting. Do you know if [redacted]? Someone once told me that.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, August 27, 2007 4:19 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: Former Ukrainian Bodyguard Melnychenko Sent Abroad For Treatment

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~NON-RECORD~~

## Former Ukrainian Bodyguard Melnychenko Sent Abroad For Treatment

CEP20070827950149 Moscow Interfax in English 1015 GMT 27 Aug 07

[OSC Transcribed Text]

[Computer selected and disseminated without OSC Editorial intervention]

b1

KYIV. Aug 27 (Interfax) - Mykola Melnychenko, the former security officer who furnished audio tapes implicating former President Leonid Kuchma in the murder of a journalist, has flown abroad for treatment.

Melnychenko, a candidate to the Ukrainian parliament for the Party of Free Democrats, said it was not

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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BKS/pnt

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


possible to detect the causes of his ill health in Ukraine, his party said on Monday. "There is only one hospital, Feofania, in Ukraine which has all the necessary equipment to diagnose the condition and rehabilitate patients who have suffered a stroke," the party said.

"However, despite requests from the Party of Free Democrats and a group of parliamentarians, the presidential administration and the department of governmental affairs have denied Maj. Melnychenko treatment at the state-owned Feofania clinic hospital," the party said.

Melnychenko published the recordings that he said were taped in the office of then President Leonid Kuchma. They prompted political accusations against the president concerning his possible involvement in the murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze.

It was reported earlier that on July 29 Melnychenko was admitted to the Oktyabrsky hospital in Kyiv, diagnosed with a minor stroke.

[Description of Source: Moscow Interfax in English -- Nonofficial information agency known for its extensive and detailed reporting on domestic and international issues]



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~~DERIVED FROM: Single Source Document~~  
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20110413~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2007 1:02 PM  
To: [REDACTED] (LO) (FBI)  
Cc: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: RE: Assistance on the Litvinenko case

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035



scanemail.rtf (8 KB)

60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

NON-RECORD

[REDACTED] Please read the attachment from [REDACTED] this lead should be set for Headquarters, CD1B, since fulfilling these requirements would not be possible at the field level. Further, please discontinue this lead for WFO. I have not responded to the attached [REDACTED] except for emailing him that I would have to consult with my supervisor regarding [REDACTED] Finally, [REDACTED]

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Today, I also revised the title of our case to:  
UNSUB;  
RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR DEATH OF FOREIGN  
(S) [REDACTED] DISSIDENT AND POSSIBLE THREAT OF US PERSONS

If there is anything that I can do at my level, please let me know.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, August 27, 2007 5:12 PM  
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: RE: Assistance on the Litvinenko case

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
NON-RECORD

b6  
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b1

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, August 27, 2007 4:22 PM  
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: RE: Assistance on the Litvinenko case

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
NON-RECORD

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Let's make sure HQ coordinates with DOJ, re any statements taken by a foreign police service. Also a little concerned re the [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, August 27, 2007 3:09 PM  
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: RE: Assistance on the Litvinenko case

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NON-RECORD

FYI, We are working with Alat, London on [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] We sent this to FBIHQ to ensure they  
were in the loop. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] We'll keep you advised.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, August 27, 2007 12:39 PM  
To: [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)  
Cc: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: RE: Assistance on the Litvinenko case

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
NON-RECORD

[REDACTED] I wanted to make sure that you were aware of this request. It appears that the  
[REDACTED] I will keep  
you posted on their dates. They also [REDACTED] so ALAT [REDACTED] is working on  
that issue.

[REDACTED]  
WFO, CI-5

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (LO) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, August 20, 2007 10:32 AM  
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Assistance on the Litvinenko case

b6  
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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
NON-RECORD

Hi [REDACTED]  
Per our conversation, attached is a copy of the [REDACTED] on the  
Litvinenko case. It has also been uploaded.

Please give me a call if you have questions.

Thanks

[REDACTED]  
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

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~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/12/2007

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

CD1B

Room 4427

New York

Attn: SA [REDACTED] CD7

From: Washington Field

CI-5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

b6  
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Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: (S) [REDACTED]:plp

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] (Pending) ✓

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Title: (S) ~~CHANGED~~  
UNSUB;  
RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR DEATH OF FOREIGN  
(S) DISSIDENT AND POSSIBLE THREAT OF US PERSONS  
[REDACTED]

Synopsis: (U) (S) Change of title of captioned matter.

(S) (U) ~~Derived From: G-3~~  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) Previous Title: (S) Title marked "Changed" to reflect "UNSUB;  
RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR DEATH OF FOREIGN DISSIDENT AND POSSIBLE  
THREAT OF US PERSONS, [REDACTED]. Title previously carried as  
(S) "ALEXANDER LITVINENKO; A/K/A EDMOND CARTER, [REDACTED]"

b1

(S) (U) [REDACTED]

(U) Details: (S) The title was changed to reflect the true nature of  
the threat.

pp072551.ec

~~SECRET~~

(S) [REDACTED]

change title

9/12/07 (S)

9/19/2007  
LH

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: Washington Field  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 09/12/2007

b1

(S)

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: 07-27-2010

CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 07-27-2035



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60322  
UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

In reply, Please refer to

601 Fourth Street NW  
Washington, DC 20535-0002  
September 11, 2007

(S)

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(S)

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Your cooperation in this matter is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, October 03, 2007 4:25 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: [redacted]

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

Will make sure all are aware of below as soon as they return. Anything needed in the meanwhile, let me know. [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, October 03, 2007 3:34 PM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: [redacted]

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

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(S) ~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

[redacted] I don't think the below information is urgent, but I am sending to you since [redacted] is out.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, October 03, 2007 3:11 PM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

(S) [redacted] and [redacted] As of today, I think that we have settled on a date for the [redacted] to come and take [redacted] statement re Litvinenko. Tentatively, they will [redacted] will be reserved for taking his statement. They will be [redacted] I will keep you posted as this firms up.

(S) [redacted] Would it be possible for you to liase with DOJ to insure that there are no issues with DOJ regarding a source providing a statement to [redacted] do not know that [redacted] is a source. Further, [redacted] Therefore, his statement should not be tainted with his relationship to the FBI.

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~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
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DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 09, 2007 11:11 AM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: [redacted]

(S) **SECRET**  
**RECORD** [redacted]

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

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[redacted]  
I'll get in touch with DOJ and make sure no issues exist. Its unlikely as we had another FBI source interviewed by [redacted] several times earlier this year without issue, but its always good to check. Thanks,

[redacted]  
SSA [redacted]

(S) CD-1B, [redacted]  
[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, October 03, 2007 3:11 PM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: [redacted]

(S) **SECRET**  
**RECORD** [redacted]

(S) [redacted] and [redacted] As of today, I think that we have settled on a date for the [redacted] to come and take [redacted] statement re Litvinenko. Tentatively, they will [redacted] will be reserved for taking his statement. They will be [redacted] I will keep you posted as this firms up.

(S) [redacted] Would it be possible for you to liase with DOJ to insure that there are no issues with DOJ regarding a source providing a statement to [redacted] do not know that [redacted] is a source. Further, [redacted] Therefore, his statement should not be tainted with his relationship to the FBI.

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~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigation~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

(S) [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 09, 2007 11:22 AM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

RECORD [redacted]

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

Thanks!

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 09, 2007 11:11 AM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

[redacted]

I'll get in touch with DOJ and make sure no issues exist. Its unlikely as we had another FBI source interviewed by [redacted] several times earlier this year without issue, but its always good to check. Thanks,

[redacted]

SSA [redacted]

CD-1B [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, October 03, 2007 3:11 PM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

[redacted] and [redacted] As of today, I think that we have settled on a date for the [redacted] to come and take [redacted] statement re Litvinenko. Tentatively, they will [redacted] will be reserved for taking his statement. They will be depart 11/10. I will keep you posted as this firms up.

David: Would it be possible for you to liase with DOJ to insure that there are no issues with DOJ regarding a source providing a statement to [redacted] do not know that [redacted] is a source. Further, [redacted] Therefore, his statement should not be tainted with his relationship to the FBI.

[redacted]

(S) [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~



~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
SECRET

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, October 12, 2007 9:18 AM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (LO) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: [redacted] to take Witness Statement from [redacted]

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

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All: Are there any comments re the attached email? I should respond to [redacted] email in the near future. Also, be advised that I will be on A/L 10/20 - 10/27. Specifically, how are the [redacted] and will DOJ have any objections to [redacted] possibly traveling to the UK at a later date?



email [redacted] 00907.  
rtf (11 KB)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 09, 2007 3:57 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (LO) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: [redacted] to take Witness Statement from [redacted]

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

<< File: email [redacted] 00907.rtf >> All: Please read the attached email from [redacted] The highlights are:

1. [redacted]
2. [redacted]
3. [redacted]
4. [redacted]

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[redacted]  
WFO, CI-5

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

6/26/08

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2007 10:46 AM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

I just heard back from NSLB, and per the attorney their after checking with DOJ we are OK regarding the source talking to

[redacted] Thanks,

SSA [redacted]

CD-1B [redacted]

b6  
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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2007 9:41 AM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

[redacted] Thanks for checking out all of these issues.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, October 15, 2007 4:33 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

Just to give you an update on the two matters I am working on:

1. NSLB attorney [redacted] advised that he didn't see any issue regarding the source talking to [redacted] and was awaiting final conformation of this from DOJ - but he didn't think it would be an issue.
2. I have a call out to the SSA in OIO who is responsible for [redacted] matters regarding funding for the dinner - hopefully he will not be one of those HQ people who never calls anyone back.

Thanks,

~~SECRET~~

BUC/mal

~~SECRET~~

SSA [redacted]

CD-1B [redacted]

(S)

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, October 12, 2007 1:27 PM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

(S)

[redacted] Thanks! I ran into problems the last time I hosted guests, so I am still not sure of the proper way to do it.

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b2  
b1

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, October 12, 2007 11:58 AM  
To: [redacted] (LO) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

Let me run this by [redacted] on Monday (she's at firearms today) and I'll get back to you. Thanks,

[redacted]

SSA [redacted]

CD-1B [redacted]

(S)

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, October 12, 2007 11:38 AM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b2  
b7E  
b1

I don't know WFO's policy but London [redacted]

[redacted] may be able to point you in the right direction for that.

EBj

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, October 12, 2007 2:14 PM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

<< File: pp072821.ec >> [redacted] and [redacted] Advance copy of EC.

Please let me know if I should copy anyone else on this.

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b1

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
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~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, October 19, 2007 4:40 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: [redacted] visit

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b1

FYI, here is the tentative timeline for the [redacted] visit.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, October 19, 2007 4:12 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: [redacted] visit

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

[redacted] and [redacted]: Here is a tentative schedule for the [redacted] visit:

11/7/07 Meet at [redacted] house. Time to be determined.

11/8/07 Possibly meet [redacted] on Thursday morning -- if needed. Meet [redacted] at WFO on Thursday afternoon.

11/9/07 Meet at [redacted] house for him to sign the statement with all the corrections.

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C  
b1

(S)

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]  
[redacted] BNB/msl

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/09/2007

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

CD1B

Room 4427

London

Attn: ALAT [REDACTED]

London

(Sent via email.)

From: Washington Field  
CI-5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED] *SB*

Drafted By: [REDACTED] *plp*

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(Pending)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Title: (S) [REDACTED]

UNSUB;

RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR DEATH OF FOREIGN

DISSIDENT AND POSSIBLE THREAT OF US PERSONS

Synopsis: (U) (S) Request coordination with the Office of  
International Operations (OIO) for funding to host guests from the  
[REDACTED]

~~(S) (U)~~ Derived From : G-3

~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) [REDACTED]  
~~(S)~~ Details: (U) (S) The Washington Field Office will host [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] on their visit  
to the United States to take a witness statement from [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Previously, WFO received a lead regarding coordination  
of this visit from ALAT [REDACTED]

(U) (S) Our guests will arrive on or about [REDACTED] and  
plan to depart on or about [REDACTED] WFO requests funding to  
properly host our guests by providing at least one dinner.

pp072821.ec

~~SECRET~~

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b6  
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b7D  
b1

(S) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: Washington Field  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 10/09/2007

b1

~~(S)~~

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

b7D

(U) Coordinate funding for the Washington Field Office  
to host [REDACTED] guests named above to at least one dinner.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2007 3:42 PM  
To: [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Subject: Info

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD

[redacted] Here is some basic information that I have on [redacted]

60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN/AAG

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U) ~~(S)~~ Main Subject  
Name -

Last: [redacted]  
First: [redacted] (I have also spelled his name [redacted])  
Middle: [redacted]  
Race: [redacted]  
Sex: [redacted]  
DOB: [redacted]  
POB: [redacted] SOC: [redacted]

I hope this helps!

[redacted]  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

b6  
b7C  
b1

(S)

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] [redacted] BUB/ASL

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/13/2007

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

CD1B

Room 4427

IA [REDACTED]

CD7B

Room 5266

London

Attn: ALAT [REDACTED]

London

From: Washington Field

CI-5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED] *BIB/ML*

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

:plp *plp*

Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

(Pending) ✓

Title: ~~(S)~~

UNSUB;

RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR DEATH OF FOREIGN

~~(S)~~

DISSIDENT AND POSSIBLE THREAT OF US PERSONS

Synopsis: ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Witness Statement made by [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ ~~(U)~~

Derived From : G-3

Declassify On: X1

~~(S)~~ ~~(U)~~ Enclosure(s): (U)

Two witness statements made by [REDACTED]

Details: ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~

The Washington Field Office hosted [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] on their visit to the United States to take a witness statement from [REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ On [REDACTED]

the above mentioned [REDACTED] took the enclosed

Witness Statements from [REDACTED] The second and shorter statement

pp073176.ec

~~SECRET~~

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~~(S)~~

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b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: Washington Field  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 11/13/2007

b1

will be held in reserve until such time this evidence becomes relevant to the case.

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Discussion between [redacted] and the [redacted] remained within the confines of his statement. Therefore, there is nothing further to report with the exception of one question that [redacted] posted to [redacted] on [redacted] At the end of the working day on [redacted] asked [redacted] if he could

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterintelligence From: Washington Field  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 11/13/2007

b1

(S)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/16/2007

To: Washington Field

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

From: Washington Field  
CI-5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] plp (S)

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] (Pending)

(S) [REDACTED] (Pending)  
Liaison [REDACTED]

Title: (S) UNSUB;  
RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR DEATH OF FOREIGN  
DISSIDENT AND POSSIBLE THREAT OF US PERSONS

Synopsis: (U)(S) Liaison with [REDACTED]

(U) (S) Derived From: G-3  
Declassify On: X1

(U) (S) Details: (U)(S) The Washington Field Office, SA [REDACTED]  
and SA [REDACTED] hosted [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] on their visit to the United States to  
take a witness statement from [REDACTED]

(U) (S) On [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] the above mentioned  
[REDACTED] took two Witness  
Statements from [REDACTED] at his home.

(U) (S) On [REDACTED] all parties mentioned above met  
with SSA [REDACTED] and ASAC [REDACTED] at the  
Washington Field Office.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b1

pp073205.ec

~~SECRET~~

(S) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-14-2010  
 CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
 REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/25/2007

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

CI-5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: (S) [REDACTED]:plp [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] (Pending)

Title: (S) (U) UNSUB;  
 RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR DEATH OF FOREIGN  
 DISSIDENT AND POSSIBLE THREAT OF US PERSONS  
 (S) [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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 b2  
 b1

Synopsis: (U) (S) Claim Statistical Accomplishments.

(S) (U) ~~Derived From: G-3~~  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

Details: (S) (U) On the following dates, WFO personnel interviewed  
 (S) [REDACTED] regarding captioned  
 matter:

(U) (S) 11/07/2007 - 11/08/2007 - SA [REDACTED] and  
 SA [REDACTED] on 11/07/2007.

(U) (S) 06/29/2007 - [REDACTED] and IA [REDACTED]

(U) (S) 06/22/2007 - [REDACTED] and IA [REDACTED]

b6  
 b7C

(U) (S) 05/31/2007 - [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] IA [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED] and IA [REDACTED]

(U) (S) 03/09/2007 - [REDACTED]

(U) (S) 12/11/2006 - [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

(U) (S) 11/29/2006 - [REDACTED]

b1

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~~SECRET~~

(S)

11/28/2007  
 747

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 11/25/2007

b1

~~(S)~~

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ 11/27/2006 - [redacted]

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 11/25/2007

b1

(S)

**Accomplishment Information:**

Number: 9  
Type: INVA-INTERVIEW (FORMER INTELL)  
ITU: CI PROGRAM  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad: CI5

Number: 2  
Type: INVA-INTERVIEW (FORMER INTELL)  
ITU: CI PROGRAM  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad: CI5

b6  
b7C

Number: 1  
Type: INVA-INTERVIEW (FORMER INTELL)  
ITU: CI PROGRAM  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad: CI1

♦♦

~~SECRET~~



[redacted] WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2007 11:22 AM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

Yes - I gave the basic scenario to them and asked them ensure it was OK. Still waiting to get a response from OIO on the funding part.

SSA [redacted]  
CD-1B [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b2  
b1

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2007 11:02 AM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

Thank you very much! This is good news. . . I assume this includes him going overseas potentially.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2007 10:46 AM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

[redacted]  
I just heard back from NSLB, and per the attorney their after checking with DOJ we are OK regarding the source talking to [redacted] Thanks,

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b2  
b1

SSA [redacted]  
CD-1B [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2007 9:41 AM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

(S) RECORD [redacted]

[redacted] Thanks for checking out all of these issues.

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, October 15, 2007 4:33 PM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
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b1

Just to give you an update on the two matters I am working on:

1. NSLB attorney [redacted] advised that he didn't see any issue regarding the source talking to [redacted] and was awaiting final conformation of this from DOJ - but he didn't think it would be an issue.
2. I have a call out to the SSA in OIO who is responsible for [redacted] matters regarding funding for the dinner - hopefully he will not be one of those HQ people who never calls anyone back.

Thanks,

[redacted]

(S) SSA [redacted]  
CD-1B [redacted]  
[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, October 12, 2007 1:27 PM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

[redacted] Thanks! I ran into problems the last time I hosted guests, so I am still not sure of the proper way to do it.

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, October 12, 2007 11:58 AM  
To: [redacted] (LO) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b2  
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(S) ~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

[redacted]

Let me run this by [redacted] on Monday (she's at firearms today) and I'll get back to you. Thanks,

[redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
CD-1B, [redacted]  
[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, October 12, 2007 11:38 AM  
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b2  
b1

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

I don't know WFO's policy but London [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] may be able to point you in the right direction for that.

EBj

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, October 12, 2007 2:14 PM  
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (LO) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: Request for Funding to Host [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b2  
b7E  
b1

(S) ~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

<< File: pp072821.ec >> [redacted] and [redacted] Advance copy of EC.

Please let me know if I should copy anyone else on this.

[redacted]

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~

~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
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~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
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~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
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~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Automated Serial Permanent Charge-Out  
FD-5a (1-5-94)

Date: 07/21/08 Time: 11:46

(S)

(S)

Case ID: [REDACTED] Serial: [REDACTED]

b1

Description of Document:

Type : EC

Date : 07/11/08

To : WASHINGTON FIELD

From : WASHINGTON FIELD

(U) Topic: ~~(S)~~ ARTICLE ON BBC REPORT ON RUSSIAN STATE SUPPORT

Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:

contractor [REDACTED] request document to be removed

Employee: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

DATE: 07-14-2010  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLP/PLJ/JN  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-14-2035

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLOSED

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/11/2008

To: ~~Washington~~ Field

From: Washington Field

CI-2

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED] *vmh*

Drafted By: [REDACTED] *rk*

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] (Closed)

Title: ~~(S)~~ UNSUB;  
RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR DEATH OF FOREIGN  
DISSIDENT AND POSSIBLE THREAT TO US  
(S) PERSONS  
[REDACTED]

Synopsis: (U) ~~(S)~~ Article on BBC report on Russian state support  
for 2006 assassination.

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~

~~Declassify On: 20180711~~

Details: (U) ~~(S)~~ Attached for the file is an article entitled  
"Medvedev's foreign policy advisor denounces BBC report on  
Litvinenko murder" authored by JONAS BERNSTEIN and carried in  
the 07/09/2008 issue of *Eurasia Daily Monitor* published by The  
Jamestown Foundation, suite 320, 1111 16th Street, N.W.,  
Washington, D.C. 20036, telephone (202) 483-8888, facsimile  
(202) 483-8337, e-mail [www.jamestown.org](http://www.jamestown.org).

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**IN THIS ISSUE:**

- \*Britain renews allegations of Russian state support for 2006 assassination
- \*GUAM membership adapts to changing strategic environment
- \*...as Moldova defects to Russian camp
- \*Turkey's political battle tied to outcome of Ergenekon investigation

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**MEDVEDEV'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER DENOUNCES BBC REPORT ON LITVINENKO MURDER**

A report by BBC television news that British intelligence believes the Russian state was involved in the 2006 radioactive poisoning of dissident former Russian security services officer Aleksandr Litvinenko has been harshly criticized by Russia as a deliberate attempt to harm Russian-British relations.

In the report, which appeared on the BBC's Newsnight program on June 7 shortly after Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown met face to face for the first time at the G8 summit in Toyako, Japan, a senior British security official was quoted as saying: "We very strongly believe the Litvinenko case to have had some state involvement." The BBC also reported it had been told that the Federal Security Service (FSB) had operated during Vladimir Putin's presidency "with far more autonomy" than the organizations usually entrusted with foreign espionage operations (Newsnight program on June 7).

British prosecutors have accused former KGB officer Andrei Lugovoi of poisoning Litvinenko with radioactive polonium-210, but Russia has refused London's request to extradite Lugovoi, now a State Duma deputy, citing the Russian constitution's ban on handing over its citizens.

The BBC also said that it had learned that officers at MI5, Britain's counter-intelligence and security agency, "believe they thwarted an attempt last summer to kill another Russian dissident, Boris Berezovsky." The BBC quoted its sources as saying that the Berezovsky incident showed "continued FSB willingness to consider operations against people in the West" and that the targeting of Russian government critics in the UK "messes up" the relationship between Britain and Russia "big time" (BBC, July 8; *Moscow Times*, July 9).

The BBC Newsnight segment referred to the man who allegedly traveled from Russia to kill Berezovsky but was caught and deported from Britain only as "Mr. A." As the *Moscow Times* noted on July 9, *Kommersant* reported last year that the man deported from Britain was the reputed Chechen

<http://by107w.bay107.mail.live.com/mail/PrintShell.aspx?type=message&cpids=a59e96ad...> 7/10/2008

crime boss Movladi Atlangeriev, known by the nicknames "Lord" and "Lenin." Atlangeriev was reportedly abducted in Moscow this past April and his whereabouts remains unknown (*Kommersant* April 14).

Atlangeriev and another reputed crime boss, Khozh-Akhmed Nukhaev, are said to have organized Moscow's Chechen criminal gangs into a unified group back in the early 1990s. Russian authorities have accused Nukhaev of ordering the 2004 murder of Paul Klebnikov, editor of Russian *Forbes* magazine. In an interview he gave to *Klebnikov* in 2000, Nukhaev said that the gang he and Atlangeriev jointly ran had protected Logovaz, Russia's leading car dealer, which Berezovsky controlled in the 1990s (*Moscow Times*, July 9). In 2002, the Prosecutor General's Office showed journalists a videotape of an unidentified witness who accused Berezovsky of involvement in the kidnapping and assassination of Major General Gennady Shpigun, the Interior Ministry's envoy to Chechnya, in late 1998, and claimed Berezovsky had "close relations, including in business, with the well-known Chechen criminal organization in Moscow [led by] Khozhakmed Nukhaev and Movladi Atlangeriev" (*The Jamestown Monitor*, March 6, 2002). In April of this year, senior Investigative Committee official Dmitry Dovgy accused Nukhaev and Berezovsky of ordering the 2006 murder of *Novaya Gazeta* correspondent Anna Politkovskaya (*Izvestia*, April 3).

Following Atlangeriev's apparent abduction in Moscow this past March, *Novaya gazeta* reported that he had "actively collaborated" with Russian special services during the first and second Chechen military campaigns, was "well acquainted" with the FSB's leadership, had been a witness in a number of criminal cases and was a frequent visitor to the Prosecutor General's Office and the offices of other "power agencies" in Moscow (*Novaya gazeta*, May 19).

Responding to the Newsnight segment alleging Russian state involvement in the murder of Aleksandr Litvinenko and attempted assassination of Boris Berezovsky, Medvedev's foreign policy adviser, Sergei Prikhodko, told reporters that the BBC report showed that "not everyone in the U.K. has a constructive approach." According to Bloomberg News, Prikhodko said it "won't be easy" for Britain and Russia to overcome their differences, adding that reports in British newspapers last week had portrayed Russia as one of "the most serious" threats for the United Kingdom.

As Bloomberg noted, *The Sun* reported on July 4 that Alex Allan, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the U.K. government's top intelligence adviser, had been hospitalized after suddenly falling ill at home. The British newspaper quoted a security expert as saying that the likeliest culprits for Allan's suspected poisoning were al-Qaeda or the FSB. (It should be noted that other British media have quoted unnamed British government sources as ruling out foul play as the cause of Allan's illness.)

*The Telegraph* reported on July 6 that the activities of Russian spies in Britain were seriously undermining the fight against terrorism. "The distraction of combating espionage by President Dmitry Medvedev's agents makes it significantly more likely that one of the many Islamist terror plots will succeed, Whitehall officials believe," the British paper reported ([www.telegraph.co.uk](http://www.telegraph.co.uk), July 6). Two days earlier, *The Times* reported that Britain's security services had identified Russia as the third most serious threat facing the country, with only al-Qaeda terrorism and Iranian nuclear proliferation greater menaces to Britain's safety ([www.timesonline.co.uk](http://www.timesonline.co.uk), July 4).

"It would be bizarre if these publications didn't represent the interests of those in the U.K. who don't want to see a normalization" of British-Russian relations, Bloomberg quoted Prikhodko as saying (*Bloomberg*, July 8).

—Jonas Bernstein



## GUAM SHOWS ITS RESILIENCE AT BATUMI SUMMIT

The GUAM Summit just held in Batumi (see *EDM*, July 7) demonstrated that Georgia and Azerbaijan compose GUAM's solid core; that Ukraine's governing political forces are committed to GUAM while the evenly matched opposition forces are uncommitted; that Moldova is on the verge of abandoning the group; and that GUAM is capable of diversifying partnership relations beyond the group's own format.

GUAM may now be called "GUAm" as a result of Moldova's all-but-declared defection. Moldova was a co-founder of the group in 1997, hosted the "GUAM revival" summit in 2005, and contributed actively to GUAM's institutionalization during the Moldovan chairmanship period (see *EDM*, April 20, 21, and 25-28, 2005). Later on, however, Chisinau distanced itself demonstratively from GUAM, hoping through this and other gestures to earn Moscow's goodwill for a solution to the Transnistria conflict. President Vladimir Voronin stayed away from the 2007 and 2008 GUAM summits. He only sent his minister of internal affairs to the Batumi event, a mismatch that looked like a snub to the five heads of state (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania) who attended this summit. The minister Valentin Mejlinski, deviated even further by choosing to deliver his perfunctory speech in Russian.

Moldova alone has not ratified the GUAM Charter, a failure that jeopardizes GUAM's quest for international recognition as a full-fledged regional organization. The Moldovan parliament with its strong pro-presidential majority could easily have ratified the GUAM Charter, if told to do so. Chisinau is not delegating its representatives to the Kyiv-based GUAM Secretariat, has a poor record of attendance at GUAM sectoral commissions' meetings, and is not paying its GUAM membership dues.

Voronin attacked GUAM in Russian press interviews ahead of the Batumi summit and during the event. He found fault, indignantly and irrelevantly, with the Odessa-Brody-Plock-Gdansk oil pipeline project for bypassing Moldova. He claimed credit for vetoing the planned GUAM peacekeeping unit (notwithstanding that it was only proposed for international missions outside GUAM states' territories). Voronin felt obligated to describe GUAM membership as "pointless" and the group itself as "economically unproductive and therefore lacking gravitational pull." By contrast he feigned praise for the CIS as a "highly effective project, confirmed by life itself, with an economic dimension based on Russia's energy resources." Catering to Moscow's adversarial view of GUAM, Voronin reassured Russia that "Moldova will not be used as [part of a] counterbalance to someone else" (*Kommersant* March 11, July 2).

Those arguments are reminiscent of Uzbek President Islam Karimov's justifications for abandoning what was then GUUAM. Uzbekistan had joined the group in 1999, only to withdraw *de facto* by 2003 and officially in 2005, on the grounds that the group was overly political, underperforming economically, and irritating Russia. By analogy, Moldova's arguments gave rise to speculation during the Batumi summit that Moldova was about to withdraw from GUAM (*Rezonansi*, July 4). Moldovan authorities, however, do not intend to abandon GUAM officially; but they will keep their distance from GUAM for as long as they crave Russian cooperation on Transnistria, and until those hopes turn (as seems likely) into disappointment.

The Ukrainian Parliament, unlike Moldova's, had wrestled for years with the issue of ratifying the GUAM Charter. Signed by the four presidents at GUAM's Yalta summit in 2001, the Charter was revised at the Chisinau summit in 2005, signed in its updated form by the four presidents at the Kyiv summit in 2006, and easily ratified by the Georgian and Azerbaijani parliaments. Ukraine's *Verkhovna Rada* (parliament) finally ratified the Charter in March 2008 by the narrowest admissible margin (226 votes in favor), with the opposition parties declining to vote or voting against (Interfax-Ukraine, March

7). Meanwhile, the GUAM Secretariat's small headquarters in Kyiv, a Ukrainian responsibility, has been undergoing repairs ever since the 2006 Kyiv summit (see *EDM*, May 25, 2006).

Ukraine is the main supporter of creating a GUAM peacekeeping unit. Kyiv regards this proposal as an opportunity to demonstrate Ukraine's capacity for regional leadership. The proposal was discussed in some detail at the GUAM summits in Kyiv 2006 and Baku 2007 (see *EDM*, June 20, 2007). In the run-up to the Batumi summit, Ukrainian Defense Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov discussed the idea yet again with receptive Georgian leaders in Tbilisi. They agreed to keep alive the consultations about composition and possible international missions of such a unit (Interfax-Ukraine, June 5). The Batumi summit documents do not mention this idea, although it was again discussed there (Civil Georgia, *The Messenger*, July 2).

Russia took the floor in Batumi for the first time at a GUAM summit. It did so by proxy through CIS First Deputy Executive Secretary Vladimir Garkun, a Belarus diplomat. In the briefest of all speeches he repeatedly declared, "We all [ex-Soviet countries] have a lot in common," a tentative overture though blurring the difference. GUAM remains the only interstate organization in formerly Soviet territory that excludes Russia from membership.

--Vladimir Socor

#### **GUAM'S BATUMI SUMMIT BUILDS PARTNERSHIPS AMID CHALLENGES**

GUAM consultations with the Partner Countries take place in the specially designed GUAM Plus framework. This operates, as it did in Batumi, through individual formats involving Poland, Lithuania, the United States, and now additionally the Czech Republic and Japan. Presidents Lech Kaczynski of Poland and Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania, Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel Schwarzenberg, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Merkel, and a Japanese envoy took part in these consultations on energy transit and regional security issues (Civil Georgia, *The Messenger*, July 2).

Romania is also a GUAM Partner country. President Traian Basescu, however, stayed away from the GUAM summit in Batumi. He had also failed to attend the Caspian-Black Sea-Baltic energy summit in Kyiv in May. The Romanian government only sent a deputy minister to each of these presidential summits. This dismissive attitude comes as a surprise, considering the active interest that Basescu had displayed until recently in Black Sea issues and energy transit projects.

Bucharest has not explained the reasons behind its sudden loss of interest in these regional summits. Unnecessary bickering with Ukraine could be a factor. At present, Bucharest is trying hard to pave the way for a presidential visit to Russia. It may seem that this effort takes precedence over participation in regional events that Moscow deems irritating.

The Japanese government had initiated direct contacts with GUAM in 2007 at the Baku summit. The current government in Tokyo continues that policy. Minister of Foreign Affairs Masahiko Komura received GUAM Secretary-General Valeri Chechelashvili and the GUAM National Coordinators in Tokyo in December 2007 and appointed a special envoy of Japan for GUAM affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, "Report on GUAM during the Azerbaijani Chairmanship," July 2008). This initiative emerged as an element in a far-reaching Japanese concept of a Eurasian "Arc of Prosperity," presumably designed to leapfrog China and Russia along their southern and south-western perimeters.

Within the European Union, an informal Group of GUAM's Friends has quietly taken shape in recent months. The EU itself, however, keeps a careful distance. It avoids sending any officials from Brussels to GUAM summits and other GUAM events, without clarifying the reasons behind this policy. The cold-shoulder adds to the disappointments over the EU's unfulfilled Silk Road projects, the inadequacies of its Neighborhood Policy, its confused stance on the protracted conflicts, and the lack of a European energy policy in the GUAM region.

The Batumi declaration alludes to the NATO membership aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine. The document stipulates that GUAM "respects and supports GUAM member states' freedom of choice of such a system of ensuring their national security that would fully correspond to their national interest" (Summit communiqué, July 1). Some of the earlier GUAM documents used to refer to NATO partnerships directly, not cryptically as is now the case. GUAM was not shy about meeting on the sidelines of a NATO summit, Azerbaijan used to be a declared NATO aspirant (along with Ukraine and Georgia), and Moldova could be flexible about its official neutrality. NATO, however, did not rush through the window of opportunity while this was wide open.

As a group, GUAM intends in the months ahead to mobilize international political and diplomatic support for dealing with the secessionist conflicts. This was GUAM's original *raison d'être*, supplemented in due course by the energy transit agenda, which, however, languishes in the EU. At the Batumi summit, Azerbaijan handed over the GUAM chairmanship to Georgia with a recommendation to adopt a program of joint action in international organizations toward resolution of the conflicts. Azerbaijan described such initiatives as GUAM's "defining factor" in its concluding report (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, "Report on GUAM during the Azerbaijani Chairmanship," July 2008).

In March and May 2008, the GUAM countries succeeded for the first time as a group in pushing favorable resolutions on the conflicts through the UN General Assembly. Although adopted by narrow margins, the resolutions condemned the secessions and ethnic cleansing perpetrated on the territories of Azerbaijan and Georgia (see EDM, March 18, May 16). A wide-ranging, jointly drafted GUAM resolution is now pending.

GUAM countries are being held together by the need to deal with externally supported secessionist conflicts, or, in Ukraine's case, to defuse this potential, and remove foreign forces from their territories. This remains the four countries' overarching interest, beyond discrepancies in their attitudes toward Russia, NATO, the pace of internal reforms, or their positions in the energy supply chain.

--Vladimir Socor

## TURKISH POLITICS IN THE COURTS

The closure case against the Justice and Development Party (AKP) will soon be concluded. After the presentation of oral arguments to the Constitutional Court last week, Osman Paksut, deputy chairman of the court, said that the verdict on the case might be issued within four to five weeks (Turkish Press, July 4). Speaking at a reception at the American Embassy in Ankara, Paksut disparaged the EU's involvement in the closure case, particularly recent remarks by officials that the EU membership negotiations might be suspended should the court shut down the AKP. Having noted that the court's earlier case squashing parliament's amendments about the headscarf ban at universities had no direct bearing on the closure case and no member of the court had made his decision yet, Paksut claimed that whatever the decision of the court might be, it would be a disaster for Turkish politics (CNN Turk, July 5).

This statement is only one indication of how the future of Turkish politics may be decided in the courts. The fate of the closure case, hence Turkish politics, is increasingly tied to another case dominating Turkey's agenda: the Ergenekon investigation (*EDM*, July 1). The timing of the key events in both cases and the response and positioning of political actors give the impression that the two cases set the battleground for a political struggle in Turkey. What is a perfectly legal case for one side is a political maneuver for the other.

Ergenekon, an umbrella organization of clandestine groups that were seeking to regroup and reassert a neo-nationalist political program, first came to the attention of the Turkish public when the police seized a weapons cache in Istanbul in June 2007. Earlier raids on the organization led to the detention of some shadowy figures, gangsters, and ex-criminals, but subsequent arrests this year have altered the course of the investigation and its meaning for Turkish politics.

Various unidentified political assassinations in recent history, such as the murder of Hrant Dink and an attack on the Council of State, have been linked to Ergenekon. More importantly, the focus has also shifted toward its political goals: troubled by a perceived betrayal of national interests by the government, members of the group organized to overthrow the government, if necessary through a military coup. The controversial killings, seen in this light, were claimed to have been carried out as part of a plan to destabilize the country through a series of manipulative attacks, setting the stage for a military takeover (*Today's Zaman*, January 26).

To establish a credible case for this charge before the courts, the prosecutors have to connect the perpetrators to "actual plotters" in the military. This seems to be the Achilles' heel of the entire case: proving Ergenekon's intent and its capability to overthrow the government requires the conviction of a good many shadowy figures; but as the prosecution pursues influential people, it gets engulfed in the muddy waters of Turkish politics. Civilian investigations into past coups and alleged coup attempts, let alone bringing those involved to trial, is a venture into uncharted territory for Turkish politics.

The prosecution took major steps in this direction with the string of arrests in January, which led to the detention of, among others, retired Major General Veli Kucuk (*Turkish Press*, January 24). Following the next two major waves of police raids, on March 21 and July 1, as many as 54 people are now in detention, including businessmen, journalists, politicians and artists. Several of the detainees are retired military officers, a new force in Turkish politics, who organized around Kemalist and neo-nationalist associations.

The crucial question has been whether Ergenekon had links to active duty military personnel and who "the number one" person was. Most experts believe that although individuals within the military might provide sporadic logistical and intelligence support to Ergenekon-related organizations, it is difficult to talk about institutional support (see interview with Samil Tayyar, *Referans*, April 25). After the recent string of arrests, the prosecution is said to have finally caught some of the "big fish" (*Radikal*, July 2). The apparently acquiescent and cooperative attitude of military top brass with the police investigation into Ergenekon, moreover, might be taken as an indication that the military is distancing itself from these clandestine activities by expressing support for the investigation.

These recent developments, nonetheless, come against the backdrop of a series of reports run by the liberal-left *Taraf* daily, which revealed a plan prepared by the military in 2007 to mobilize opposition against the current government (*Taraf*, June 20). These developments also revived earlier discussions about some generals' plans to topple the AKP government in 2004. The "coup diaries" uncovered by the newsweekly *Nokta* in March 2007 could not be investigated fully at the time. With several people involved in these plots now arrested, the question of whether groups within the military pursued coup



ambitions is back on the agenda. The answer might come years later at the end of a long trial. The prosecutors, however, have yet to submit their indictment for Ergenekon, so that a trial could start. The prosecutors were close to finalizing a 2,500-page indictment last week, but in light of the recent arrests they postponed the indictment again (Turkish Press, July 5). The prosecution's repeated delaying of the indictment and keeping scores of influential figures in jail, coupled with the manner in which the police raids were carried out, led the opposition to accuse the AKP of using Ergenekon to silence opponents and take revenge for the closure case (Deniz Baykal on NTV, July 4).

Prosecutor Zekeriya Oz assumed a Herculean task by deciding to expand the scope of the Ergenekon investigation. In this already politicized case, the prosecution will have to prove that what is on trial is not the neo-nationalist political program opposing the AKP but a group that poses an imminent threat to legal order. Hence, the Ergenekon investigation ironically coalesces with the closure case in an odd way. If the prosecution cannot furnish a strong case, it will be charged with seeking to prosecute advocates of an idea rather than the wrongdoings of a terrorist organization, paralleling the charges that the Constitutional Court closes political parties for harboring ideas without looking into hard evidence.

It may take years before the Turkish courts decide whether Ergenekon is "Turkey's Gladio" or an amateur shadowy organization. In any case, the prosecutor Oz has already put the entire political system into flux. Recent developments have set Turkish politics into a new collision course between the government and opposition, as well as leaving deep divisions within the Turkish media. While the Ergenekon trial is seen as a requirement for further democratization by some, others view it as a campaign to defame the military, deepening divisions already created by the closure case.

Meanwhile, encouraged by the recent developments, a group of deputies signed a motion by socialist deputy Ufuk Uras, calling on parliament to make a thorough investigation of past coups as well as the threat of pending coups. Although deputies from major parties refrained from supporting the motion, it gathered enough votes to be submitted to parliament this week (*Taraf*, July 4; *Turkish Daily News*, July 5). If parliament decides to take on this probe, it may open another chapter in the history of Turkish democracy.

—Saban Kardas

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